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INTRODUCTION

Federal statutes, like the lawmaking enterprise itself, are
seldom models of efficiency. Whether through inevitable laxity1 or
conscious choice, 2 Congress when legislating leaves a fair number of

1.
Procedural complexities and practical constraints impose substantial pressure on
legislators seeking to enact new laws. One recurrent example of inadvertent drafting oversight
involves federal statutes that lack an explicit limitation period within which to initiate legal
action. See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33 (1995) (referring to numerous
specific federal laws that fail to provide a limitations period). While there may be rare instances
in which this decision is conscious and deliberate, see infra note 2, it generally reflects simply
insufficient attention to detail.
2.
Occasionally, the pressure of the legislative process may give rise to deliberate
ambiguities around which a pro-enactment majority can form. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994) (concluding, based on review of legislative history, that
supporters of 1991 Civil Rights Act "agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act
would apply to preenactment conduct"); see generally Miriam R. Jorgensen & Kenneth A.
Shepsle, A Comment on the Positive Canons Project, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 44-45
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gaps in the meaning of its complex regulatory schemes. In filling
those gaps with case-specific interpretive responses, federal courts
perform an important policymaking function.3
Such policymaking has lately generated increased concerns
about the politicization of the judiciary. 4 Scholars using social science
techniques have contributed to the image of courts as policymakers, by
establishing that judges' political party affiliation and ideological
orientation are at times significant predictors of voting behavior. 5
Presidents and senators have implicitly endorsed this image through
their sharp-edged insistence on scrutinizing candidates and nominees
for ideological compatibility. 6
Even some judges, by candidly
discussing the role of personal beliefs and value judgments in their
decisionmaking matrix, acknowledge a policy-oriented dimension to
their interpretation of statutes, albeit as a junior partner in the
lawmaking enterprise. 7
This acknowledgement of political influence is difficult to
reconcile with the prevailing conception that our courts derive their
legitimacy in large part from objective and transparent methods of
judicial decisionmaking.8
The tension between judges as value(Winter 1994). Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation,115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2155 (2002).
3.
Congress also invites this gap-filling from executive branch agencies. Edward Rubin,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2,
at 5 (Nov. 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2/.
4.
Plausible legal contentions tendered in a courtroom often reflect the ideological
preferences of diverse interest groups. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001) (adjudicating tobacco industry's right to engage in certain forms of cigarette advertising);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (adjudicating extent of
government's ability to regulate internet access); See John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics,
PoliticizingLaw, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 64-65 (Summer 2002).
5.
See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 111-17 (1999)
(discussing empirical scholarship that links presidential expectations to Supreme Court Justices'
performance); James J. Brudney, RecalibratingFederalJudicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
149, 162 & n.43 (2003) (summarizing recent studies that demonstrate association between
political affiliation and judicial behavior in U.S. courts of appeal).
6.
Brudney, supra note 5, at 153-56; Lisa Holmes & Elisa Savchak, JudicialAppointment
Politics in the 107th Congress, 86 JUDICATURE 232 (2003); see also Nancy Scherer, The Judicial
Confirmation Process: Mobilizing Elites, Mobilizing Masses, 86 JUDICATURE 240 (2003)
(discussing role of ideological interest groups in federal judicial selection process).
7.
For examples of judges acknowledging that policy influences decisionmaking, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 123-26 (1995); Stephen Reinhardt, Dialogue: Good
Judging, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 299, 301-02 (1999); Mary M. Schroeder, Compassion on Appeal, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 49 (1990). See generally Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 34-35 (2002).
8.
Notwithstanding a diverse chorus of dissenters, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-159, 339-419, 422-501 (1995) (discussing perspectives from legal
realism, critical legal theory, and law and economics), the traditional lawyerly account of judicial
decisionmaking envisions a reasoned, ideologically neutral elaboration of text and its
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promoting policymakers and judges as principled, impartial actors
implicates a core aspiration of our legal culture: that judicial
techniques of reasoning are or ought to be both reasonably predictable
and outcome-neutral. This Article explores a central aspect of that
aspiration by examining the Supreme Court's expressed reliance in
recent decades on one assertedly neutral reasoning technique-the
canons of construction-in one area of substantive doctrine, the law of
the workplace.
Our approach is both empirical and doctrinal. We rely on
bivariate and regression analyses to illuminate how the canons have
been used in our dataset of more than 600 cases--over periods of time,
across different subject matter categories, by individual Justices, and
in closely contested decisions. We then analyze selected individual
opinions in some detail to assess several competing theoretical
accounts of how the canons operate. Through this combination of
methods, we evaluate the role that the canons have played in
justifying the Supreme Court's workplace jurisprudence.
Our focus on canons of construction is especially timely given
that their use is experiencing a renaissance among judges and legal
scholars.9 Judges, especially textualist-oriented judges, praise the
canons for their relative clarity and commonsense virtues. 10 Public
choice scholars claim that the canons substitute for lack of judicial
expertise and minimize error costs.1 1 Legal process theorists defend
the canons as "off-the-rack" interpretive rules that guide judicial
discretion and render statutory meaning more predictable. 12 On the
other hand, more pessimistic accounts suggest that the canons are
being used strategically, to justify judicial policy preferences or to
accompanying precedents. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
634-35 (1995); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737-38
(1987). Judges themselves have tended to embrace this account. They recognize the role of
discretion in deciding particular cases, especially at the appellate level, but insist that such
discretion can be appropriately channeled through a more or less coherent reliance on statutory
language, prior judicial decisions, and logical reasoning. See, e.g., FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL:
COURTS, LAWYERING & JUDGING 258-62 (1994); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of
the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965, 987-88 (1993), Harry T. Edwards, The Role of the Judge in
Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 385, 388-95 (1983); Ferejohn, supra note 4, at 65.
9.

See John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons' Revival, 5 THE GREEN BAG 2D

283, 289-95 (2002).
10.

ANTONIN SCALLA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25-27

(1997).
11. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Construction and Judicial
Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 658-68 (1992).
12. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 67 (1994); David L. Shapiro, Continuity
and Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943 (1992).
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frustrate clear legislative intent. 13
We consider each of these
assertions about methodological utility, as well as the underlying
issues of whether and to what extent reliance on the canons correlates
with ideological positions embodied in the Court's opinions.
Our database consists of every decision addressing workplace
law matters since the start of the Burger Court era: 632 cases with
written opinions from 1969 to 2003.14 For each case, we classified
outcomes as liberal (basically pro-employee or union) or conservative
(basically pro-employer) 15 and identified the substantive statutory or
constitutional provisions being interpreted and applied.
Most
importantly, in order to assess judicial reasoning techniques we coded
the textual and contextual resources on which authoring Justices
expressly relied in their majority or dissenting opinions. Majority
opinions depend upon the canons of construction as part of their
reasoning in some 160 instances, more than one-fourth of all decisions.
Our results include some elements that might be readily
anticipated and others that are unexpected. Not surprisingly, the
Court's reliance on both language canons and substantive canons 16 in
its majority opinions has virtually doubled from the Burger to the
Rehnquist eras, even as the Court's reliance on legislative history has
steadily declined. Yet, dependence on the canons has not been
uniform across all substantive areas of workplace law: for instance,
language canon reliance has been especially frequent in opinions
implementing minimum standards statutes and the employee benefits
provisions of ERISA. 17
Reliance on the canons also has varied
considerably among Justices. For example, the heaviest users of
language canons in majority opinions include both textualists such as
Justices Scalia and Thomas and pragmatists such as Justices Stevens
and Blackmun. The latter pair, however, often combine invocation of
canons with reliance on legislative history or statutory purpose,
something that is rare among textualists.

13. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Modern
Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of PracticalReason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45
VAND. L. REV. 579 (1992).

14. See infra Part II. for discussion of how we constructed the database.
15. See infra Part II. for discussion of our classification approach, including identification of
the small number of cases with no ideological direction.
16. Language canons address grammar rules and the arrangement of words or phrases
within a statute, in an effort to clarify the ordinary or common meaning of legislatively chosen
text. Substantive canons reflect judicially perceived policy priorities related to the common law,
statutes at some general level, or the Constitution. See Part I.B. infra for further explanation of
the distinction between these two categories of canons.
17. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
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Beyond their intrinsic interest, our findings shed light on
certain claims made by legal scholars praising or doubting the canons'
role as neutral and predictable interpretive norms. There is some
support for public choice proponents' assertions that decisions
interpreting complex and technical statutes, or resolving interpretive
questions of a less ideologically charged nature, are more likely to
involve language canon reliance.
After analyzing several such
decisions, however, we suggest that this reliance is best explained by
reference to characteristics of the statutory provisions under review
rather than to the Justices' desire to avoid error or embarrassment.
Of greater import are our conclusions with respect to
pessimistic claims that the Justices use canons to reinforce ideological
predispositions, often at the expense of discoverable legislative
purposes.
Our findings indicate that canon usage by Justices
identified as liberals tends to be linked to liberal outcomes, and canon
reliance by conservative Justices to be associated with conservative
outcomes. We also found that canons are often invoked to justify
conservative results in close cases-those decided by a one-vote or
two-vote margin. Indeed, closely divided cases in which the majority
relies on substantive canons are more likely to reach conservative
results than close cases where those canons are not invoked.
In addition, we identified a subset of cases in which the
majority relies on canons while the dissent invokes legislative history:
these cases, almost all decided since 1988, have yielded
overwhelmingly conservative results.
Doctrinal analysis of
illustrative decisions indicates that conservative members of the
Rehnquist Court are using the canons in such contested cases to
ignore-and thereby undermine-the demonstrable
legislative
preferences of Congress. Taken together, the association between
canon reliance and outcomes among both conservative and liberal
Justices, the distinctly conservative influence associated with
substantive canon reliance in close cases, and the recent tensions in
contested cases between conservative majority opinions that rely on
canons and liberal dissents that invoke legislative history, suggest
that the canons are regularly used in an instrumental if not
ideologically conscious manner.
Finally, we discovered little evidence to support legal process
scholars' claims that the canons serve as consistent or predictable
guides to statutory meaning. Our dataset includes a number of
decisions in which both majority and dissent rely on canons, and we
found that majority reliance on language canons is likely to be
accompanied by dissent invocation of language canons, and majority
use of substantive canons is similarly linked to dissent dependence on
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substantive canons. Such results suggest that the Justices themselves
are inclined to disagree about the clarity or predictability of canonbased reasoning. Doctrinal consideration of some of these "dueling
canon" cases illustrates the malleability of both language and
substantive canons, and demonstrates how reliance on the canons
does not seriously limit judicial discretion. Overall, our findings and
analyses offer some sobering lessons regarding formalist claims that
the canons can promote either impartiality or consistency in judicial
reasoning.
Part I of the Article briefly describes the canons' role as an
interpretive resource for courts, including the basic distinction
between language and substantive canons. Part I also discusses
scholars' current theoretical claims on behalf of the canons and
identifies three such claims that we will attempt to evaluate using our
database. Part II relates the methods we used to assemble and
analyze our database, including how we assessed judicial outcomes
and how we coded different types of judicial reasoning. Part III
presents our findings, using tables that reflect aggregate data as well
as some description of individual approaches by different Justices.
Part IV pursues key aspects of our findings in doctrinal terms by
analyzing certain illustrative decisions, and also situates our results
in a broader context.
I. THE CANONS AS A FORM OF JUDICIAL REASONING
The phrase "canons of construction" is understood to
encompass a set of background norms and conventions that are used
by courts when interpreting statutes.' 8 While the Supreme Court
recently referred to them as "simply rules of thumb which will
sometimes help courts determine the meaning of legislation,"19 the
reality of their use is more complicated. Federal judges regularly
exercise broad discretion in deciding when the canons should apply,
which ones to invoke in a particular setting, and how to reconcile them
with other contextual resources such as specific legislative history,
general statutory policy or purpose, and deference to agency
determinations.

18.

See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY

STATE 147 (1990); Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 12, at 65-67. Such background norms and
conventions may also be applied to interpret common law sources or constitutions, but our
primary focus here is on their use as part of statutory construction.
19. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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A. Descriptive and Normative Controversy
Canons or maxims of interpretation have an impressive
pedigree. They were used as interpretive aids in a number of ancient
legal and religious settings, 20 and Anglo-American judges have relied
on them for at least 400 years. 2 1 Despite their durability, however,
the canons have been controversial in the modern American context.
Professor Karl Llewellyn's classic critique, which listed a
counter-canon for each of twenty-eight canons, highlighted what he
viewed as the canons' radical indeterminacy. 22 More generally, legal
realists assailed the canons as insincere if not deceptive, because their
mechanistic and acontextual approach ignored the presence of an
"assumed purpose" 23 that inevitably informs a judge's interpretive
enterprise. 24
Contemporary scholars have echoed this refrain,
observing that canons "presume . . . that a statute is primarily a
linguistic artifact" when in fact statutory content and direction are
25
distinctly purposive and value-laden.
Since 1990, many legal academics have sought to rehabilitate
the role that canons play in statutory interpretation. Starting from
the premise that courts continue to say they rely on canons
notwithstanding decades of withering scholarly reviews, Professor
Cass Sunstein maintains that the canons serve a valuable practical
function. 26
Understanding congressional text inevitably involves
accepting certain background principles, both about "how words
should ordinarily be understood [and about] how regulatory statutes
27
should interact with constitutional structure and substantive policy."
20. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmaticsand The Maxims of Interpretation,1990 Wis. L. REV.
1179, 1183-91 (1990) (describing use of interpretative norms and conventions in construing
ancient Hindu texts, in medieval Christian commentary on the Bible, in Talmudic commentary
on the Old Testament, and in interpretations of Roman Law).
21. See Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies,
86 KY. L.J. 527, 542-43 (1998) (discussing use of canons of statutory construction in sixteenth
century English case law).
22. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
23. Id. at 400.
24. See, e.g., Frederick J. De Sloovere, ExtrinsicAids in the Interpretationof Statutes, 88 U.
PA. L. REV. 527, 536-37 (1940); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 87375 (1930); see also Mank, supra note 21, at 544-45 (discussing critiques by realists).
25. Rubin, supra note 13, at 580; see also Louis Fisher, Statutory Construction: Keeping a
Respectful Eye on Congress, 53 SMU L.REV. 49, 49 (2000) (judges often become "so preoccupied
with the minutiae of the canons of statutory construction ... that they lose sight of institutional
interests").
26.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 147-57.

27.

Id. at 150.
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Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey build on this
pragmatic approach, arguing that the canons further rule-of-law
norms. Their accessibility as "off the rack, gap-filling" principles
enhances the clarity of enacted law ex ante for drafters and ex post for
interpreters. 28 Certain canons also should be viewed as ordering
mechanisms or "signaling devices": because policy-related canons
carry presumptive weight with the federal courts, they inform
Congress that it must draft in clear and specific terms in order to
trump the policy-related presumption. 29
In addition to these pragmatic and institutional process
justifications, public choice academics have explained the canons as
serving the judiciary's more strategic self-interest.
Professors
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller suggest that, whether
consciously or not, judges use canons as an expedient when they lack a
policy-based justification for their decision. 30 Assuming arguendo that
judges develop personal policy preferences just as other political actors
do, and that these preferences are an important motivating factor for
judicial decisions, Macey and Miller contend that the canons come into
play primarily in the unusual circumstances when a judge has no
preferred policy position. 31 Such situations tend to arise because the
judge has neither expertise nor strongly held convictions with regard
to the subject matter area or substantive issue being litigated. 32
Macey and Miller maintain that when a case involves complex and
technical areas of the law, where judges generally have less knowledge
and are not as concerned about the policy consequences, courts will
rely more on the canons-as a content-neutral substitute for
specialized expertise and as a means of avoiding errors that could
have substantive law implications. 33
A third and more pessimistic assessment is that the canons are
at times used by judges to frustrate the policy preferences of the
legislature. Professor Stephen Ross contends that certain linguistic
canons regularly invoked by conservative Justices in recent years rest
on the inaccurate presumption that Congress is an omniscient

28. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 66-67.
29. Id. at 68-69; see Shapiro, supra note 12, at 943-45 (discussing canons' role in providing
predictability and fair notice); see also Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Supreme
Court Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation,43 AM. J. POL.
SC. 162 (1999) (discussing Court's willingness to signal Congress in majority opinions through
invitations to reverse its statutory interpretation decisions.).
30. Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 660.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 660-64.
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drafter.3 4 Some policy-related canons favored by the Rehnquist Court
majority also have drawn fire for assuming an unrealistic level of
congressional foresight. 35 In concluding that Congress's omission of a
particular group from a protected list signals the group's exclusion
from coverage, or that Congress's failure to be sufficiently explicit
about state government liability means no such liability may attach,
the Court may be ignoring clearly discoverable legislative purpose.
For Ross and other skeptical scholars, the canons tend to serve as a
policy
fagade, useful to support decisions that reflect judicial
36
preferences notwithstanding a different congressional intent.
Controversy about the canons has not been confined to the
academy. Federal judges also disagree about their value in statutory
Justice Scalia considers the canons-particularly
interpretation.
those related to the grammar and structure of statutes-to be
commonsense rules of inference that serve as important guides to the
meaning of legislative text. 37 The fact that these canons may on
occasion be overridden by contrary indicia of meaning, including other
canons, simply indicates they are persuasive rather than conclusive.
For Scalia, the existence of competing interpretive possibilities does
not tarnish the canons' dual role of making interpretation more
predictable for parties and encouraging Congress to draft laws in a
38
more consistent and precise manner.
Judge Posner, by contrast, is more skeptical about the canons,
especially the language canons. He regards them as generally without
value even when invoked as flexible guidelines or presumptions
because they are premised on "wholly unrealistic conceptions of the
legislative process." 39 Given that Congress is far from omniscient in
34.

Ross, supra note 13, at 572.

35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 907-08 (3d. ed.

2001) (discussing effect of newly emphasized substantive canons in disrupting settled
congressional expectations about how the Court would approach the political process).
36. Ross, supra note 13, at 562; Rubin, supra note 13, at 590; see also Shapiro, supra note
12, at 958-59 (expressing concern about such misuses, which he views as episodic rather than
systemic).
37. SCALIA, supra note 10, at 25-27. Justice Scalia is less sanguine about canons that
create default rules and presumptions of substantive policy, although he expresses support for
some substantive canons as reflecting imbedded understandings about our constitutional
structure. See id. at 28-29 (describing how most substantive canons present "[t]o the honest
textualist... a lot of trouble" but defending canons that protect states' sovereign immunity
against congressional action because they are essentially variants on "normal interpretation").
38. Id. at 27; see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing role of canons in clarifying the ordinary meaning of text); Finley v. United States, 490
U.S. 545, 554 (1989) (applying canon to invite Congress to draft clearly when it wishes to make a
substantive change from settled textual meaning).
39.

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 277 (1985).
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either its linguistic drafting process or its ability to appreciate policy
problems that its legislative product will encounter, judges have no
adequate basis for invoking special rules of inference based on a
presumed level of knowledge or foresight. 40 Posner understands that
judges continue to rely on the canons "to give [their] opinion[s] the
form of logical deduction," but he objects to the way canons disguise
by presenting the
the creative elements of statutory construction
41
interpretive process as essentially mechanical.
One instructive aspect of these often heated debates is that so
many scholars and judges believe the canons perform important
Moreover, despite spirited disagreements
interpretive functions.
about whether the canons serve merely to rationalize results reached
on other grounds, judges continue to refer to them as an integral part
of the ratio decidendi that drives their decisions.
Admittedly, discovering whether judicial reliance expressed in
a written opinion actually determines or even contributes to the
underlying result is no mean feat. For close statutory cases that can
plausibly be justified in either direction, a conscientious judge
generally has available many reasoned arguments, derived from a
range of interpretive resources. At times, individual values or policy
preferences may shape the weight or priority given to each
interpretive resource in arriving at a coherent, principled outcome.42
The subconscious nature of some of these preferences complicates any
attempt to discover the precise role played by the canons, even when
the judge deems them principal as opposed to cameo performers.
We are aware of this difficulty, and we do not attempt to
calibrate the complex mixture of intellectual reasoning and personal
value judgments that contribute to judicial opinions relying at least in
part on the canons. Rather, we wish to identify patterns or trends of
expressed reliance on the canons in the Court's workplace law
opinions, and to consider whether those patterns support or
undermine the leading theorized accounts of how canons operate.

40. Id. at 279-82. Posner does see some merit in certain substantive canons. See id. at 28385 (discussing rule of lenity and canon of constitutional avoidance).
41. Id. at 285-86; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and
Due Process of Statutory Interpretation,45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 688-89, 696-97 (1992) (criticizing
Court's overly mechanical and insufficiently purposive "plain meaning' approach).
42.

See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 349-50, 445-47

(1998); John M. Ferren, General Yamashita and Justice Rutledge, 28 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 54, 70-73
(2003).

12
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B. Language Canons and Substantive Canons
A further dimension of the controversy surrounding the canons
is that these background interpretive guides are far from monolithic.
They operate in distinctive ways and are justified in varied normative
terms. Some canons address the uncertainty inherent in all written
language, while others respond to the tensions that arise between
creation and implementation of legislative directives. Canons have
been identified as techniques for clarifying the ordinary meaning of
text, assuring continuity in the law, respecting constitutional
principles such as federalism and due process, and enhancing the
policies that underlie certain federal statutes. 43 While scholars have
classified the canons' functions and goals in numerous ways, 4 4 we have
chosen to follow the prevailing taxonomy that divides the canons into
45
two basic categories: linguistic and substantive.
Language canons consist of predictive guidelines as to what the
legislature likely meant based on its choice of certain words rather
than others, or its grammatical configuration of those words in a given
sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found in
other parts of the same statute or in similar statutes. 46 These canons
do not purport to convey a judge's own policy preferences, but rather
to give effect to "ordinary" or "common" meaning of the language
enacted by the legislature, which in turn is understood to promote the
actual or constructive intent of the legislature that enacted such
language. 47 The language canons most often invoked by the Justices
in workplace law decisions during this period are the Whole Act Rule
and its various permutations, suggesting that each term or provision

43. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 35, at Appendix B (listing over one
hundred canons derived from Supreme Court opinions in 1986 through 1993 Terms).
44. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 150-56 (grouping the canons into four basic
functional categories: those that clarify statutory meaning, those that illuminate interpretive
instructions from the legislature, those that promote better lawmaking, and those that serve a
judicial, constitutional, or commonsense substantive purpose); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
12, at 66-69 (describing the canons as serving rule-of-law purposes such as clarity and
predictability, and institutional coordination purposes such as distributing certain decisional
power to the courts and signaling judicial preferences for specific policy priorities).
45. For explanations of this dichotomy in some detail and with examples, see Shapiro,
supra note 12, at 927-941; ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 35, at 819-36, 848-54, 873,

889. See also Ross, supra note 13, at 563 (summarizing basic distinction between descriptive
canons, which are guidelines to legislative intent based on particular uses of language, grammar,
or syntax, and normative canons, which advise legislators that ambiguous text will be construed
in favor of certain judicially crafted policy objectives).
46.

ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 35, at 818.

47.

Ross, supra note 13, at 563; Shapiro, supranote 12, at 927.
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should be viewed as part of a consistent and integrated whole, 48 and
the expressio unius maxim, under which the inclusion of one term or
concept in text suggests the exclusion of opposite or alternative terms
and concepts not mentioned. 49 Other frequently used language canons
are the in pari materia guideline, which presumes that similar
statutes should be interpreted similarly and also that Congress uses
the same term consistently in similar statutes, 50 and the ejusdem
generis maxim, under which a general term is understood to reflect
the class or type of objects identified in more specific terms as part of
51
the same sentence or provision.
Substantive canons, unlike their linguistic counterparts, are
generally meant to reflect a judicially preferred policy position. They
are not predicated on what the words of a statute should be presumed
to mean, or what a rational Congress presumptively must have meant
when it chose to use them. Rather, substantive canons reflect
judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts' understanding of
how to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived
constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common law practices, or
specific statutorily based policies. 52 These judicially articulated values
serve as presumptions that can be rebutted by sufficiently weighty
evidence of contrary meaning found in text and sometimes in
legislative history or purpose. Substantive canons may function as
mere tiebreakers, but in recent years they often have been heavier
weights on the interpretive scale, especially when the Supreme Court
has characterized them as "clear statement" rules that can be rebutted
only by express language in statutory text. 53 Substantive canons often
relied on by the Court in the workplace law setting include the need to
avoid
interpretations
that
would jeopardize
a
statute's

48. For examples of the Court's application of forms of the Whole Act Rule, see Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119 (2002); Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471,
482, 487 (1999); American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610-611, 613 (1991).
49. For examples of the Court's application of the expressio unius maxim, see Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438, 452-53 (2002); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 209
n.l (1994); Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93-94 (1981).
50. For examples of the Court's application of in pari materia, see Pollard v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2001); Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 745-46 (1988); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 225-26 & n.8, 233 n.19 (1982).
51. For examples of the Court's application of the ejusdem generis maxim, see Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Union, 493
U.S. 67, 91-92 (1989). See also Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (applying
closely related noscitur a sociis canon).
52. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 35, at 848.
53. See id. at 850-51 (providing a list of Supreme Court decisions that used canons of
construction); see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991)
(distinguishing between clear statement rules and presumptions).
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constitutionality, 54 the clear statement rule against federal abrogation
of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 55 the presumption
against federal preemption or disruption of traditional state
functions, 56 and the presumption against a waiver of the United
57
States' sovereign immunity.
C. Three Theorized Accounts
Given the distinction we embrace between language canons
and substantive canons, 58 we analyze and discuss the two types of
canon separately in Part III. In addition, we follow up on some of our
results in Part IV by assessing the persuasiveness of three distinct
theoretical approaches to describing or justifying the Court's canon
reliance.
First, we address the explanatory model offered for the canons
by public choice scholars Macey and Miller. We explore how majority
authors invoke the language canons to resolve more technical
statutory disputes in relatively nonideological statutory settings. We
also consider whether these aspects of canon reliance are attributable
to the Justices' lack of expertise or ideological investment, or are
better explained by reference to other factors.
Second, we examine the pessimistic assertions by Ross and
Rubin, among others, that the Court uses canons to undermine
54. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 535-36 (2002); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-78 (1988);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979).
55. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73-77 (2000); Will v. Mich. Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46
(1985).
56. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365, 387 (2002); Johnson
v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918, 922 (1997); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 654-55, 661-62 (1995).
57. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 431-32 (1990); Lehman v.
Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1976).
Guidelines or norms favoring deference to agency interpretation of statutes are not classified as
substantive canons; judicial reliance on such norms is coded as "agency deference." See infra
Part II.C.
58. There will, of course, be occasional difficulty in drawing lines at the edges between the
two categories. We follow custom in referring to the Whole Act Rule as a language canon even
though references to overall statutory structure and the need to avoid surplusage at times may
implicate substance. Similarly, we classify the canon that repeals by implication are disfavored
as substantive even though its policy promoting continuity between statutes may not seem
terribly different from the in pari materia language canon's promotion of consistency between
statutes. But cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548-50 (1974) (tying implied repeals to
considerations of judicial respect for congressional intent and purpose). Still, the fundamental
distinction is familiar and serviceable between canons that profess only to clarify the text (and
therefore meaning) approved by Congress, and canons that promote judicially preferred policies.
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discoverable legislative intent. Here, we focus on disagreements
within the Court that reflect tensions between majority reliance on
canons and dissent dependence on legislative history. In cases where
such tension exists, is there a predictable ideological direction? If so,
is this ideological tilt best understood by reference to the use of
particular types of canons, to specific subject matter areas before the
Court, or to the opinion-writing of certain Justices?
Finally, we consider the pragmatic claims made on behalf of
the canons by modern scholars like Sunstein, Eskridge and Frickey,
and Shapiro. In order to understand if the canons in fact function as
"off-the-rack gap-filling rules" to promote interpretive continuity, we
examine the extent to which their use can be deemed consistent and
ideologically neutral. Particularly when both majority and dissenting
opinions invoke the canons, we consider whether the Court's patterns
of reliance enhance clarity and whether they serve as constraints on
arbitrary judicial action.

II. ASSEMBLING AND ANALYZING A DATABASE
A. Identifying and Classifying Workplace Law Cases
Based on a review of Supreme Court decisions since the start of
Chief Justice Burger's tenure in the Fall of 1969, we have identified
632 cases with published opinions that directly address some aspect of
the employment relationship. 59 The cases were compiled initially
through a series of searches in the Westlaw FLB-SCT database keyed
to numerous titles and sections of the U.S. Code. 60 We also have relied
on U.S. Law Week end-of-term summaries and on the annual review of
Supreme Court labor and employment decisions, appearing in The

59. Our dataset includes all cases decided by written opinion (signed or per curiam) from
December 1969 through June 2003, a span of 34 Supreme Court terms. It does not include
opinions written as part of the initial disposition of a certiorari petition. It also does not include
affirmances without opinion by an equally divided vote, as in Bd. of Educ. v. Nat'l Gay Task

Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
60. Brudney began this project in 2000, and he secured initial and updated lists with the
skilled help of Brian Ray and Rebecca Frihart, research assistants and now graduates of The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. A memorandum detailing the search methods used
to generate initial case lists for 1969-1999 is on file with the authors. The search methods
yielded far more than the current number of cases; Brudney's review of Westlaw summaries
allowed him to eliminate cases citing the searched for code sections that did not directly involve
the employment relationship. Selection of relevant cases required exercising only a minimal
amount of discretionary judgment; the great majority of decisions were not "borderline."
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Labor Lawyer since the 1983 term, to supplement and cross-check our
61
electronic search.
Our dataset focuses on controversies that affected employees in
their status as employees. In almost all instances, these disputes
implicated the relationship between employees and employers, unions
and employers, or unions and employees. Occasionally, our cases
feature workplace-related disputes that involved the government or
another third party, as in decisions concerning the immigration effects
or tax consequences of an employment-based event. 62 We have not
included cases that may have employment law implications but do not
themselves arise in the employment context. While some of these
cases may have had a substantial impact on the subsequent direction
of labor and employment law,6 3 we found it more practicable-and less
subjective-to classify based on the presence of a workplace nexus
rather than the anticipated relevance of an education or voting rights
or attorney's fees decision.
The 632 cases we have identified represent a remarkably stable
portion of the Supreme Court's overall decision docket. To be sure, the
number of workplace law decisions has fluctuated considerably
between terms. 64 Still, measured in three year intervals, these
decided cases have constituted roughly one-sixth of the Court's docket
on a consistent basis since the mid 1970s. 65 It is notable that this

61. For cases decided in the past three terms, we have relied primarily on case reviews and
summaries from U.S. Law Week. The annual review that appears in The Labor Lawyer is
compiled and presented by the Secretary to the American Bar Association Section on Labor and
Employment Law, a position occupied by different labor and employment law professors on an
annually rotating basis.
62. See, e.g., INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183 (1991) (holding that
agency regulation requiring release bonds for excludable aliens to contain "condition barring
employment" pending deportability determination is valid exercise of statutory authority);
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001) (holding that salary-based
damages paid to professional baseball players for employer misconduct occurring in previous
years are taxable for the year the damages are actually paid).
63. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (addressing
constitutionality of state-supported affirmative action programs); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424 (1983) (establishing standards for attorney's fee awards under civil rights laws); Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (deciding there is no private right of action to enforce disparate
impact regulations under Title VI of Civil Rights Act).
64. The range is from a high of thirty-three in the 1981 Term to a low of seven in the 1999
Term. See James J. Brudney, The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law: Labor and
Employment Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term, 16 THE LAB. LAW. 151, 152-64
(2000) (providing overview of Court's workplace law docket from 1969-2000).
65. See id. at 152-53, (discussing workplace law ratio from 1969 through 1999 term). In the
past three terms (2000 to 2002), the Court issued 226 signed or per curiam opinions deciding
cases after oral argument.

LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,

DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 82-84 tbl.2-11 (3d ed. 2003); 72 U.S. L.W. 3079 (July 15, 2003)
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workplace law proportion has held steady even though the Court's
overall number of decisions has plunged by over 50 percent since the
early 1980s. 66 Moreover, the level of interest has persisted over nearly
thirty years despite major social and economic developments outside
the workplace, shifting ideological priorities among the Justices, and
substantial changes in Justice Department and interest group
litigation agendas. This impressive stability presumably reflects the
enduring importance of work in our modern culture. It also indicates
the Court's attentiveness to continuing efforts by Congress and the
President to provide a range of legal protections for employees, while
accommodating those redistributive preferences to certain privileges
asserted by employers.
Federal law imposes a kind of structure on the American
workplace through the large number of statutory and constitutional
provisions that create and condition the enforceable rights of workers.
For subject matter purposes, we have classified our 632 cases into
eight main groupings. Seven of these categories cover claims related
to various statutory schemes or provisions: (i) labor-management
68 (iii)
relations statutes;6 7 (ii) race or sex discrimination provisions;
provisions involving other forms of status discrimination, such as age
or disability; 69 (iv) laws creating minimum employment standards or
compensation levels; 70 (v) retirement-related statutes; 7 1 (vi) general

(identifying number of majority opinions for 2002 term). Of these opinions, 42, or 18.6 percent,
addressed workplace law matters.
66. See Brudney, supra note 64, at 152 (contrasting average of 153 decided cases per term
in 1981-83 with average of 86 cases per term in 1996-99, a drop of 67, or 44 percent). The Court's
average for the 2000, 2001, and 2002 terms has been 75 cases, a decrease of 51 percent from the
1981-83 average.
67. This category includes the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, the Railway Labor Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Federal Service Labor Management
Relations Act of 1978, and a smattering of other provisions that gave rise to labor-management
or union-employee conflicts.
68. Such claims arose primarily under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but they also
arose under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and under the Civil War era statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985). Race or sex discrimination cases implicating constitutional provisions (chiefly
Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment) are covered here as well.
69. This category includes the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Civil War era
statutes when invoked to allege discrimination based on factors other than race or sex, and
statutes alleging discrimination against veterans.
70. This category includes the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Mine Safety and
Health Act, as well as many other laws addressing basic terms and conditions of employment
that arose only once or twice as the focus of Court decisions.
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negligence-based provisions that apply mostly to workers in the
railroad or maritime industries; 72 and (vii) miscellaneous employmentrelated provisions. 73 The eighth category consists of decisions that
implicate provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 74 Within each of these
eight workplace law areas, we have done additional coding based on
75
the particular statutory scheme or constitutional provision involved.
B. Coding Opinion Results and Individual Justices in Ideological
Terms
Our effort to evaluate political neutrality or ideological
direction is grounded in our coding of judicial outcomes. For all cases,
we determined whether the Court's legal result favored employees or
employers. In 90 percent of the cases this was a fairly straightforward
process, because the interests of employees or unions as grievants
were pitted against the interests of employers. Further, the employee
or union sought to vindicate a congressionally provided or
constitutionally conferred right, or the employer invoked a statutory
defense or constitutional interest of its own, such that the outcome
was readily classifiable as either pro-employee or pro-union-referred
76
to here as liberal-or pro-employer-referred to as conservative.
71. This category refers primarily to ERISA, but it also includes some cases applying
specialized federal retirement statutes that affect civil service, railroad, coal industry, and
military employees.
72. This grouping includes the Jones Act, the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the
Federal Tort Claims Act, general admiralty law, and state tort law when applicable.
73. This most disparate category encompasses employment-related disputes that arise in
connection with antitrust law, immigration law, criminal law, tax law, social security law, and
various other areas.
74. Many of these cases present issues under the First Amendment or the Equal Protection
or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, although there also are decisions
involving the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments as well as other constitutional
provisions. When a majority opinion involved interpretive reasoning that implicates both
constitutional and federal statutory provisions (such as a First Amendment challenge to a
federal statute regulating employer speech or union picketing), we included it in both subject
matter categories. This occurred in about 9 percent of all cases (fifty-five total). Further, in
about 2 percent of the cases (thirteen total), the Court analyzed two issues in distinct areas of
federal workplace law (for example, the court took certiorari on and resolved both an NLRA and
an ERISA issue); here again, we included the case in both subject matter categories. We did not
double count these "two substantive category" cases in any other respect; they count as a single
case when coding decision results and also when coding the opinions of individual Justices.
75. For example, a case decided in the area of labor-management relations will be further
classified based on whether it involved the NLRA, LMRA, LM-RDA, Norris-LaGuardia Act, etc.
A copy of the Codebook identifying subject matter categories, including specific subcategories for
each of our eight subject matter groupings, is on file with the authors.
76. We apply the terms "liberal" and "conservative" in this workplace and civil rightsrelated area of law and public policy; the terms may have a somewhat different connotation in
other policy areas such as business regulation or international affairs. Employee-employer
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Some 10 percent of the cases (sixty-seven total), however, were
anomalous. These decisions either involved "reverse discrimination"
issues in which a non-minority or a male employee asserted rights to
equal treatment, 77 or they involved disputes between employees and
unions in which individual workers alleged some form of union
misconduct under a federal statute or the Constitution. 78 We coded
the reverse discrimination decisions as liberal if the outcome favored
the class or group that was the primary intended beneficiary of the
statutory or constitutional provision. 79 For the disputes between
individual employees and unions, we coded some cases based on
ideological outcome but more often we were unable to identify the
Court's decision as liberal or conservative given the nature of the
80
conflicting interests.
Besides coding judicial outcomes, we also identified each of the
nineteen Justices who served during this period as either liberal or

conflicts typically involved disputes over employee claims for reinstatement or compensation
under Title VII, the ADEA, other employee protection statutes, or even the Fourteenth
Amendment. Union-employer conflicts regularly involved contests over union attempts to
engage in organizing or collective bargaining under the NLRA, the RLA, or related statutes.
Employers on occasion asserted their own rights, either as defenses to liability or as claims for
compensation. See, e.g., Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health of Mo.,
411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (employer asserts successful sovereign immunity defense); Eastern
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 536-37 (1998) (employer asserts successful claim under Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause). In a very small number of cases, the Court's decision was
sufficiently divided in outcome between employees and employers that we did not code the
majority opinion as either liberal or conservative.
77. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). There are nine such cases.
78. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67 (1973); United Steelworkers of America v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982); Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527
(1989). There are fifty-eight such cases.
79. Thus, the Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Johnson, 480 U.S. 616, outcomes are coded
liberal because the Court ruled in favor of the interests of racial minorities and women, even
though the individual white male employees in each case ended up as losing parties.
80. When individual rights were aligned with traditional civil rights-related concepts (such
as individual employees alleging race or sex discrimination against the union or asserting a right
to intervene in a lawsuit or to be certified as a class), we coded results as liberal (pro-employee)
and conservative (pro-union). But when individual employee rights directly impinged on the
rights of a union majority that had taken a democratically supported position (such as
disciplining an individual for crossing a picket line in violation of the union constitution, or
seeking to collect agency fees from bargaining unit members to support union-approved lobbying
or organizing efforts), we concluded that the result did not line up in traditional liberalconservative terms. Finally, there were a handful of cases in which the direct policy implications
seemed to us too close to call (for example, is it "conservative" to prohibit punitive damages
against a union? Is it "conservative" to allow a newly elected union president to discharge
appointed business agents who opposed him in the election?). In the end, we omitted 37 of the 58
union-employee conflict decisions from our ideological results coding. When combined with the
small number of decisions that were truly divided in outcome, see supra note 76, there are 48 out
of 632 total decisions that are not coded for results in ideological terms.
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conservative.8 1 In making these determinations, we relied on voting
scores derived from a data base compiled by Professor Harold Spaeth,
whose work analyzing Supreme Court voting behavior is well
recognized.8 2 Several of Spaeth's designated policy areas, combined
together, provide a distinctively formulated yet comparable subject
matter category to our workplace law dataset.8 3 Based on voting
scores for those policy areas, we identify eight Justices as
conservatives and eleven as liberal.8 4 There is a close correlation
81. The nineteen Justices include five who served only on the Burger Court (Justices
Burger, Black, Harlan, Douglas, and Stewart), six who served only on the Rehnquist Court
(Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer), and eight whose tenure spans
both eras (Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, and
Rehnquist).
82. See Computer file: Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database,
1953-2001 Terms (2001) (on file with producer, Mich. St. Univ. Dep't of Political Science);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
256-60 (1993).
83. We needed to obtain ideology scores for the Justices individually, and the Court as a
whole, that were not endogenous to our dataset but that still captured the potential ideological
differences between workplace law decisions and the aggregate of cases. We employ an ideology
score derived from each Justice's votes through the 1999-2000 term (including votes prior to
1969) on a subgroup of issues in the Spaeth database. The issues include all civil rights issues
(Issue variable codes in 200s and 300s), all union-related issues (Issue variable codes 553 to 599),
and selected economic issues (Issue variable codes 601, 605, 611, 621, 631, and 636). The civil
rights issues are modestly overinclusive in that they contain cases dealing with voting rights,
education, and general poverty law as well as employment. The combined issue codes are also
mildly underinclusive in that certain other issue codes represent policy areas (for example, First
Amendment, due process, Federalism) that contain some employment-related subjects. Still, the
Spaeth combination of issue codes has substantial overlap with our employment-based dataset,
and in screening out a number of potentially distorting or conflating policy areas (such as
criminal law, judicial power, natural resources), it provides a useful independent baseline for the
ideological orientations of the Justices.
In recent years, political scientists have been experimenting with alternative ways of
operationalizing judicial ideology. For examples of dynamic measures of the Justices' changing
votes over time, using more sophisticated statistical methods, see Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing
Presidents, Senators, and Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 477 (2001). These measures, however, are derived through the original Spaeth dataset,
relying on vote scores that are still used regularly in the political science field. For our purposes,
the newer measures are less than ideal, given their complicated methods and the fact that they
are oriented toward the universe of all cases rather than a discrete subset of decisions. We do
take account of the changing nature of workplace law subject matter over time, as well as
changes in the approaches taken by individual Justices.
See, e.g., infra tbls.III-VI and
accompanying discussion.
84. Justices are coded as liberal or conservative by using simple directional analyses keyed
to the proportion of liberal votes. The eight conservatives (Justices Harlan, Burger, Powell,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Rehnquist) voted for individuals (against employer,
business, or government-related positions) less than 50 percent of the time; the other eleven
Justices cast pro-individual employee votes in more than 50 percent of the cases. When relying
on judicial classifications in our analyses, we focus primarily on five Rehnquist Court
conservatives and eight long-serving liberals, with the six other Justices grouped in a reference

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

between voting behavior in our dataset and in the larger Spaeth
collection of civil rights-unions-economic issues, although some
85
differences exist between the two.
With respect to ideological outcomes in our workplace law
dataset, we found that the decisions over this thirty-four year period
are quite evenly divided. Of the 584 cases for which we coded such
outcomes,8 6 301 (51.5 percent) were liberal decisions while 283 (48.5
percent) were conservative. Although employees and unions fared

category. We also conduct similar analyses distinguishing conservative and liberal Justices
simply based on the intensity of their Spaeth vote scores, grouping moderate-voting Justices (4555 percent for employees) as our reference category. See infra tbls.X,XII and notes 197-198, 214.
85. The voting scores listed below reflect the percentage of cases in which a Justice cast
votes favoring the legal position of individuals, employees, or unions; a score above 50 percent is
characterized as liberal. We present vote scores based on the Spaeth issue codes, see supra note
83, side-by-side with scores based on our own dataset; we include in parenthesis the number of
ideologically identified votes cast by each Justice.

Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Blackmun
White
Marshall
Brennan
Powell
Burger
Stewart
Douglas
Black
Harlan

Spaeth Issue Codes

Brudney & Ditslear

32.6% (1028)
61.9% (849)
46.1% (581)
30.2% (358)
38.4% (319)
64.1% (227)
28.0% (194)
65.8% (137)
73.4% (120)
63.6% (965)
59.8% (1251)
81.1% (991)
78.1% (1315)
45.1% (707)
41.1% (754)
54.3% (906)
81.2% (760)
74.0% (573)
49.8% (543)

37.5%
64.5%
46.0%
40.9%
47.2%
60.0%
41.2%
62.0%
63.2%
62.7%
52.2%
77.3%
76.2%
40.7%
37.3%
45.8%
80.8%
71.4%
47.6%

(557)
(488)
(376)
(264)
(216)
(170)
(148)
(129)
(114)
(450)
(454)
(423)
(408)
(307)
(319)
(201)
(78)
(21)
(21)

For thirteen of the nineteen Justices, there is less than a 5 percent difference between our
voting scores and Spaeth's scores. For three Justices (Kennedy, White, Stewart) the difference is
between 5 percent and 10 percent, and for three Justices (Scalia, Thomas, Breyer) it is between
10 percent and 15 percent. Only one of the nineteen Justices has a differential that changes his
characterization: Justice Stewart's Spaeth "label" (liberal) is at odds with his voting record in our
dataset.
86. See supra note 80.
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slightly better before the Burger Court than they have before the
87
Rehnquist Court, the difference is not significant.
Several factors may contribute to this finding of broad-based
ideological neutrality, which is somewhat at odds with the Court's
conservative reputation in recent decades. First, given the higher
likelihood that disputes will be litigated (as opposed to settled) in close
cases, parties' win rates as a general matter may tend to be
comparable over an extended period.8 8
The prospects for such
comparability are likely enhanced when the parties can present
plausible legal contentions before an appellate court that exercises
purely discretionary jurisdiction. 89
Second, using individual case outcomes to report the Court's
ideology does not account for the ambition or aspirations that underlie
the cases being brought. Conservative Justices can appear more
liberal if they accept and then resolve disputes in which pro-employee
votes were relatively easy to cast. 90 In the labor relations and
employment discrimination areas, the business community doubtless
plays a larger role in presenting the Justices with "hard cases" than it
did in the Warren Court years, or even the early Burger Court era.
Conversely, the civil rights community's role during the Rehnquist era
has been distinctly more subdued in this regard. Assuming, as is
likely, that employers in recent decades have pushed the envelope of

87. In the Burger era, 53.9 percent of decisions were liberal while in the Rehnquist era it
has been 48.7 percent; the difference is not statistically significant. The use of "significant"
refers to results that are statistically significant using either the t-test or the z-test as
appropriate based on the sample size. A t-test compares the mean of two samples or sets of data,
controlling for the sample size, to determine whether the difference between the statistics could
be due to chance. A result that is significant at the .05 level (t < .05) has no more than a 5
percent chance of occurring purely as coincidence. R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 178-89 (1995). All statistical analyses in this Article are run using Stata Version 7.
For further discussion of our use of t-tests and z-tests, see infra note 113.
88. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning
from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 218-19 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 190-91 (1987).
89. As a rough analogy, the Harvard Law Review reported that for the 1991 through 2001
terms, the Court decided a total of sixty-seven state criminal law cases, thirty-five won by the
state government and thirty-two by the criminal defendant. These results are presented in
Table III (Subject Matter of Dispositions with Full Opinions), found in the very back of issue one
(the annual Supreme Court review issue) of volumes 106 through 116.
90. See Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Changes in the Rehnquist Court, 23 AM. POL. Q.
373 (1995) (concluding that the early Rehnquist Court's record of outcomes in civil liberties cases
overstated support for civil liberties because the Court in this period increasingly accepted cases
in which pro-civil liberties votes were relatively easy to cast). See generally Gregory A. Caldeira
& John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988) (finding that Justices are significantly more likely to grant review
when interest groups file amicus curiae briefs supporting certiorari).
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what they view as a sympathetic Court, their win-loss rate is in part
attributable to their having pursued a more ambitious agenda.
Finally, our aggregate outcome data do not measure the
magnitude of Supreme Court decisions. For instance, by weighing a
union loss in a major case the same as a union win in a minor case,
our "box score" cannot assess the impact in policy terms of wins and
losses over time. 91 One way to recognize the ambition and magnitude
factors referred to here is by focusing on decisions in closer cases, as
opposed to unanimous or near-unanimous decisions. We present some
results under this approach in Part III below.
C. Coding InterpretiveReasoning in the Justices'Opinions
In order to examine the rationales for each written opinion in
our dataset, we identified ten distinct interpretive resources on which
the Court relied with some frequency. 92 These are as follows: (1) the

91. Compare, e.g., Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (major conservative
outcome, restricting nonemployees' access to employer premises during organizing drive), with,
e.g., Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (minor liberal outcome, reaffirming
settled law regarding proper time during contract negotiation when employer may express good
faith doubt as to union's continued majority status).
92. Brudney used four law student research assistants (RAs) over an eighteen-month period
to code judicial reasoning in the first 622 cases. He worked with a fifth RA to code the 10 cases
decided in the 2002 Term. To minimize the risk of subjective or inconsistent results, he gave
each RA a memorandum on coding categories and judgments. He also assigned cases by term,
with terms spaced at sufficient intervals so that the four principal RAs (each of whom reviewed
between 114 and 198 cases) coded a sizeable number of cases decided in the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s. This reduced the possibility that any individual coder would encounter a greater
concentration of one form of reasoning that may have dominated a particular Justice's approach,
or the Court's overall thinking, during a given period. For each case, an RA filled in a detailed
coding sheet. Brudney then analyzed each case separately, and reviewed all coding sheets,
proposing occasional revisions that were discussed with the RA on a case-by-case basis at weekly
meetings. While Brudney made the final determinations, consensus was reached in virtually all
instances. Copies of the memorandum on coding interpretive reasoning as well as the coding
sheet are on file with the authors. The substance of the memorandum is incorporated into the
Codebook, see supra note 75, also on file with the authors.
In order to check for intercoder reliability, we conducted Tau-B tests to compare the decisions
made by each principal coder against the other three for all ten judicial reasoning variables. See
J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical
Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159 (1977). The Tau-B test evaluates whether there is a statistically
significant difference in the mean score assigned by each coder against the other coders. The
results indicate that with one minor exception, there are no significantly different codings on any
variable. The exception involves the Supreme Court precedent variable (not a focus of this
Article), which one of the coders was slightly less likely than the other three coders to count as
either affirmatively probative or a determining factor.
Notwithstanding the safeguards taken, classification of judicial reasoning inevitably involves
the exercise of discretionary judgment.
We believe that our standardized approach and
readiness to resolve all disagreements between coders on a case-by-case basis has made the
coding process as objective as possible. While we have little doubt that another set of readers
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meaning of the textual language, including related appeals to plain or
ordinary meaning; (2) dictionaries; (3) language canons; (4) legislative
history (including specific references to committee reports, floor
debates, hearings, and the Framers' history for constitutional
provisions); (5) legislative purpose (including general references to
what Congress meant to accomplish, or the mischief aimed at, and
policy justifications imputed generally to a statute or constitutional
provision); (6) legislative inaction (including congressional silence
after intervening Court decisions and also traditional appeals to "dogs
that don't bark"); (7) Supreme Court precedent; (8) common law
precedent (including the background status of common law at time of
enactment and specifically applicable common law principles); (9)
93
substantive canons; and (10) agency deference.
When reviewing each majority opinion, we identified the
interpretive resources being invoked and then determined whether a
resource was (i) merely referenced without being relied upon,
including resources mentioned as part of preliminary or background
discussion and also resources distinguished as substantively
unhelpful; (ii) relied upon as affirmatively probative to help the
majority reach its result; or (iii) relied upon as "a" or "the"
determining factor in the majority's reasoning process. 94 Virtually
every opinion for the Court has at least two resources identified as
either probative or determining, and the vast majority have three or

might apply our ten categories slightly differently in individual instances, we also believe that
any such deviations would be minor and randomly distributed.
93. We omitted some items that were referred to only infrequently, such as law review
articles, treatises, and amicus curiae briefs. Our classification scheme includes both similarities
to and differences from approaches taken by other scholars. For examples of other approaches,
see Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Interpretation:Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1998); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on JudicialReasoning: Statutory Interpretation
in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N. MEX. L. REV. 325 (2001).
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in attempting to analyze judicial reasoning from
an empirical perspective. In addition to the articles by Professors Schachter and Schneider, see
generally Lee Epstein et al., Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretationand Notes
for a Project on the Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 305 (2003); Robert M.
Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An OriginalLook at Originalism, 36 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 113 (2002);
Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 1409 (2000); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning; 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1434-50, 1493-98 (1998). Our
approach, identifying ten different interpretive resources, coding expressed reliance (rather than
mere reference) for each of those ten resources, and linking that reliance to ideological outcomes,
is especially ambitious.
94. We coded each resource as a 1, 2, or 3 based on degree of reliance; any resource not
referred to at all in the analysis sections of an opinion was coded zero.
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more resources so identified. 95 For purposes of this Article, we focus
on resources that are either probative or determinative: in both
instances the resource contributes in a meaningful way to the majority
96
justification for its holding.
We found that the most important, and at times difficult,
distinction to make regarding degree of probative value was between
reference and reliance. Majority opinions often invoke resources such
as legislative purpose, canons, or agency deference when using these
resources in essence as foils or strawmen, because the majority is
dismissing the value ascribed to them by a lower court, or by a party's
brief, or by a dissenting Justice. Although these resources are in one
sense being discussed as appropriate reasoning assets, the opinion
author has not relied on them as positive support for the argument
that leads to the Court's holding. We concluded that focusing on an
interpretive resource's integral role in the majority's affirmative
reasoning process would allow us to cast the sharpest light on the
Court's principled justification for its decision. Moreover, in order to
examine the relationship between principled justifications for the
Court's decisions and the ideological direction of those decisions, we
needed to focus on resources that advanced the direction chosen by the
97
majority.
Two examples may be helpful at this point. In Christensen v.
Harris County,98 Justice Thomas's majority opinion relied on the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act text and on two language
canons (expressio unius and the Whole Act Rule) to hold that an
employer's restrictive compensatory time policy was lawful under the
95. Majority opinions relying on only one resource comprise fewer than 5 percent of the
dataset; majority opinions relying on two resources comprise another 8 percent of the decisions.
Many of these "low resource" opinions were unsigned: seventeen of the twenty-two per curiam
majority opinions in our dataset relied on no more than two resources.
96. Under our coding scheme, there is considerable variation in the architecture of majority
opinion reasoning. Many opinions contain multiple 2s but no 3s, many others have one 3 and
several 2s, and some majority opinions are coded with two 3s; the latter generally occurs when
the Court must resolve two distinct subissues to reach its conclusion.
97. Ours is certainly not the only plausible methodological approach to coding judicial
reasoning. Professor Schacter, analyzing decisions from a recent Supreme Court Term,
distinguished between opinions that made substantive use of an interpretive resource-even if
the opinion author derived no guidance from the resource she considered-and an author's mere
citation of the resource when setting forth the procedural history of the case. Schacter, supra
note 93, at 12-13. Schacter, however, was not coding judicial outcomes, and her substantiveprocedural dichotomy does not distinguish between substantive uses of a resource that the
opinion's author supports and substantive uses the author rejects as unpersuasive, inconclusive,
or even incorrect. Because we seek to examine the relationship between judicial reasoning and
judicial outcomes, we have focused on interpretive resources used to advance the outcome
endorsed by the opinion author.
98. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:1

FLSA.9 9 Justice Thomas also considered the contention of petitioner
employees and amicus United States that the Court should defer to a
Labor Department opinion letter expressly prohibiting what the
employer was doing, but he concluded that deference was not
warranted. 10 0 We coded language meaning and language canons as
probative elements of the majority's reasoning, but agency deference
as a nonprobative reference.
Similarly, in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,10 1 Justice Stevens's
majority opinion relied on the meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act text, Supreme Court precedent, and legislative
inaction to conclude that a mandatory arbitration agreement
prohibiting an employee from seeking judicial remedies did not bar
10 2
the EEOC from seeking the same victim-specific relief in court.
Justice Stevens considered arguments made by the lower court (and
by Justice Thomas in dissent) that the purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act and the substantive canon favoring arbitration
required a different result, but he found those arguments inapplicable
or unpersuasive. 10 3 We identified language meaning, Supreme Court
precedent, and legislative inaction as probative, while coding
legislative purpose and substantive canons as merely referenced.
The coding distinctions we applied to 632 majority opinions
also were used to identify the nature and extent of judicial reliance in
377 principal dissenting opinions that included an elaboration of
reasons. 10 4 For opinions dissenting from a liberal majority, the
outcome was, of course, identified as conservative.
D. Caveats Regarding the Dataset
Before proceeding to report on our results, it is worth noting
certain limitations of our empirical approach. First, we address only a
subset of the Supreme Court's overall decision docket in recent times.

99. Id. at 582-85.
100. Id. at 586-89.
101. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
102. Id. at 286-98.
103. Id. at 293-96.
104. Of the 632 decisions, 252 were unanimous and three involved simply a statement of
dissent. We did not code such dissenting statements. For the 377 decisions featuring one or
more dissenting opinions, we focus here on the primary or principal dissent. See infra note 123
(describing method for identifying that dissent). We also coded concurring opinions that included
an elaboration of reasons, but we do not discuss concurrences in this article. Opinions that both
concurred and dissented were identified in that way, but are classified here as dissents and
coded only for their dissenting rationales. Sixty-four of these partial dissents combined with 313
"pure" dissents produce the number in text.
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Despite its stability, workplace law disputes constitute just one-sixth
of the volume of Court cases. This area of public policy does involve
well-defined competing interests, making it relatively easy to code
outcomes on an employee versus employer scale. In addition, because
Congress's broad legislative goals in the workplace law area have been
essentially unidirectional (to augment employee protections and
thereby improve terms and conditions of employment), it may be
easier to analyze whether particular interpretive resources are
associated with liberal (or conservative) outcomes than it would be for
some other subject matter areas. 10 5 Still, it is quite possible that an
effort to assess the role of the canons in a different substantive area of
10 6
Supreme Court case law would tell a different story.
Next, our dataset covers one discrete period in the long history
of the Court. The methodology for interpreting statutes is in part
dynamic, insofar as it reflects an ongoing, if inchoate, conversation
between the judiciary and the two more political branches.10 7 The
Court's approach to its interpretive process may therefore be affected
over time by external factors such as new appointments and the
changing political composition of congressional majorities, and by
internal adjustments in the Justices' expectations regarding the
105. The fact that Congress's goals have been essentially to promote employee rights and
protections in the workplace does not mean they have been exclusively so. Provisions in the
Taft-Hartley and Landrum Griffin Acts restricting employee rights to picket and union rights to
impede commerce reflect legislative intent that was primarily conservative rather than liberal as
we are using those terms. And complex regulatory statutes like ERISA reflect legislative
compromises accommodating employer as well as employee interests. Nonetheless, statutes
reviewed in this dataset have overwhelmingly sided with employees in resolving the recurring
polarized conflict between employee and employer interests. By contrast, securities law can
involve more complex tensions among different types of market participants (banks, accounting
firms, investment companies, mutual funds, individual investors), and Congress has been less
predictable in its policy orientation regarding the securities laws it has enacted. See Margaret V.
Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial
Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 784-91 (1997) (discussing proregulation nature of 1933
Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act); Michael A. Perrino, Fraud and Federalism:
Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 280-98 (1998)
(discussing antiregulation nature of 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); David M.
Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The SecuritiesLitigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun
Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 3-4, 51-53 (1998) (discussing antiregulation
nature of 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act).
106. As noted below, the conservative tilt of substantive canon reliance is due in part to the
recurring role of canons protecting the immunity of federal and state governments. By contrast,
in the criminal law area, one might expect reliance on the rule of lenity to contribute to a more
liberal set of outcomes associated with the substantive canons.
107. See e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHIC. L. REV.
149 (2001) (arguing that interpretive change is due primarily to endogenous shifts in the
expectations of legislators and judges, the two key sets of actors in our interpretive system);
Ross, supra note 13, at 562 (discussing recurrent interpretive periods characterized by
conservative judiciary at odds with a more liberal Congress).
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legislative performance and capabilities of Congress.1 0 8 Our period of
thirty-four years allows for observation of some evolution in the
Court's usage of canons, but our discussion of current and relatively
recent practices provides for more of an in-depth or time-lapse
snapshot than a prolonged historical perspective.
Further, we do not attempt to set priorities among the
interpretive resources we identify as probative for each opinion. When
a majority author relies on the canons, she may rely on only one other
resource or on as many as five, and she may rely on the canons as
modestly probative to advance her reasoning in one opinion while
invoking them as central to her justification in a separate decision.
Judicial reasoning is highly situation-specific, reflecting sensitivity to
the novelty and difficulty of issues presented, the nature of divisions
among the Justices, and at times even the Court's interest in
educating the general public. 10 9 We concluded that any effort to rank
the Court's multiple and often complementary justifications for its
holdings would require judgments more subjective than we were
prepared to make. Accordingly, we focus on the presence of expressed
reliance, foregoing any attempt to titrate the relative weight of various
resources that contribute to each majority opinion. Part IV presents
extensive doctrinal analyses, offering a more qualitative assessment of
the Court's reliance on canons in different circumstances.
Finally, our study seeks to examine which interpretive
resources were used to justify the Court's decisions, not what actually
accounts for each author's judicial behavior. As we suggested earlier,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess empirically the array
of personal values, practical considerations, and principled reasons
that motivates each individual Justice.1 1 0 Nonetheless, our focus on
108. Textualist judges' disparaging view of the legislative process as systematically strategic
and even manipulative has contributed to reduced reliance on legislative history by the Supreme
Court. See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369, 384-87 (1999); see also Vermeule,
supra note 107, at 160-61 (arguing that members of Congress may respond to this devaluation by
making legislative history more accurate, which would encourage future judges to use it more
often).
109. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones
University v. United States, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (1983) (suggesting that Court in the Bob
Jones decision was primarily speaking to newspapers and history books, not rigorously applying
legal principles, when it held that racial discrimination violated the "public policy" embedded in
the tax code). See Sisk et. al., supra note 93, at 1498-1500; Farber, supra note 93, at 1416-30.
110. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Nor do we assess directly the impact of
collegial decisionmaking, which may inter alia augment or temper the use of canons and other
interpretive resources and may also affect the ideological component of judicial decisionmaking.
See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003). Judge Edwards, who expressly limits his discussion to appellate courts
other than the Supreme Court, identifies collegiality as "a process that helps to create the
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how the Court explains its results offers advantages in understanding
the judicial reasoning process.
The Court's justifications for its
holdings are valuable in part because they furnish guidelines to lower
courts, attorneys, and the legal academy regarding how justifications
should be rendered in future cases.
The Court's principled
explanations also legitimate the judicial form of decisionmaking,
which in turn contributes to the Court's acceptability to a broader
public.
In sum, while the limitations of our dataset suggest a need for
caution, they also offer grounds for confidence.
Our extensive
assessment of one resource used in judicial reasoning allows for new
insights in both descriptive and normative terms. By focusing on
whether the canons are favored across different time periods, in
particular subject areas, or by individual Justices, we can shed
considerable light on complex patterns of reliance within the
contemporary Court. By examining possible relationships between
reliance on these canons and ideological outcomes, we can evaluate
the theoretical claims
regarding ideological neutrality-and
predictability or clarity-that have been vigorously promoted with
respect to this interpretive resource.
III. RESULTS
A. Reliance on Canons and Other InterpretiveResources Over Time
We begin with our dataset of 632 workplace law decisions in
which the Supreme Court issued reasoned majority opinions.1 1 1 Table
I reports the extent to which the Court relied on our ten interpretive
resources to justify its holdings. For each resource, we report reliance
as a proportion of the total number of majority decisions over the
thirty-four Supreme Court terms. Table I also reports reliance based
on the two distinct "eras" of the Court within this period: the 350
conditions for principled agreement." Id. at 1645 (emphasis in original). He regards collegiality
as a qualitative filter rather than a quantitative variable, and he contends that it mitigates the
ideological preferences of judges. Id. at 1661, 1689.
Although we do not attempt to incorporate collegial considerations as an explicit justifying
factor, we do consider their possible impact in some of our explanatory discussion. See infra text
accompanying notes 171-174, 181-182 (discussing possible change in reasoning approach by some
Justices as result of collegial considerations); see also Linda Greenhouse, The Court: Same Time
Next Year, And Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, §4 (Week in Review), at 3 (discussing the
Court's performance as a small interdependent group).
111. In twenty-two of these decisions (nine in the Burger Court and thirteen in the
Rehnquist Court), the Court announced its holding and set forth its principal reasoning in a
plurality opinion. We treat these plurality opinions as majorities for purposes of our analyses.
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workplace law decisions issued by the Burger Court during seventeen
terms from 1969 to 1985, and the 282 workplace law cases resolved by
the Rehnquist Court in the seventeen terms from 1986 to 2002.

Table 1: Reliance on Interpretive Resources Over Time
(N = 632)

Resource
Textual Meaning*
Dictionaries*
Language Canons*
Legislative History*
Legislative Purpose*
Legislative Inaction
Supreme Court
Precedent
Common Law
Precedent*
Substantive Canons*
Agency Deference

% of All
Cases

% of Burger
Court Cases

% of Rehnquist
Court Cases

55.1
3.5
17.1
38.1
81.2
5.9

49.1
1.4
12.0
46.6
86.9
5.7

62.4
6.0
23.4
27.7
74.1
6.0

82.8

80.3

85.8

11.9
11.6
16.8

9.4
14.9
8.3
15.6
17.1
16.3
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference between Burger Court and Rehnquist
Court reliance on same interpretive resource

Preliminarily, Table I provides a useful overview of how the
Court has justified its workplace law decisions over this thirty-four
year period. For instance, the Court relied on the inherent or plain
meaning of the textual language (including related references to
ordinary meaning) in 55.1 percent of all majority opinions,11 2 while
relying on dictionary definitions in only 3.5 percent of its decisions.
Further, the Court's interest in these two resources has become
stronger over time. Reliance on the textual meaning resource has
increased from 49.1 percent of all decisions in the Burger Court era to
62.4 percent during the Rehnquist Court years, while reliance on the

112. Although it may seem counterintuitive 'for judges not to be relying on text as the
starting point for their analyses virtually 100 percent of the time, the 55.1 percent figure for
textual meaning reflects how often we found express reliance on the meaning of the words (not
mere reference to textual provisions) to support or advance the actual holding.
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dictionary has grown from 1.4 percent to 6.0 percent between the two
113
eras. Each of these increases is significant in statistical terms.
Two of our interpretive resources, Supreme Court precedent
and legislative purpose, were used as justifications in more than fourfifths of all majority opinions, far exceeding reliance on any other
reasoning approach. We believe that the Court's heavy dependence on
its own previous case law is in large part attributable to ordinary or
traditional skills of advocacy. Except in rare instances of complete
novelty, the parties to a Supreme Court dispute will plausibly contend
that some aspect of the Court's precedents supports their position,
even if simply to reframe or subtly modify the general legal rule or
standard being applied. In addition, the Court derives part of its
legitimacy from wrapping new decisions in a mantle of consistency so
as to blend the dual imperatives of stability and change. Invocation of
precedent enhances public perceptions of a coherent legal system and
of a judiciary that exercises limited powers, regardless of whether an
identified line of prior decisions is dispositive or simply somewhat
probative.1 1 4 For these reasons, and perhaps others, it should not be
surprising that the Court's reliance on its own precedent is a staple
ingredient of its reasoning.
As for legislative purpose, our rather expansive definition of
this category may account for the unusually heavy reliance that we
observed. Unlike text, canons, or legislative history, a purposive
approach does not require reference to particular provisions or
maxims, or to specific documents in the legislative record. We gleaned
the Court's reliance on legislative purpose from its articulation of
justifications grounded in more open-ended terms or concepts, such as
the policies or values that a statute was meant to protect,11 5 or the

113. A t-test compares the mean of two samples or sets of data, controlling for the sample
size where that sample size is relatively small (about twenty-five observations or less) to
determine whether the difference could be due to chance (including the possibility of random
error in sampling or coding). The z-test operates in the same manner as the t-test, except that
the sample size is in excess of twenty-five observations. For the sake of convenience, we report
all significance tests in Tables I through XI as t-tests (t
.05), recognizing that a different
distribution (the z-distribution) is being employed for the larger samples. See MICHAEL A.
MALEC, ESSENTIAL STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 117-27 (2d ed. 1993). Stata Version 7
assumes the proper distribution (z versus t) based on sample size. See supra note 87 (explaining
significance as measured by using t-test.).
114. See Barak, supra note 7, at 30-31 (emphasizing the importance of adhering to precedent
whenever possible and making that adherence explicit in order to engender ongoing confidence
in a stable and predictable legal order); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1
(1923) (describing law's challenge of reconciling need for stability and need for change).
115. See, e.g., Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558-60 (1997) (relying on
purposes of Jones Act coverage protection for seamen).
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goals that Congress must have had in mind, 116 or even the absurd
11 7
practical consequences that Congress must have wanted to avoid.
Although we focused on norms or policies expressly attributed by the
Justices to Congress or to the legislative branch, the often
hypothetical or inferential nature of such attributions inevitably
broadened the domain of this reasoning approach.11 8
Table I also makes clear that the Court's pattern of reliance on
interpretive resources changed markedly between the Burger and
Rehnquist eras. In addition to its increased usage of textual meaning
and dictionaries, the Rehnquist Court has shown a greater willingness
to justify its decisions through language and substantive canons, as
well as common law precedent. The increased value attributed to text,
dictionaries, and language canons is consistent with perceptions
among scholars and commentators that the Court has become more
"textualist" in recent years. 119 Whether one considers such reliance a
welcome return to genuinely authoritative resources or a disturbing
obedience to linguistic formalism, the trend is both distinctive and
ongoing.
Conversely, Table I reveals a diminished appetite on the
Rehnquist Court for using legislative history or legislative purpose to
explain and justify results. This decreased reliance parallels scholarly
commentary discussing the Court's newfound skepticism as to the
value or even coherence of "congressional intent" as a principled
116. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-34 (2000) (relying on purpose imputed
to Congress with respect to scope of fiduciary status under ERISA); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984) (relying on purpose imputed to Congress in prescribing two separate
types of bankruptcy proceedings).
117. See, e.g., Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1999) (reasoning that
certain consequences of an ADA interpretation are so absurdly onerous that Congress must have
wanted to avoid them); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 219-20 (1985)
(interpreting LMRA so as to avoid practical evisceration of its basic policies).
118. The inferential nature of some purposive attributions has been questioned in
methodological terms from inside the Court. See Pub. Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
472-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (sharply warning against risk that certain
judicial predilections or background societal norms will be imputed as "congressional purpose"
absent any evidence that Congress considered them). Nonetheless, some interpretive resources
are easier to define than others. Legislative inaction and common law precedent also involved
more generalized contours, although neither area was invoked nearly as often as legislative
purpose. Because the Court regularly justified its conclusions by summoning purposive norms or
policy considerations expressly linked to what Congress, the Act, the Framers, or the
Constitution presumably meant, the legislative purpose category may have become something of
a default for reasoning that was too expansive to be assigned to a more precisely defined
category. At some future point, we may decide to subdivide this resource category in an effort to
sharpen our coding approach.
119. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1993);
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 157-88 (1999).
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explanation for statutory meaning.120
At the same time, the
Rehnquist Court's increased reliance on substantive canons and
common law precedent suggests more willingness to invoke policies or
norms that reflect judicially expressed values.1 21 That willingness
may signify an emerging interest in resolving close interpretive
questions by reference to judicially crafted policy preferences, as
1 22
opposed to policies or norms derived from legislative sources.
Our principal focus is on the canons, and Table II presents in
more detail the changes over time in the Justices' reliance on this
interpretive resource. Table II reports both language canon and
substantive canon reliance at five year intervals, for majority opinions
123
and also for primary dissenting opinions.

120. See Koby, supra note 108, at 377-81, 395 (linking Scalia critique directly to diminished
Court reliance since 1987). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 61, 68 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 425-29, 444-45 (1988).
121. Other scholars have remarked on this trend. See Schacter, supra note 93, at 19-31
(observing that during the 1996 Term, Justices regularly invoked wide array of judicially
selected policy norms to help them explain or justify their statutory interpretation decisions);
Mank, supra note 21, at 614-16 (criticizing the Court's readiness to rely on judicially created
canons while undervaluing deference to agency interpretations and evidence of legislative
intent).
122. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 328, 332-54 (2000) (describing a series of cases in which the Court struck down federal
statutes because of perceived deficiencies in the formal legislative record); Ruth Colker & James
J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 87-105 (2000) (arguing that recent Court
decisions show less willingness by the Court to defer to Congress's judgment). Reliance on the
three remaining variables-Supreme Court precedent, agency deference, and legislative
inaction-has been relatively consistent between the Burger era and the Rehnquist period.
123. Although 40 percent of our 632 decisions do not include a dissenting opinion, there are
377 cases that include over 480 opinions dissenting at least in part from the Court's result.
Working with a research assistant, Brudney identified primary dissents in almost all instances
based on which dissent garnered the most votes or (in a tie) which dissent was of greatest length.
For the five cases in which multiple dissents garnered equal support and were of comparable
length, Brudney selected a primary dissent based on his judgment as to which opinion had the
most elaborate or complex reasoning.
For our purposes, it was not necessary to report statistical significance in Table II, especially
given the small number of observations for many subcategories. Significant difference in
reliance on language and substantive canons between the Burger and Rehnquist eras has
already been reported in Table I.
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Table II: Reliance on Canons Over Time:
Majorities (N = 632) and Primary Dissents (N = 377)

Terms
1969-73
1974-78
1979-83
1984-88
1989-93
1994-98
1999-02

Language
Canon
Majority%
8.2
11.2
14.2
18.2
28.6
12.7
34.7

Language
Canon
Dissent%
5.9
5.5
12.5
9.1
18.9
11.8
24.0

Substantive
Canon
Majority%
5.5
10.3
6.3
15.7
19.0
14.1
10.2

Substantive
Canon
Dissent%
5.9
11.0
8.8
2.6
18.9
17.6
24.0

With the exception of a brief period during the mid 1990s,
Table II reflects a steady rise in the Justices' willingness to rely on
language canons in majority opinions and a comparable upward trend
for dissents as well. The increase in majority reliance began in the
mid 1970s and has continued during the Rehnquist Court years,
peaking at more than one-third of all majority opinions over the past
four terms. Table I indicated that a majority opinion written in the
Rehnquist Court era was twice as likely to rely on language canons as
one authored in the Burger Court years. The same sharp increase is
also evident when comparing the late Burger Court years with the
very recent Rehnquist Court. During the 1983-85 terms, majority
opinions relied on language canons 13.6 percent of the time, compared
with 33.3 percent of the time in the 2000-02 terms. 124 As we will see
when we examine patterns in the reasoning used by individual
Justices, the Rehnquist Court's growing inclination to rely on
language canons coincides with the ascendancy of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, who are among the heaviest users of language
canons in their majority opinions. 125 In addition, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and White became substantially more reliant on language
canons in majority opinions they authored after 1986.126

124. The difference is significant at z = .01. Data for year-by-year reliance, as well as
individual case records coding judicial reasoning for all 632 cases, are on file with the authors.
125. By contrast, among Justices who served exclusively or almost exclusively on the Burger
Court, Justices Powell and Stewart rarely invoked language canons as part of their majority
reasoning. See infra tbl.V and accompanying discussion.
With respect to primary dissents that rely on language canons, newer
126. See id.
appointees Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas are again among the heaviest users. In
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With respect to usage of substantive canons in majority
opinions, the Court's reliance also doubled from the Burger years to
the Rehnquist era (see Table I), although the trend as reflected in
Table II was not as steady. Increased reliance first became apparent
in the late 1970s, and it reached nearly one in five majority opinions
during the early 1990s, before receding to roughly one-eighth of all
majorities over the past seven terms. 127 As was true with regard to
language canons, the Court's greater willingness to rely on
substantive canons is associated with newer arrivals on the Court and
also with changes among certain long-tenure Justices. Justice Souter
and Justice O'Connor have made frequent use of substantive canons
in their majority opinions. 128 In addition, Justices Stevens and White
increased their reliance on substantive canons in majorities they
129
authored from 1986 onward.
The Court's growing reliance on both language canons and
substantive canons stands in marked contrast to the declining
influence of legislative history as an interpretive justification during
this same period. While the overall decrease in reliance on legislative
history between Burger and Rehnquist Court majority opinions is
reflected in Table I, the decline since the late 1980s has been even
more precipitous. In the five terms from 1984-88, the Court's majority
opinions relied on legislative history 42.1 percent of the time; that
figure dropped to 22.6 percent for the next five terms (1989-93) and
has remained between 22 and 25 percent for the past decade. 130 The
arrival of Justices Scalia and Thomas, who have been openly scornful
of legislative history as a resource, accounts for a large part of this
decline. 131 In addition, Justices Stevens and White relied considerably
addition, Justices Blackmun and Stevens relied substantially more often on language canons in
their primary dissents authored from 1985 onward. Precise figures on primary dissents for
individual Justices are on file with the authors.
127. The pattern for dissents relying on substantive canons is slightly different: the sharp
increase in the early 1990s has been basically sustained over the past seven years.
128. See infra tbl.VI and accompanying discussion. Justice O'Connor served for five terms
on the Burger Court, but she authored only five workplace law majority opinions during that
time. By contrast, she has written forty-two workplace law majorities since 1986, and those
forty-two constitute an even larger proportional contribution given the Court's shrinking docket
in this period. Accordingly, for workplace law purposes, Justices O'Connor qualifies as one of the
newer arrivals, along with the seven Justices appointed since 1986.
129. See infra tbl.VI and accompanying discussion.
130. The ratios, at five-year intervals since 1969, are as follows: 1969-73-43.8 percent; 197478-45.6 percent; 1979-83-48.8 percent; 1984-88-42.1 percent; 1989-93-22.6 percent; 1994-9822.5 percent; 1999-2002-24.4 percent.
131. Justices Scalia and Thomas together have authored forty-seven majority opinions in the
workplace law area, only one of which has relied on legislative history. For examples of the
Justices' critical perspective on legislative history generally, see Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
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less often on legislative history in their majority opinions authored
after 1986, and Justice Breyer has invoked that resource on a
relatively infrequent basis. 132 Based on these and other changes, the
graph below illustrates how the Court has moved over the past threeplus decades, from initially valuing legislative history far more than
the canons to its present position of relying on the canons nearly twice
133
as often as legislative history in its majority opinions.
Trends in Reliance: Canons and Legislative History,
Majority Opinions 1969-2003

60-

Canons

I

% of Majority
Opinions
Using Canons
or Legislative
History

30

Leg. History

20
10

69-73

74-78

79-83

84-88

89-93

94-98

99-02

Court Term

B. Subject Matter and the Canons: Specialization Effects?
Variations in canon usage by the Court may be linked not only
to changes in judicial personnel but also to the diverse subject matter
composition of workplace law itself.134 We noted earlier the Court's
200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring). See also SCALIA, supra note 10, at 29-37
(criticizing the use of legislative history to interpret statutes).
132. Justice Stevens's reliance has dropped from 48.3 percent in the Burger years to 25.8
percent in the Rehnquist era, while he authored virtually the same number of majority opinions
in each period (twenty-nine in Burger era; thirty-one in Rehnquist era). Justice White's reliance
declined from 53.1 percent in the Burger years to 17.6 percent during his Rehnquist Court
tenure, although Justice White wrote far more majorities in the Burger years (forty-nine v.
seventeen). Justice Breyer has relied on legislative history only 21.4 percent of the time,
considerably below the 45.8 percent of Justice Blackmun, the Justice he replaced.
133. The numbers for canon reliance are slightly below the combined totals from columns
one and three in Table II, due to the seventeen cases (decided over our thirty-four year period) in
which the majority opinion relied on both language and substantive canons.
134. The variations we identified may also be related to changes in legal education,
specifically an increase in attention to statutory interpretation and the role of canons in courses
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relatively constant interest in labor and employment issues over the
past thirty years. 13 5 Yet despite this steady general level of attention,
the Court's specific subject matter priorities have shifted considerably
during the course of three decades. From 1969 to the early 1980s,
labor-management relations cases and race or sex discrimination
cases together comprised over 70 percent of the Court's labor and
employment decisions; that proportion had fallen to less than 30
percent by the early 1990s, and it has hovered at around 30 percent
for the past decade. 136 The Court's more disparate diet of workplace
law cases doubtless can be attributed to a range of legal and policy
developments, notably including a proliferation of new federal
employee protection laws since the late 1960s and substantial changes
in the demographics and structure of the labor market over that same
13 7
period.
In recognition of the broad range of workplace-related subjects
that now give rise to interpretive disputes, Tables III and IV present
the Court's patterns of reliance on the canons across these distinct
substantive law areas. Table III reports language canon reliance for
our eight identified subject matter categories, calculated basically as a
proportion of the total number of majority decisions in each
category. 38
Table III further breaks down this language canon
reliance into Burger Court and Rehnquist Court periods.
taught at many of the elite law schools that furnish law clerks for the Justices. See infra note
178 and accompanying text.
135. See supranotes 64-66 and accompanying text.
136. See Brudney, supra note 64, at 153-59 (documenting this shift in detail through 1999
Term). In the past three terms (2000-02), the Court has decided forty-two workplace law cases:
twelve of these (28.6 percent) have involved either labor-management relations or race or sex
discrimination, while the rest (71.4 percent) have addressed the assorted other workplace law
categories identified at supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
137. Congress's newer enactments have been mostly in the areas of minimum standards,
retirement and other fringe benefits, and age and disability discrimination. This increased
reliance on government regulation as a preferred means of structuring the employment
relationship has presented the Court with many new interpretive issues. Moreover, the new
issues have generally arisen in the context of a gradually aging workforce, an expansion of
contingent employment arrangements, and the periodic tremors of corporate downsizing. Each
of these factors has contributed to real and perceived threats affecting job security, retirement
eligibility, and health benefits among American workers. In addition, the sharp decline in union
density and the resolution of major interpretive battles over the meaning of Title VII have
diminished the urgency of litigation in the two areas that formerly commanded most of the
Court's attention. Brudney, supra note 64, at 158.
138. As discussed, supra note 74, there are sixty-eight decisions in which the Court resolved
issues in two or more distinct areas of federal workplace law that cut across our subject matter
categories (for example, a case involving both NLRA and ERISA interpretation, or a case
involving FLSA and Tenth Amendment interpretation).
One of these cases involved the
resolution of issues in three areas, while the other sixty-seven involved two subject matter
categories. In an effort to reflect more accurately the interpretive resources relied on by the
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Certain subject matter categories are associated with
unusually high Court reliance on language canons. In particular,
majority opinions interpreting minimum standards laws, ERISA and
other retirement legislation, and miscellaneous statutes, made
significantly more use of language canons to help justify their results
139
when compared with the baseline rate of reliance.
Table III: Reliance on Language Canons by Subject
Matter Category and Over Time (N = 701)

Issue

Lang.
Canon
Majority%

Lang.
Canon
Majority%

Lang.
Canon
Majority%

All
Years

Burger
Years

Rehnquist
Years

All Cases (701)
15.4
10.9
21.0#
Labor Relations (192)
12.0
9.0
19.0#
Race & Sex Discrimination (135)
17.8
12.8
26.5#
General Discrimination (49)
18.4
26.7
14.7
Minimum Standards (70)
31.4*
24.2
37.8
Retirement (59)
32.2*
20.0
36.4
General Negligence (22)
4.5
0.0
5.6
Miscellaneous (42)
23.8*
20.0
27.3
Constitutional (132)
0.0*
0.0
0.0
*indicates t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for All Years between each
issue area and all other issue areas
# indicates t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for a given issue area
between Burger Court and Rehnquist Court

As Table III indicates, the Court's minimum standards
decisions invoked language canons 31.4 percent of the time, compared
to 15.4 percent for all workplace law decisions.
Moreover, the
noticeably higher level of reliance was evident in both Burger and

Court in these cases, we assigned each resource separately to whichever statutory or
constitutional category was implicated by reliance on that resource. The result is an 11 percent
increase in our universe of "decisions" (N=701) for Tables III and IV, but we believe this is
acceptable in order to assure that judicial reasoning relied on to resolve a Tenth Amendment
issue is not imputed to the FLSA category (or vice versa).
139. Significance results reported with an asterisk are for the All Years category, based on
comparing canon usage in each issue area to the baseline of all cases minus that issue area.
Significance results identified as "' report changes in language canon usage for a particular
issue area as between the Burger and Rehnquist eras.
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Rehnquist Court years, and this heavier reliance also persisted
through both periods for the retirement and miscellaneous categories.
By contrast, the Court's reliance on language canons in labor
relations decisions and in race or sex discrimination decisions hovered
around the baseline rate for all cases, although reliance in these two
areas increased significantly between the Burger and Rehnquist eras.
The Court's complete nonreliance on language canons in constitutional
cases presumably reflects in large part the Justices' willingness to
invoke policy-related justifications when interpreting what, for them
and the legal community, are very familiar legal concepts.
In
addition, the canons have little to contribute to the comparatively
straightforward linguistic structure of leading provisions such as the
140
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although we discuss the applicability of various theories in
case-specific terms in Part IV, these subject matter results are
intriguing from a public choice perspective.
The Court's heavy
reliance on language canons in the area of retirement legislation is
consistent with the theory that such canons may serve in part as
substitutes for more policy-oriented justifications.
Controversies
arising under ERISA and related federal retirement provisions
present difficult and at times highly technical interpretive questions,
and the Justices are less likely to approach such questions with the
expertise or even the comfort level they may bring to more
ideologically familiar areas such as race discrimination or labor1
management relations. 41
Within the minimum standards category, the Justices have
relied heavily on language canons when construing safety and health
legislation-either provisions that regulate technical safety and health
standards 42 or disputes involving complex procedural or jurisdictional

140. Disputes involving these three amendments comprise over three-fourths of all
constitutional decisions. Legislative purpose is invoked in 74.2 percent of majority opinions on
constitutional issues, and Supreme Court precedent in 97 percent of them. The general
negligence category, which contains a mere twenty-two cases over the thirty-four-year period,
includes only one majority opinion that relies on language canons. Almost all of these cases
(nineteen of twenty-two) were decided in the Rehnquist years, and the Justices relied heavily on
Supreme Court and common law precedent as well as substantive canons when interpreting the
Jones Act, the Federal Employees Liability Act, and admiralty law.
141. See Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 658 (linking content-independent reasoning of
plain meaning rule to more complex technical cases in 1989 Term). Some 85 percent of the cases
in the retirement category (fifty of fifty-nine) involve interpretation of ERISA. Similarly, the
Court's greater tendency to invoke language canons in the miscellaneous category is compatible
with the Justices being infrequently exposed to these statutes in a workplace law setting and to
the at times esoteric nature of the statutory provisions.
142. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36, 38-39 (1990); Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-11, 513 (1981).
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questions.1 43 The Court also has frequently invoked these canons
when construing the rather low-visibility, statute that provides
144
specialized protection for longshoremen and harbor workers.
Although the number of cases in each of these minimum standards
subcategories is relatively small, this trend toward greater language
canon usage in more technical or specialized statutes is broadly
consistent with what we observed in the retirement category.
Also of interest is the Court's reliance on language canons in 21
of the 108 majority opinions that interpret the provisions of Title
VII.145 Unlike statutes such as the Coal Mine Safety Act or the
LHWCA, Title VII disputes appear to present more accessibly policyrelated controversies. From a public choice standpoint, it would seem
plausible that the Justices relied less often on ostensibly contentneutral linguistic techniques to help justify their results in this
"ideological battleground" area. Notably, we found that for 17 of the
21 majority opinions that did use language canons, the controversy
before the Court could fairly be called procedural rather than
substantive, and more technical than ideological.
The Title VII
decisions that relied on language canons mainly involved disputes
over ancillary and specialized aspects of monetary relief,1 46 contests
regarding limitation periods and retroactivity, 47 and controversies

143. See e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 208-9 (1994); Nat'l Indep. Coal
Operators Ass'n. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 398 (1976).
In the fifteen cases requiring
interpretation of OSHA, MSHA, or the Coal Mine Safety Act, the majority opinion relied on
language canons seven times (46.7 percent). Omitting the four cases that involved constitutional
challenges to an OSHA or MSHA provision, the percentage rises to 63.7 percent.
144. Five of the seventeen LHWCA decisions (29.4 percent) feature reliance on language
canons. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling, 505 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1992); MorrisonKnudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1983).
145. Title VII cases follow the Court's general trend regarding reliance on language canons
in the race and sex discrimination issue area. The overall 20.4 percent ratio for Title VII
majority opinions combines 13.4 percent of the sixty-seven Burger Court Title VII majorities
with 31.7 percent of the forty-one Rehnquist Court majorities.
146. See, e.g., Pollard v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (deciding
whether front pay awards are an element of compensatory charges); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
458 U.S. 219 (1982) (resolving whether employer can toll backpay by offering re-employment
without retroactive seniority); N.Y. Gaslight Club Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (addressing
entitlement to attorney fees for state administrative and judicial proceedings).
147. See, e.g., Landsgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (addressing retroactive
application of new Title VII provision); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod., 486 U.S. 107 (1988)
(addressing timeliness under Title VII of a state law claim); Int'l Union Elec. Workers v. Robbins
& Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (addressing deadline for filing claim).
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41

focused on jurisdictional questions14 8 or other procedural matters. 149
Thus, even with respect to perhaps the most ideological statute in the
workplace law arena, the Court's use of language canons is associated
150
with more technical aspects of the statutory scheme.
With regard to substantive canons, Table IV reports reliance
for the eight subject matter categories, again further subdivided based
on the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court eras. In the retirement
category, the Court's decisions rely more frequently on substantive
canons, just as they more often made use of language canons in that
area. The Court's reliance on substantive canons in race or sex
discrimination decisions is right around its baseline rate of reliance
for all cases; this too is similar to the Court's pattern with respect to
151
language canons.

148. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (addressing state
court jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976)
(resolving whether district court order was an appealable final decision).
149. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (addressing whether anti-retaliation
provision covers former as well as current employees); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449
U.S. 590 (1981) (resolving whether agency is permitted to disclose information in government
files to charging parties).
150. There are Title VII cases in which reliance on language canons is part of a majority
opinion resolving a more obviously substantive and policy-related dispute. See, e.g., Harris v.
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (refining liability standard for hostile environment sexual
harassment claims); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that business
partnership decisions are covered by Title VII); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)
(reconciling Title VII antidiscrimination standards with preference for Native Americans in
Indian Reorganization Act).
151. The rate of reliance on substantive canons for labor relations decisions is significantly
lower than for the baseline of all other decisions. As in Table III, significance results are
reported in two contexts: comparing canon usage in each issue area to the baseline of all cases
minus that issue area, and comparing canon usage in a particular issue area as between the
Burger and Rehnquist eras. For explanation of why "N" is 701 rather than 632 for Table IV, see
supra note 138.
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Table IV: Reliance on Substantive Canons by Subject
Matter Category and Over Time (N = 701)

Issue

Subst.
Canon
Majority%
All
Years

Subst.
Canon
Majority%
Burger
Years

Subst.
Canon
Majority%
Rehnquist
Years

All Cases (701)
11.7
8.0
Labor Relations (192)
6.3*
5.2
Race & Sex Discrimination (135)
10.4
4.7
General Discrimination (49)
16.3
20.0
Minimum Standards (70)
5.7
6.1
Retirement (59)
22.0*
20.0
General Negligence (22)
18.2
0.0
Miscellaneous (42)
19.0
25.0
Constitutional (132)
14.4
8.8
*indicates t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for All Years

16.1#
8.6
20.4#
14.7
5.4
22.7
22.2
13.6
19.4#
between each

issue area and all other issue areas
#indicates t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for a given issue area
between Burger Court and Rehnquist Court

On the other hand, the Court uses substantive canons less
often in its minimum standards decisions, an area in which the Court
has relied heavily on language canons. Further, the Court's more
regular usage of substantive canons in the constitutional category
represents a striking contrast with its practice of total nonreliance on
language canons in that subject matter area. Given that substantive
canons generally express policy preferences-including preferences
linked to perceived constitutional norms or values-it is not surprising
that the Court finds them more useful than language canons when
resolving constitutional controversies.
Because substantive canons tend to reflect judicial policy
preferences, the ways in which they are used over a period of time
may be linked more to the policy implications of individual canons
than to the statutory subject matter category in which they arise. For
example, one might expect that canons favoring a particular policy
position, such as respect for federalism and state sovereignty, might
be invoked more often during periods when that policy position is
shared by a majority of the Justices. Conversely, for canons that are
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less explicitly policy-oriented but instead may relate more to
structural or legislative process norms, such as avoiding constitutional
issues 152 or disfavoring repeals by implication, one might surmise that
the patterns of reliance would be relatively steady or continuous.
Our results on the most frequently invoked substantive canons
tend to support this expectation. The Court has relied in eleven
majority opinions on some version of what we call an "antipreemption" canon, presuming that absent explicit statutory
language, federal law should be understood not to interfere with
traditional or core state functions. Ten of those eleven opinions have
been handed down since 1984,153 which corresponds generally to the
time when the Court has staked out a distinctive position supportive
of states' rights and suspicious in constitutional terms of federal
regulatory encroachment. 154 A related though distinct federalism
canon requires unmistakably clear federal statutory language in order
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuits
in federal courts. Seven of the eight majority opinions relying on this
155
canon were issued from 1985 onward.
The pattern of reliance is more continuous, however, with
respect to substantive canons that on their face seem less ideologically
oriented. Thus, the Court on twelve occasions has relied on the canon
of construing statutes restrictively in order to avoid possible or likely
in
constitutional problems: seven of those decisions were handed down 156
the Burger era while five were issued during the Rehnquist years.
Likewise, the Court in seven instances has relied on the presumption

152. There is considerable controversy over whether the avoidance canon is ideological or
predictably hostile to congressional intent. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance,
Resistance Norms, & the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1573-1601
(2000). We report on empirical results with respect to the ideological direction for this canon at
note 196 and accompanying text, infra.
153. The ten were decided in 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989 (2), 1995, 1997 (3), and 2002. The
eleventh was decided in 1979.
154. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (limiting Congress's authority to
"commandeer" state executive branch officials into the federal regulatory process); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting Congress's regulatory authority under Commerce Clause);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (limiting Congress's authority to commandeer
state legislative processes as part of federal regulatory effort).
155. See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989);
Welch v. State Dept. of Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985). The eighth case was Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health of Mo. v. Dep't of Pub.
Health of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
156. The seven Burger Court cases were decided in 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, and
1984; the five Rehnquist Court decisions were issued in 1988, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 2002.
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disfavoring implied repeals by Congress: three during the Burger
157
years and four in the Rehnquist era.
C. The Justices and the Canons: Individual Variations in Usage
In addition to reviewing the Court's reliance on canons over
time and by subject matter, we also examined how individual Justices
made use of canons in their majority opinions. Authoring an opinion
for the Court is hardly an exercise in free will. Majority opinions
typically are assigned by the Chief Justice based on criteria that go
well beyond the assignee's desire to take on the task. 158 In addition,
the contours of the opinion will likely be shaped to some extent by the
litigants' contentions in their briefs and at oral argument, and by the
rationales the Justices discuss at conference. 159 Still, the Justices do
retain discretion as to how they will present justifications for the
results reached, so long as they can hold onto at least four other votes.
Thus, it is not surprising that we found considerable variation in the
Justices' individual willingness to rely on either language or
160
substantive canons.
Table V reports individual Justices' reliance on language
canons in their majority opinions, listing each Justice's total number

157. The three Burger Court decisions came down in 1974, 1981, and 1982; the four
Rehnquist Court cases were decided in 1987 (2), 1991, and 2003.
158. Assignments (including self-assignments) may be used to further the policy goals of the
Chief Justice or the senior associate Justice making the assignment. See BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 64-65 (1979) (discussing how Chief Justice Burger used
assignment power to influence the scope of majority opinions in some areas of law). The
assignment power also is used to meet the Court's institutional needs, such as equalizing
workload, enhancing efficiency through issue specialization among the Justices, or solidifying a
majority coalition in a closely divided case. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 82 at 261-75;
Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May it Please the Chief?. Opinion Assignments in the
Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SC. 421 (1996).

159. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 207 (4th ed. 1980) (quoting Justice
Powell's observation that his initial views on an argued case were "not infrequently" altered
through discussion at Conference); WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 158, at 308-10
(describing fluid dynamic during Conference on a controversial case).
160. It seems reasonable to believe that the parameters set by briefs, oral argument, and
conference discussion are equally constraining, or tractable, for each Justice who authors a
majority opinion. Opinion assignments, by contrast, are concentrated in fewer hands: in our 34year period this was primarily the two Chief Justices, and presumably also Justices Brennan
and Stevens as recurrent senior members of majorities that did not include the Chief Justice.
Still, choice among reasoning approaches would not seem to be a determining or even influential
factor when exercising this assignment power. As indicated in Table V, one of the Chief Justices
was a high user of language canons while the other has been a relatively low user.

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

of majority opinions as well. 16 1 We have arranged the nineteen
Justices who served between 1969 and 2003 based on frequency of
their language canons usage, starting with high users. For Justices
whose tenure spans both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, we also
report reliance separately for each period.
Table V: Reliance on Language Canons by
Individual Justices Over Time (N = 610)

Justice

Lang.Canon%
All Years

Lang. Canon%
Burger Years

Lang.Canon%
Rehnquist Years

Thomas (20)
45.0*
N/A
N/A
33.3*
Scalia (27)
Stevens (60)
30.0*
31.0
29.0
Burger (17)
29.4
N/A
Blackmun (48)
29.2*
32.1
25.0
N/A
28.6
Breyer (14)
Ginsburg (11)
27.3
N/A
Harlan (4)
25.0
N/A
Black (4)
25.0
N/A
Kennedy (25)
24.0
N/A
N/A
15.0
Souter (20)
Brennan (69)
13.0
5.6
40.0
Rehnquist (47)
12.8
12.5
13.3
Marshall (53)
11.3
5.4
25.0
O'Connor (47)
10.6
20.0
9.5
Stewart (33)
9.1
N/A
White (66)
6.1*
4.1
11.8
Powell (36)
5.6
6.1
0.0
Douglas (9)
0.0
N/A
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference between each Justice's reliance and
reliance in decisions authored by all other Justices

Among Justices who have authored twenty or more workplace
law majority opinions, the four most frequent users are two
conservatives, Justices Thomas and Scalia, and two liberals, Justices
Stevens and Blackmun. 162 At first glance, this allocation might seem
161. Because the Court issued 22 per curiam opinions, the total number of majority opinions
authored by named Justices is 610.

162. Each of these Justices relied on language canons significantly more often than the
baseline of all majority opinions minus those authored by that Justice. Other Justices with
relatively high rates of reliance (Burger, Breyer, Ginsburg) have authored fewer majorities; their
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to indicate that language canons are comparably valued by Justices of
distinct ideological perspectives. In looking at these four Justices'
reliance on other interpretive resources in their language canon
decisions, however, a more complicated picture emerges. Justices
Thomas and Scalia have each authored nine majority opinions that
rely on language canons. Of those eighteen opinions, not one relies on
legislative history, and only six rely on legislative purpose, a
proportion that is far below legislative purpose reliance for all
decisions during the Rehnquist Court years. 163 By contrast, of the
thirty-two majority opinions authored by Justices Stevens and
Blackmun that rely on language canons, nineteen also rely on
legislative history while twenty-five rely on legislative purpose.164
What accounts for the striking disparities in how these four
Justices have used language canons in relation to interpretive
resources that are traditionally associated with specific congressional
intent or legislative policy preferences? In our view, such disparities
likely reflect serious disagreement as to the appropriate hierarchy of
legitimate justifications for judicial decisions interpreting a statutory
scheme or provision. For Justices Scalia and Thomas, the statutory
text is not only the most authoritative source of meaning, it should be
the exclusive source whenever possible. 165 Accordingly, language
canons are a primary resource, used to extend and deepen textual
analysis, as part of a nuanced linguistic approach that may also rely
on dictionaries 166 and on the Court's own precedents construing
identical or comparable language provisions.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun take a more traditional legal
process-oriented approach to the interpretation of statutes.
In
searching for and relying upon evidence of what Congress specifically
had in mind, or what it must have meant from a policy standpoint,
reliance did not differ significantly from the baseline.
By contrast, Justice White was
significantly less likely than his colleagues to rely on language canons in his majority opinions.
163. Justice Thomas's nine majority opinions include four that make use of legislative
purpose in some way; Justice Scalia's nine majority opinions include two such decisions.
164. Justice Stevens authored eighteen majority opinions making use of language canons; he
relied on legislative history in eleven of them, and in legislative purpose in thirteen. Of Justice
Blackmun's fourteen majority opinions relying on language canons, eight relied on legislative
history and twelve on legislative purpose.
165. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172 n.1 (1993); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-99 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
166. The 18 majority opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas relied twice (11.1 percent) on
dictionaries, well above the norm of 3.5 percent. Justices Thomas and Scalia generally rely on
dictionaries much more than the Rehnquist Court norm-7 of 32 total majority reliances since
the 1993 Term (Thomas 2 of 18; Scalia 5 of 14) constitutes together 22 percent, compared to 7.8
percent (8 of 103 majorities) for all other Justices during the same time period.
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these Justices do not view the text and accompanying linguistic tools
of textual elaboration as the final word. Legislative history and
16 7
purpose will often be used to confirm what the text seems to mean,
and on occasion will be relied upon to supersede that apparent
meaning, 168 but under either approach these contextual resources play
a positive role in justifying results reached by the Court. In this
setting, language canons are more supplemental than primary,
serving as part of a broader web of resources that allows the Court to
derive interpretive value from historical and practical context as well
169
as literal text.
To illustrate this basic distinction in types of reliance, an
Appendix summarizes four majority opinions, one authored by each of
the aforementioned Justices. 70 These four examples are not meant to
suggest that language canons are always relied upon in one way by
textualists such as Justices Thomas or Scalia and in a different way
by legal process advocates like Justices Stevens or Blackmun. They
are, however, indicative of a basic difference in terms of how language
canons are integrated with certain other interpretive resources.
Apart from our comparisons among the most frequent users,
Table V also reveals interesting variations in language canon reliance
among the six Justices who made substantial contributions to
workplace law during both the Burger and Rehnquist Court periods.171
Three of these Justices-Justices
Stevens, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist-remained relatively constant in their use of language

167. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 143-46 (1979) (Blackmun majority opinion
relying on legislative history as confirming textual analysis); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200, 209-12 (1994) (same); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-22 (1980)
(Stevens majority opinion relying on legislative history to support that text means what it says);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (Stevens majority opinion relying on
congressional purpose to reinforce and strengthen textual analysis).
168. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey 499 U.S. 83, 108-15 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1996)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
169. It is worth noting that Justices Scalia and Thomas rely on fewer interpretive resources
to explain or justify their results. The eighteen Scalia and Thomas majorities average 2.4
resources per opinion (Thomas 2.22; Scalia 2.67), while the thirty-two Stevens and Blackmun
majorities average 3.6 resources per opinion (Stevens 3.6; Blackmun 3.6).
Thus, the
substantially greater Stevens-Blackmun reliance on legislative history and purpose does not
appear to be a substitute for some other resources.
170. We do not maintain that these opinions are "representative" of each Justice's overall
output in any mathematical sense. Still, we believe they help illuminate why aggregate
differences exist.
171. Our measure of substantiality is solely quantitative, based on authoring at least fifteen
majority opinions in each period. Justice O'Connor authored only five majorities in the Burger
years, and Justice Powell wrote only three majorities in the Rehnquist era; accordingly, they are
not included in this discussion.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:1

canons between the two eras. 172 The other three, however-Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and White-made much heavier use of language
canons in their Rehnquist era majority opinions than they had during
the Burger years. 173 These increases occurred during the same period
when the Court's workplace law docket was becoming notably more
diverse and less dependent on labor relations and race or sex
discrimination cases, 17 4 and it is plausible to believe that subject
matter shifts contributed to the three Justices' greater propensity to
invoke language canons.
Yet, the cumulative impact of a five-fold increase in reliance for
three Justices who had been among the lowest users of language
canons 175 suggests that other factors were at work as well. One
possibility is that the new arrivals exerted a subtle but important
influence on the Court's methodological culture. By relying more
often, and more prominently, on language canons as part of their
linguistic approach to judicial reasoning, Justices Scalia and Kennedy
elevated the status and role of this assertedly content-neutral
resource. 176 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White may therefore
have come to regard analysis using language canons as more
important, and-perhaps subconsciously-as an approach that would
be valuable in order to attract or retain the allegiance of their newer
colleagues. 177 An additional factor may be the influence of legal
172. Justice Stevens used language canons in 31.0 percent of his Burger Court majorities
and 29.0 percent of Rehnquist Court majorities; for Justice Blackmun, the corresponding
proportions are 32.1 percent (Burger) and 25.0 percent (Rehnquist) while for Justice Rehnquist
they are 12.5 percent (Burger) and 13.3 percent (Rehnquist).
173. The increase was most dramatic for Justice Brennan, whose rate of reliance rose from
5.6 percent (Burger) to 40 percent (Rehnquist). Justice Marshall went from 5.4 percent to 25
percent, while Justice White moved from 4.1 percent to 11.8 percent. The increases between eras
were significant, using the t-test, for Justices Brennan (t < .01) and Marshall (t = .03), while the
increase for Justice White was not significant (t = .12).
174. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text (describing subject matter shift and
suggesting possible explanations for its occurrence).
175. Taking Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White together, language canon reliance in
their majority opinions soared from 5.0 percent (7 of 140 majority opinions authored from 1969 to
1986) to 25.0 percent (12 of 48 majorities authored from 1987 to 1992).
176. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)
(Kennedy, J.); Fort Stewart Schs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1990)
(Scalia, J.); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 176-77 (1989) (Kennedy, J.).
There is no reason to believe that Justices Scalia and Kennedy confined their reliance on
language canons to the workplace law area; to the contrary, Justice Scalia has promoted such
reliance in more general terms. SCALIA, supra note 10, at 25-27.
177. Because Justices Stevens and Blackmun had regularly relied on language canons in
their Burger Court majorities, the arrival of others who favored their use would presumably not
have had the same effect. The combined effect of these two holdovers plus the arrival of Justices
Scalia and Kennedy may, however, have helped sharpen Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
White's awareness of their increasingly anomalous status on this score. Justice Thomas may
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education. In the mid to late 1980s, elite law schools began devoting
increased attention to the subject of statutory interpretation, and law
school graduates who clerked for the Justices may have brought with
them a more conscious appreciation for linguistic analysis as a key
178
element of judicial reasoning.
With respect to substantive canons, Table VI reports individual
Justices' reliance, again arranging the nineteen Justices starting with
those who most often make use of substantive canons in their majority
opinions. The eight Justices who served on both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have their rates of reliance identified separately for
each era.

also have contributed to Justice White's increased willingness to use language canons, but he
could not have affected Justices Brennan or Marshall, as he arrived after their departure.
Apart from pure (or even strategic) collegiality considerations, regard for principles of
argumentation also may have been at work. Because more Justices were resorting more often to
language canon arguments, Justices Brennan, Marshall and White may have felt increasingly
obligated to answer them in like terms.
178. Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey published a casebook on Legislation in
the fall of 1987 that stimulated considerable new interest in teaching the subject of statutory
interpretation. See generally Richard A. Posner, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes
and the Creation of Public Policy, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567 (1988) (book review). Although sales
figures for the first edition of the casebook are no longer retrievable, Professors Eskridge and
Frickey report that courses using their materials (in draft or final form) were taught starting in
the mid 1980s at Chicago, Michigan, Yale, and Berkeley law schools, and perhaps other topranked schools as well. See Email from William Eskridge to James Brudney, (June 9, 2004);
Email from Philip Frickey to James Brudney (June 9, 2004) (on file with the authors).
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Table VI: Reliance on Substantive Canons by
Individual Justices Over Time (N = 610)

Justice

Subst. Canon%
All Years

Subst. Canon%
Burger Years

Subst. Canon%
Rehnquist Years

Souter (20)
30.0*
N/A
O'Connor (47)
25.5*
40.0
23.8
Stevens (60)
18.3
6.9
29.0
Blackmun (48)
16.7
17.9
15.0
Rehnquist (47)
14.9
12.5
20.0
White (66)
12.1
8.2
23.5
Kennedy (25)
12.0
N/A
Burger (17)
11.8
N/A
Douglas (9)
11.1
N/A
Thomas (20)
10.0
N/A
Ginsburg (11)
9.1
N/A
Powell (36)
8.3
6.1
33.3
Marshall (53)
7.5
8.1
6.3
Breyer (14)
7.1
N/A
Brennan (69)
4.3*
5.6
0.0
3.0
Stewart (33)
N/A
Scalia (27)
0.0
N/A
Harlan (4)
0.0
N/A
Black (4)
0.0
N/A
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference between each Justice's reliance and
reliance in decisions authored by all other Justices

Focusing on the Justices who have authored twenty or more
majority opinions, we see that two relatively frequent users of
substantive canons-Justices Stevens and Blackmun-also relied
heavily on language canons. The heaviest users of substantive canons
in this group, Justices Souter and O'Connor, 179 were slightly below the
Court average in their reliance on language canons. Moreover, the
two most regular users of language canons, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, rank much lower in their willingness to make use of
substantive canons. For Justice Scalia, the contrast is especially
stark: of his twenty-seven majority opinions, nine rely on language
canons as part of their reasoning while not a single one makes use of

179. These two Justices are the only ones whose reliance on substantive canons is
significantly above the reliance by Justices in all other opinions.
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substantive canons. This difference is consistent with Justice Scalia's
stated philosophy of interpretation set forth in his Tanner Lectures,
where he extolled the commonsense and content-neutral virtues of the
language canons while doubting the legitimacy of more substantive
80
"dice-loading rules."'
As was true for language canons, the sharp increase in use of
substantive canons between the Burger and Rehnquist eras coincides
both with certain newer arrivals at the Court and with changed
patterns of reliance among some "longer term" Justices. Justices
Souter and O'Connor, newer members of the Court, use substantive
canons considerably more often than Justices Powell and Stewart did
during the Burger Court years. In addition, Justices Stevens and
White relied on substantive canons more frequently after 1986 than
they had as Burger Court members. 8 1 This latter increase may relate
in part to a different kind of change in the Court's methodological
culture, stemming from heightened interest in federalism issues. 8 2
D. The Canons and the Size of the Court Majority
A further dimension to our description of canons usage involves
the possibility that patterns of reliance may differ in close cases as
opposed to unanimous decisions or those that are nearly unanimous
(such as 8-1 or 7-2 votes). For this purpose, we have grouped the
dataset in four categories, depending on whether the Court's decision
(i) was unanimous (involving zero dissenters); (ii) enjoyed a wide
margin of support (a vote differential of five, six, or seven); (iii) was
supported by a moderate-sized majority (a vote margin of three or
four); or (iv) was a close case (a vote margin of one or two). 8 3 Table
VII reports the frequency of language canon usage for each of these
four categories. We measure reliance as a proportion of the total
number of majority opinions in each of our four vote differential
categories and in each of our two Court eras. Thus, for instance, the

180. SCALIA, supra note 10, at 28; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. Justice
Scalia, however, does regularly join majority opinions that rely on the substantive canons, and
he has not distanced himself from such reasoning in separate concurrences as he has often done
with respect to legislative history reliance by the majority. See supra note 165.
181. Justice Stevens's increased usage between the two eras was significant (t = .01), as was
Justice White's (t = .048).
182. Several of the majorities authored by Justices Stevens or White in this post-1986 period
rely on substantive canons protecting state interests or state jurisdictional authority against
federal interference. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); Will v. Mich. Dept. of Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
183. We counted concurring opinions on the side of the majority, while an opinion or vote
that both concurred and dissented was counted as a dissent.
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Burger Court relied on language canons in 18.6 percent of its 118
unanimous majority opinions while the Rehnquist Court did so in 21.6
percent of its 134 unanimous majorities.
As presented in Table VII, there are intriguing differences evident
over time in the amount of intra-Court controversy attached to
majority opinions that invoke language canons. The Burger Court
relied on language canons in its unanimous majority opinions more
than twice as often as it used them in closely contested cases. The fact
that language canon usage is more likely to be associated with broad
consensus among the Justices is consistent with a view of these
canons as content-neutral justifications that may well facilitate
18 4
agreement across traditional ideological lines.
Table VII: Reliance on Language Canons by Size of
Majority Opinion Margin (N = 632)

Size of Majority

Lang.Canon%
All Years

Lang.Canon%
Burger Years

Lang. Canon%
Rehnquist Years

Unanimous
20.2 (252)
18.6 (118)
21.6 (134)
Wide*
13.0 (123)
6.8 (73)
22.0 (50)
Moderate
13.8 (109)
11.6 (69)
17.5 (40)
Close*
17.6 (148)
7.8 (90)
32.8 (58)
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference in reliance between Burger Court and
Rehnquist Court for a given majority vote margin

By contrast, the Rehnquist Court has relied on language
canons in close cases somewhat more often than it has in unanimous
decisions, although the difference is not significant.1 8 5 Further, the
Rehnquist Court has been significantly more likely than the Burger
Court to use language canons in support of narrow majorities. This
very different Rehnquist Court profile, in which so many closely
contested decisions include language canon reliance, suggests a
possible link between these canons and recent policy-related divisions
within the Court. We return to this association in Part III. E.
For similar size-of-majority data regarding the substantive
canons, we turn to Table VIII. Once again, reliance is assessed as a

184. See Macey & Miller, supra note 11; Frederick Schauer, Statutory Constructionand the
CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 247-49 (1991). The Burger

Court's increased tendency to rely on language canons in unanimous opinions as contrasted with
closely contested cases is significant (z = .004).
185, For the Rehnquist Court's increased tendency to rely on language canons in close cases
as contrasted with unanimous opinions, z = .15.
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proportion of the total number of majority opinions in the four vote
differential categories, broken down into Burger and Rehnquist Court
eras.
Table VIII: Reliance on Substantive Canons by Size of
Majority Opinion Margin (N = 632)

Size of Majority

Subst. Canon%
All Years

Subst. Canon%
Burger Years

Subst. Canon%
Rehnquist Years

Unanimous
12.7 (252)
9.3 (118)
15.7 (134)
Wide
9.8 (123)
6.8 (73)
14.0 (50)
Moderate
7.3 (109)
5.8 (69)
10.0 (40)
Close*
14.2 (148)
10.0 (90)
20.7 (58)
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference in reliance between Burger Court and
Rehnquist Court for a given majority vote margin

Here, the contrast between Burger and Rehnquist periods is
not as great. During both eras, substantive canons were used more in
close cases than in unanimous decisions. Indeed, they were used in
close cases more than in any of the three other categories. Given that
these substantive canons generally do represent judicial policy
preferences, often related to politically divisive issues such as
federalism or separation of powers, it is not terribly surprising that
reliance on them is associated with more divisive voting patterns
among the Justices. Still, it is noteworthy that the Rehnquist Court
Justices remain significantly more likely than their Burger Court
counterparts to rely on substantive canons when justifying results in
the closest cases.
E. The Canons and Ideology
In attempting to assess whether canon usage during our thirtyfour year period points distinctively in a liberal or conservative
direction, we adopt a number of different perspectives. We ask first if
reliance on the canons is predictably related to a particular kind of
ideological result in majority opinions taken as a whole. We then look
separately at distinct groups of conservative and liberal Justices, to
assess how each group uses canons in relation to its respective policy
preferences. Next, we focus on the subset of 148 closely contested
decisions, considering the extent to which reliance on the canons in
this more controversial setting has ideological associations. Finally,
we examine the ideological tenor of a special group of cases in which
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majority reliance on canons clashes with dissent dependence on
legislative history or on competing canons.
Each of these approaches reveals only part of a complex
picture; even taken together, they cannot be fully responsive on the
relationship between canon usage and ideological outcome.
In
addition, it is not self-evident how one should define "neutral" in this
context. We adopt as our presumptive definition that an interpretive
resource is ideologically neutral if its use by the Court is as likely to be
associated with a liberal result as with a conservative one. We
attempt to control for the influence of other factors by supplementing
our bivariate analyses through the use of regression equations.18 6 At
the same time, we are unable to control for certain influences that
may help determine which Justice will write a majority opinion, and
whether others will have input.
These elements include, at a
minimum, (i) the prospect (especially in unanimous or nearunanimous decisions) that opinion assignments may serve workload
equalization goals rather than reflect an assigned writer's ideological
perspective; (ii) the extent to which (especially in closer decisions)
opinion assignments and substantive reasoning may promote strategic
considerations such as retaining a fragile majority coalition;1 8 7 (iii) the
186. The use of a multinomial logistic regression model allows multiple categories of the
dependent variable to be analyzed and compared against a base category, and-as a result of
being included in the same analysis-also against each other. The primary analysis uses as its
four-part dependent variable whether a majority opinion expressly relied on no canons at all,
language canons alone, substantive canons alone, or both types of canons, in justifying its result.
The model includes as independent variables-in addition to the liberal or conservative nature of
the outcome and of the opinion author-a large number of background factors addressed to the
subject matter of the case, the vote margin enjoyed by the majority, the types of interpretive
resources (other than canons) relied on in the Court's reasoning, and the presence or absence of
selected interpretive resources in the dissent's reasoning.
If logistic regression had been used instead of multinomial logit, the analyses would be
insufficient to gauge the import of the canons because (for instance) a model focused on language
canons would be comparing language canon usage against all other categories, not just against
no canon usage. Multinomial logistic regression analysis more accurately reflects the reality of
the potential canon usage employed by the Justices, through proper comparisons. See TIM
FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS 48-50 (1994).
We report our basic
multinomial regression results in Table XII infra. We also ran additional regression equations to
address supplemental questions; results are summarized in notes 191, 192, 201, 214, 221 and
accompanying text infra. Copies of these additional regression results are available from the
authors upon request.
187. There are many examples of an opinion with a liberal outcome being written by the
most conservative member of the majority coalition (or conservative opinions written by the most
liberal member of the coalition) to ensure the majority holds firm or that it is narrowly confined.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (O'Connor, J., majority opinion) (holding
that law school's narrowly tailored use of race as a factor in admissions for the purpose of
achieving a diverse student body did not violate Equal Protection Clause); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Steady Rationale at Court Despite Apparent Bend, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at
A22 (suggesting that Chief Justice, who retained assignment in important Eleventh Amendment
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impact of collegial exchanges at oral argument and in private settings
on the Justice assigned to write the opinion;1 8 8 and (iv) the
unarticulated and even subconscious differences in intensity of policy
preference brought to the table by each potential majority author.
Still, our multifaceted exploration does help to illuminate the
diverse connections between canon usage and ideological outcomes.
Importantly, our approach also reaffirms the basic nature of the
relationship between judicial reasoning and decisional outcome as
situational and evolving rather than uniform and static. Through
examining a series of large and small case groupings, we can observe
the circumstances under which the Justices appear to rely on the
canons as neutral interpretive resources at the broadest level, and yet
as instruments functioning to support or even strengthen certain
ideological leanings as we focus more narrowly on controversial,
closely divided settings.
1. Ideology and the Dataset as a Whole
Initially, we have grouped the dataset in three categories,
based on whether the outcome was liberal (pro-employee or prounion), conservative (pro-employer), or, in a small number of cases,
indeterminate.1 8 9 Table IX reports the frequency of language canon
and substantive canon usage for the 584 cases with an identified
ideological result and also the 48 indeterminate decisions. While
decisions relying in part on substantive canons appear to be slightly
more conservative than the conservative proportion of all decisions,
and decisions invoking language canons seem marginally more liberal
than the percentage of all decisions, neither difference is close to
significant.

decision, had used his majority opinion to continue Court's institutional control of linedrawing in
this area).
See
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 37 (10th ed. 1994).

JUDICIARY:

THE

SUPREME

COURT

IN THE

188. See Edwards, supra note 110, at 1661-62 (arguing that variable-based empirical
analysis of judicial decisionmaking fails to capture the "process of dialogue, persuasion, and
revision" that characterizes appellate deliberations).
189. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of how we coded
judicial outcomes, including indeterminate results.
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Table IX: Reliance on Canons by Ideological Outcome
(N = 632)

All Cases
Language Canon Cases
Substantive Canon Cases

Liberal
Decision%

Conservative
Decision%

Indeterminate
%

47.6 (301)
49.1 (53)
42.5 (31)

44.8 (283)
43.5 (47)
50.7 (37)

7.6 (48)
7.4 (8)
6.8 (5)

We also used a multinomial logistic regression model to probe
further into the possibility that the Court's overall reliance on either
language canons or substantive canons might be associated with a
particular ideological direction. We analyzed whether reliance on
either language or substantive canons was significantly associated
with a liberal or conservative result when controlling for the subject
matter being decided, the size of the Court's majority, and the use of
other interpretive resources. 190 The independent variable addressing
decisional outcome was never close to significant. 191 In an effort to
determine whether the Court's reliance on canons might have become
more ideological over time, we applied the same multinomial
regression model to the two subsets of all 350 Burger era decisions
There was no significant
and all 282 Rehnquist era cases.
relationship between decisional outcome and majority reliance on
192
language canons or substantive canons in either era.
With respect to substantive canons, it is possible that our
finding of overall neutrality reflects at least in part the "balancing"
impact associated with the Court's use of several types of substantive
canons in this area of law. When the Court invokes its "superstrong
clear statement rule," requiring the clearest possible evidence that
Congress meant to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
the states, the result almost always has been a victory for the state as

190. See supra note 186 (discussing our approach to multinomial logit regressions).
191. We also constructed a separate logistic regression equation in which decisional outcome
was the dependent variable and language canon usage, substantive canon usage, and both
canons' usage were included as independent variables. None of these canon options was close to
significant. Indeed, only one interpretive resource independent variable showed significant or
close to significant results with decisional outcome as a dependent variable. Majority opinions
relying on common law precedent were significantly associated with conservative results (p
.04). Copies of these regression results are on file with the authors.
192. Copies of these two regression results are on file with authors.
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employer. 193 In addition, two other canons less often invoked-the
presumption against interpreting statutes to apply retroactively and
the presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity by the
Federal government-have been associated with consistently proemployer outcomes. 194 By contrast, the canon that Congress is
presumed to follow common law usage, and the canon presuming
against federal preemption of historic or traditional state functions,
have regularly been associated with pro-employee outcomes in this
thirty-four-year period. 195 Finally, the constitutional avoidance canon
has been relied on virtually as often in liberal as in conservative
96
decisions-both during the Rehnquist years and in the Burger era.1
2. Ideology and Canon Reliance by Conservative and Liberal Justices
Although the use of the canons by the Court taken as a whole
has not been associated with a conservative or liberal direction, there
remains the possibility that canon reliance is ideologically linked in
the hands of certain conservative or liberal Justices. To consider this
possibility, we focus on two ideologically identifiable subgroups: the
five most conservative members of the Rehnquist Court 97 and the
193. There have been eight such cases (six in the Rehnquist era), and seven have yielded
conservative, pro-employer outcomes. The one exception was Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp
v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
194. There have been three decisions relying on the anti-retroactivity presumption and five
decisions invoking the presumption against waivers of sovereign immunity: all eight reached
conservative outcomes.
195. Of the six majority opinions relying on the "Congress follows common law usage"
presumption, four reached liberal results, one was conservative, and one indeterminate. Of the
eleven majority opinions relying on what we refer to as the anti-preemption canon (see supratext
accompanying notes 154-155), seven reached liberal results, three resulted in conservative
outcomes, and one was indeterminate. The latter findings appear to reflect changes in the tenor
of applicable state statutes and common law. In the 1950s and 1960s, NLRA preemption cases
often involved state law that imposed restraints on union activities, making states' authority less
supportive of what were deemed employee interests than was the federal statute that arguably
preempted them. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). By
the 1980s, state statutory and common law developments offered increased rights and
protections to employees, and the "anti-preemption" position became more favorable to employee
interests than it had been in earlier decades. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 755-56 (1985).
196. Of the twelve cases making use of this canon in our dataset, six have reached liberal
outcomes, five conservative, and one decision was indeterminate. In the Rehnquist era, five
majority opinions have relied on the constitutional avoidance canon: two reached conservative
results while three were liberal decisions.
197. Four of the five conservatives, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy, voted
for individual employees or unions (against employer, business, or government related positions)
between 28 percent and 38 percent of the time, based on Spaeth issue codes. The fifth
conservative, Justice O'Connor, voted for individual employees or unions 46 percent of the time.
See supra note 85 (explaining liberal and conservative voting scale, with vote scores for each
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eight most liberal Justices who served for at least nine years on the
198
Rehnquist or Burger Courts.
As reported in Table X, the liberals and conservatives seem to
have relied on both language and substantive canons as support for
their pre-existing ideological preferences, with one qualification
discussed briefly below. Thus, our eight liberal Justices authored
slightly more than three liberal majority opinions for every two
conservative ones, and they maintained that same approximately 3:2
ratio for majorities that relied on language canons as well as
majorities that relied on substantive canons. 199 Our five conservative
Justices wrote slightly more than twice as many conservative majority
opinions as liberal ones, and this ratio also persisted for majorities
that relied on language canons. 20 0 We ran a series of regression
equations to see if we could detect either a "neutralizing effect"
(Justices are less ideological than normal when relying on canons) or a
"magnifying effect" (Justices relying on canons become even more
ideological than normal) in the use of canons by our eight liberal or
five conservative Justices. In each of our equations, the results for the
ideological variables were not close to significant. 20 1 Overall, the use
of canons was not associated with either a more liberal or a more
conservative set of outcomes for either of these two ideologically
distinct groups.

Justice). We omitted Justices Powell, Burger, and Harlan because of our interest in focusing on
the dynamic at work within the reigning conservative majority on the Rehnquist Court. These
three moderately conservative Justices (Spaeth scores of 45.1 percent, 41.1 percent, 49.8 percent)
are part of our reference category for regressions.
198. Two of the eight liberals, Justices Marshall and Brennan, voted for individual
employees or unions more than 78 percent of the time under the Spaeth issue codes, while a
third liberal, Justice White, supported individuals 60 percent of the time. The five other liberals,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Blackmun, voted for individuals between 62
percent and 73 percent of the time. See supra note 85. We omitted Justices Douglas and Black
because (like Justice Harlan) they served for such relatively short periods (two to six terms)
during the Burger era, and we omitted Justice Stewart because of his "hybrid" characterization
(modestly liberal under Spaeth, modestly conservative under our dataset). These three liberal
Justices are part of our reference category for regressions (along with Justices Powell, Burger,
and Harlan).
199. The exact ratios are 63:37 liberal for all cases, 62.5:37.5 liberal for language canon
cases, and 64:36 for substantive canon cases.
200. The exact ratios are 68:32 conservative for all cases and 69:33 conservative for language
canon cases.
201. See infra tbl.XII for basic multinomial model: neither "directional Justice" variable was
close to significant. We also looked separately at decisions involving only the conservative
subgroup and liberal subgroup; the decision outcome variable was not close to significant for
either subgroup. Copies of these subgroup regression results are on file with authors.
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Table X: Reliance on Canons by Selected Liberal and

Conservative Justices (N =

All Cases
Lang. Canon Cases
Subst. Canon Cases

507)202

Liberal Justices
Lib.
Cons.
Decision%
Decision%

Conservative Justices
Lib.
Cons.
Decision%
Decision%

58.1 (198)
57.4 (35)
59.5 (25)

30.7 (51)
28.6 (10)
20.8 (5)

33.7 (115)
34.4 (21)
33.3 (14)

64.5 (107)
62.9 (22)
70.8 (17)

These findings of a "supporting effect" do not mean that the
Justices have consciously manipulated the canons to serve their
respective policy objectives. Nor should the effect be understood to
imply, for example, that liberals' reliance on the canons was the
driving force enabling them to justify the liberal results they reached
60 percent of the time. As we noted earlier, the Justices typically rely
on multiple interpretive resources, and the canons may well be
supportive in an ancillary rather than dispositive sense in explaining
the Court's outcome. In addition, canon reliance tells us nothing
about the underlying intensity or magnitude of the ideological resultwhether, for instance, liberals' reliance occurs most often in cases that
are relatively routine or that do not carry substantial policy
consequences.
Our findings do indicate, however, that the canons are not
having an independent, constraining effect on the Justices'
decisionmaking-in particular, they are not functioning as a set of
overarching "neutral principles" in the hands of either liberal or
conservative Justices. Put differently, the canons' self-evident
persuasiveness and logical force are not leading liberal, or
conservative, Justices whose opinions rely on the canons closer to the
Court's ideological center.
One might counter that such a
"neutralizing" hypothesis is unrealistic if not naive. Given that the
Justices vote in conference on a result before they agree in writing on
a set of reasons, each majority opinion inevitably must use
interpretive resources to justify an already established outcome. At
the same time, the canons are touted as an important and putatively
neutral element in the bundle of competing, principled contentions
presented to the Justices by the parties and amici. On this view, they
202. The "W' of 507 includes 36 indeterminate majorities (neither liberal nor conservative)
authored by these 13 Justices: 28 authored by liberal Justices and 8 by conservative Justices.
For this reason, the percentages in Table X do not add up to 100 for either liberal or conservative
Justices.
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should be capable of playing at least a modestly leveling role in
shaping the outcome itself.
As we have seen, some scholars have implied such a role for the
canons, by characterizing them as "off-the-rack gap-filling rules" or
conventional signals that enhance the predictability of statutory
meaning. 20 3 Insofar as the language canons, for example, "embody
plausible or even irresistible judgments about how words should
ordinarily be understood,"'20 4 such an understanding would seem to
have no particular ideological orientation. Because, however, these
"plausible or irresistible judgments" are more likely to be associated
with liberal results in the hands of liberal Justices and conservative
results in the hands of conservatives, the language canons that
embody them do appear to function as a form of assistance for
preferred policy outcomes.
One additional aspect of Table X deserves mention. Decisions
authored by our five identified conservative Justices that rely on the
substantive canons reach conservative results more than three times
as often as liberal outcomes. While the low number of decisions
involved, twenty-four, may contribute to the absence of statistical
significance, 20 5 this set of outcomes is more sharply defined in
ideological terms than any of our findings involving language canons
or than any group of decisions authored by the eight designated liberal
Justices. The finding, therefore, raises the possibility that reliance on
substantive canons by the reigning Court majority may be more
closely connected to ideology than it was in the past.
3. Canons and Ideology in Close Cases
Although all cases considered by the Supreme Court are in
some sense controversial, the Justices end up resolving many cases
without disagreeing among themselves, while many others involve
narrow vote margins and extended, reasoned dissents. In order to
consider the possibility that highly contested decisions involving
canon usage might have their own distinct policy orientation, we
compare ideological outcomes for two categories of cases discussed in
Part III D above: unanimous decisions and close cases. Table XI
reports our results, which indicate that as a general matter
unanimous decisions during our thirty-four year period are more
203. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 67; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 943-45.
204. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 149-50.

205. When comparing the mean for decisions written by the five conservatives relying on
substantive canons with the mean for such decisions by all other Justices, t = .15. The overall
number of such decisions (twenty-four) includes two that are indeterminate in outcome.
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likely to produce liberal outcomes, while close cases tend to yield
conservative results.
Table XI: Reliance on Canons in Unanimous
20 6
and Close Cases (N=400)
All Cases

Unanimous

Lang. Canon Cases

Subst. Canon Cases

Lib.

Cons.

Lib.

Cons.

Lib.

Cons.

Decision

Decision

Decision

Decision

Decision

Decision

62.3 (157)

31.7 (80)

62.7 (32)

33.3 (17)

65.6 (21)

31.3 (10)

71.4 (15)*
30.8 (8)
57.7 (15)
23.8 (5)
Close
39.2 (58)
52.7 (78)
*indicates t-test reveals a significant difference between close (or unanimous) decisions involving
reliance on a particular type of canon and close (or unanimous) decisions not involving such
reliance.

The conservative or pro-employer nature of our 148 close cases
(53 percent conservative versus 39 percent liberal) warrants brief
attention. Our finding may well be attributable at least in part to the
political context of the appointments that have been made to the
Court since 1969. Of the eleven Justices who became members of the
Supreme Court between 1970 and 1994, nine were selected by
Republican presidents and each was more conservative in terms of
relevant judicial philosophy than the Justice he or she replaced. 20 7 As
the majority has gradually shifted in a conservative direction, the
cases that most closely divide the Court understandably have tipped
20 8
in that direction as well.

206. Note that N of 400 consists of 252 unanimous cases (15 indeterminate) and 148 close
cases (12 indeterminate); because of indeterminate cases (6.0 percent of unanimous; 8.1 percent
of close), percentages in Table XI do not add up to 100.
207. The series of replacements was as follows: Blackmun for Fortas; Rehnquist and Powell
for Harlan and Black; Stevens for Douglas; O'Connor for Stewart; Scalia for Burger; Kennedy for
Powell; Souter for Brennan; Thomas for Marshall. Each new Justice scores more conservative on
the Spaeth scale than the Justice being replaced.
208. The tendency for unanimous cases to produce liberal results is consistent with judicial
behavior research into the Burger, Warren, and Vinson Courts. See Saul Brenner & Theodore S.
Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial
Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAv. 75, 78-80 (1987). The authors speculate that conservative Justices
during this period may have felt more constrained by rule-of-law norms than did their liberal
counterparts, and hence more often voted to uphold positions with which they disagreed in policy
terms. Id. at 83. One possible explanation for the liberal tilt in unanimous decisions during our
thirty-four year period is as a kind of reaction to the increasingly conservative Court. Lower
courts anticipating the Supreme Court's direction, and pro-employer litigants enthused about
where the Court seems to be heading, may tend to expect more rapid conservative movement
than the Court is prepared to undertake, or to overreach on occasion in their litigation strategies.
The Court's response to such excesses is a unanimous rebuff. A perhaps more cynical alternative
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More interesting for our purposes, however, is the fact that
closely divided decisions in which the majority relies on substantive
canons are significantly more conservative than close cases in general,
and close cases in which the majority relies on language canons also
have a conservative tilt. While 39 percent of all close cases yield
liberal results, 31 percent of such cases relying on language canons
and 24 percent of those cases invoking substantive canons come down
in favor of employees. 20 9 By contrast, Table XI indicates that
unanimous opinions relying on language canons or substantive canons
are neither more nor less liberal than unanimous opinions in general.
We noted earlier that Rehnquist Court Justices are
significantly more likely than their Burger Court colleagues to rely on
both language canons and substantive canons when justifying results
in close cases. 210
That outcomes in these close, canon-invoking
majority opinions turn out to be especially conservative is a result
warranting further attention. At a minimum, our finding points to an
ideologically conservative climate when the canons are relied upon in
cases that divide the Justices.
It is possible, however, that increased canon reliance in close
cases is more a byproduct of ideological divisiveness than a
contributing factor to it. When a Supreme Court decision is being
challenged internally, the majority opinion author may well feel more
pressure to develop principled and assertedly content-neutral reasons
that will be viewed as persuasive by the inner circle of informed Court
followers and perhaps by the general public as well. 21 1 In these
circumstances, the canons may take on additional value to the extent
that they are perceived by judges, lawyers, and the public as relatively
neutral or principled.
: Yet, our results suggest that this "enhanced reliance" effect is
not ideologically neutral with respect to the canons: it occurs more
often in close conservative decisions than close liberal ones. In close
cases that reach conservative results, the majority author relies on
would be that unanimous cases involve issues that are either less important in policy terms or
less intensely "ideological," hence liberal victories can be ceded at relatively small cost.
209. These results are significant for substantive canons when using the t-test (t = .04),
although not for language canons (t = .20). Once again, the low number of decisions involved
(twenty-six close cases relying on language canons, including three indeterminate, and twentyone close cases relying on substantive canons, including one indeterminate) makes it more
difficult for results to achieve statistical significance.
210. See supra tbls.VII,VIII.
211. It is noteworthy in this regard that majority opinions in close cases rely on significantly
more interpretive resources than majority opinions in unanimous cases (3.45 resources on
average versus 3.13, Z <.01). Majority opinions in wide-margin and moderate-margin cases also
invoke more resources than majorities in unanimous cases, but the increases there are slight and
not significant.
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substantive canons 19.2 percent of the time, whereas for close liberal
decisions the majority opinion invokes substantive canons only 8.6
percent of the time. The difference is less stark for language canons,
but it points in the same direction: 19.2 percent of close conservative
decisions rely on language canons, whereas only 13.8 percent of close
liberal decisions do so. 2 12 Accordingly, it remains plausible to ask
whether canon reliance in contested cases is contributing to-not
simply reflecting-conservative outcomes.
In order better to understand the dynamics at work for the
subset of cases in which dissents have been written, we conclude this
Part with a more detailed picture of canon usage by the Justices.

212. This conservative tilt to canon reliance is further evidenced in majority opinions
authored by the five Rehnquist conservatives.
Of their fourteen close decisions with an
ideological outcome that relied on canons, all fourteen reached a conservative result. Of their
eighteen close decisions with an ideological outcome that did not invoke canons, two (11.1
percent) reached liberal results. Even for the eight liberal Justices, close case outcomes they
authored were slightly more conservative with canon reliance: 63.2 percent liberal with reliance
(twelve of nineteen), and 68.5 percent liberal without reliance (thirty-seven of fifty-four).
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4 Ideology and the Tensions Between Majority and Dissent
We report the results of our multinomial logistic regression
equation, in which the dependent variable involves four possible forms
of canon use in majority opinions: language, substantive, both types,
or no canons. We are especially interested in the possibility that
dissenting opinions might in effect challenge canon reliance, by
contending that such reliance either is an effort to thwart
congressional intent or reflects a selective or manipulative use of the
canons as a resource.
Accordingly, we include as independent
variables whether the dissenting opinion relied on legislative history,
on language canons, or on substantive canons.
Additional
independent variables address majority reliance on the eight
interpretive resources other than the canons. 213 We also include as
control variables the ideological direction of the decision, the Court era
(Burger or Rehnquist) in which it was decided, the subject matter
addressed, whether the majority was written by a liberal or a
conservative Justice, 214 and the majority opinion vote margin. 215 Table
XII reports our results.

213. We do not need a reference category here, because coding of the interpretive resources
does not involve mutually exclusive classifications.
214. We rely here on our previous grouping of eight long-serving liberals and the five
conservatives on the Rehnquist Court, see supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. We use
the six other Justices (Powell, Burger, Harlan, Stewart, Black, Douglas) as our reference
category. We ran the same multinomial regression equation grouping liberals and conservatives
solely based on the Spaeth scale, in order to be sure our interest in the Rehnquist conservative
majority was not skewing results. In this alternate regression, our reference category was
moderate-voting Justices (45-55 percent for employees) - O'Connor, Powell, Harlan, Stewart.
Results were virtually identical - everything significant in Table XII was also significant in the
alternate equation. Two additional variables were significant in the alternate equation: the five
conservatives used language canons more than the ten liberals (p = .01), and reliance on both
canons was associated with dissent invocation of language canons (p = .05). Copies of this
additional regression are on file with the authors.
215. We use wide-margin cases as our reference category for vote margin. In addition, we
use labor relations as the reference category for subject matter. The control variable for
ideological direction (which is fairly evenly distributed) is coded "-1" for conservative, "0" for
indeterminate, and "1" for liberal, precluding the need for a reference category.
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Table XII: Multinomial Logistic Regression for Canon Use
in Majority Opinions (N = 701)
Language
Canons

Substantive
Canons

Both
Canons

Interp. Resources
1.57 (.66)**
.25 (.34)
1.73 (.38)**
Textual Meaning majority
-34.80 (.67)**
-.86 (1.16)
.03 (.65)
Dictionary majority
1.00 (.57)*
.16 (.39)
Leg. History majority
.12 (.30)
-.07 (.34)
-1.03 (.52)**
Leg. Purpose majority
.22 (.31)
1.13 (.62)*
-.10 (.97)
.43 (.57)
Leg. Inaction majority
Supreme Court Precedent
-.05 (.30)
.54 (.43)
majority
.44 (.54)
Common Law Precedent
.21 (.66)
.24 (.43)
.35 (.47)
majority
-.73 (.66)
-2.49 (1.06)**
Agency Deference majority
-.50 (.36)
.78 (.84)
1.27 (.42)**
Leg. Hist. dissent
.32 (.36)
1.24
(.78)
.35
(.61)
Lang. Canon dissent
.88 (.44)**
.91 (.55)*
-34.30 (.71)**
Subst. Canon dissent
.11 (.51)
Control Variables
-.20 (.25)
.10 (.15)
-.09 (.17)
Liberal decision
.81 (.97)
.32
(.51)
-.10
(.44)
Liberal author
-.96 (1.16)
.43 (.66)
.37 (.47)
Conservative author
-.76 (.40)*
-.76 (.68)
-.65 (.33)**
Burger Court
1.08 (.52)**
.82 (.71)
.79 (.44)*
Unanimous
.10 (.83)
(.51)
.62
(.44)
.74
Close
.11 (.49)
-.09 (.60)
-1.75 (1.35)
Middle
-.09 (.39)
-.31 (.51)
.86 (.93)
Sex/race discrimination
.38 (.59)
.64 (.94)
-.20 (.51)
General discrimination
-35.50 (.67)**
.81 (.40)**
-.06 (.69)
Min. Standards
.64 (1.09)
1.20 (.57)**
.75 (.43)*
Retirement
-1.05 (1.05)
.72 (.72)
-34.70 (1.02)**
Negligence
.33 (.74)
2.04 (.81)**
-.21 (.57)
Miscellaneous
.81 (.44)*
-34.50 (.84)**
-35.40 (.32)**
Constitutional
-3.52 (.75)**
-4.01 (.92)**
Constant
-5.35 (1.73)**
18
90
55
Observations
**p .05, *p < .10
Pseudo R 2= .22
Prob>Chi-squared= .000
Robust Standard Errors based on clustering by case appear in parentheses next to
coefficients. Base Category for comparison is no canons used.
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Certain control variables have achieved significance when
compared to the base category of no canons. 21 6 The majority is more
likely to rely on language canons, and also on substantive canons, in
opinions written during the Rehnquist era, in opinions resolving
retirement issues, and in opinions that are unanimous. 217 In addition,
the majority is significantly more likely to rely on language canons in
opinions that address minimum standards issues, and the relationship
between reliance on substantive canons and opinions resolving
constitutional issues approaches significance. All of these findings are
broadly consistent with results reported in some of our earlier
218
bivariate tables.

216. We follow the common social science approach of designating regression results with pvalue of .05 or less as "significant," and results with a p-value of .10 or less as "approaching
significance." DAVID MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 506-07 (4th ed. 1997).
Our multinomial logistic regression includes subject matter variables because addition of those
variables more accurately captures the Justices' use of different resources in the cases. See
supra notes 74 and 138. As a result, the regression employs a different unit of analysis (subject
matter categories, N=701) than many of our prior analyses of canon usage (cases, N=632). While
a case-based analysis makes sense for most discussions of decisions in bivariate terms, subject
matter controls should be included in order for a regression to be fully specified. We have
addressed issues of heteroskedasticity with respect to the lack of independence for observations
from the same case, through clustering the data by case and then using the Huber-White
correction to produce robust standard errors. The use of robust standard errors is the more
accurate statistic for significance where heteroskedasticity is present or even possible. See
DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONMETRICS 61-63 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining heteroskedasticity);
STATA CORP., STATA BASE REFERENCE MANUAL AND USER'S GUIDE 254-258 (2001) (describing

how Huber-White correction is used to obtain robust standard errors).
217. For Rehnquist era opinions, results are significant for language canons and approach
significance for substantive canons. For retirement issues and unanimous opinions, results are
significant for substantive canons and approach significance for language canons. In addition,
the relationship between majority reliance on both types of canons in the same opinion and
decisions construing miscellaneous employment-related provisions is significant. Use of "both
canons" in a majority opinion occurs only eighteen times, and the two types of canons display
quite different traits when considered separately. We comment on further results from the Both
Canons category infra note 220.
There is a statistical artifact associated with the way Stata calculates the Huber-White
correction for clustering. Stata uses a point estimation technique that in this setting changes
findings of zero observations for a given variable to a very small number of observations
(something close to .0000001). As a result, five variables in the Both Canons results and one
(constitutional matters) in the Language Canon results appear to be extremely significant in the
negative direction when in fact there are no observations of any of these variables being related
to the use of the canons in question.
218. The significance of Rehnquist era reliance is consistent with Table I; significance for
retirement-related issues, and also minimum standards issues, is consistent with Tables III and
IV. With respect to unanimous opinions, data from Tables VII and VIII indicate canons were
used in the Burger years significantly more often in unanimous cases than in close decisions, and
in general were invoked more frequently in unanimous opinions than in any of the
nonunanimous groupings we coded. Although constitutional issues were not significant overall
in Table IV (substantive canons), there was a significant increase in reliance between the Burger
and Rehnquist eras.
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A number of interpretive resources also are significant with
respect to one type of canon or the other. Majority opinions that rely
on the language canons are significantly more likely to rely on the
meaning of the text as well. This is not surprising inasmuch as
reliance on such canons will almost invariably be linked to close
textual analysis. Majority opinions relying on the substantive canons
are significantly less likely to rely on agency deference. Thus, when
the Justices choose to rely on judicially developed norms or policies,
they are less willing to view executive branch interpretations as
persuasive authority. 2 19 At the same time, majority opinions relying
on substantive canons are more likely to invoke legislative inaction.
Such reliance on the absence of probative legislation suggests that the
Justices may be especially attuned to evidence of congressional
passivity when they decide to embrace their own policy-related
220
norms.
Finally, it is notable that when the majority relies on canons in
nonunanimous opinions, the dissent is significantly more likely to rely
on legislative history than when canons are not part of the majority's
reasoning. For substantive canons, the association is significant over
the entire thirty-four year period. For language canons, the overall
Significance based on t-tests in bivariate analysis does not always appear in regression
results because of the complex interaction among variables and the relative weight of each
variable based on its N size. What appears as significant in a bivariate analysis is important for
understanding the interactions between two variables, but it may not be powerful enough to
achieve significance in a regression model. We have chosen to report both bivariate and
regression results in an attempt to provide a full and textured description of the relationship
between canon usage and other factors that help explain the Court's decisions.
219. This diminished propensity to defer to agency interpretations does not extend to
majority opinions relying on language canons.
220. Apart from the statistical artifact described, supra note 217, three interpretive
resources are significant or close to significant when majority opinions rely on both types of
crnons. The higher likelihood of also relying on textual meaning would seem to reflect the same
link between language canons and close textual analysis identified for pure language canon
reliance. The association between majority reliance on both canons and heightened reliance on
legislative history may reflect in part the opinion-writing approach of Justices Blackmun and
Stevens. Those two Justices authored eleven of the eighteen decisions relying on both types of
canons (only one other Justice authored as many as two majorities in this category). As
discussed earlier, their legal process approach typically leads them to invoke legislative history
to confirm or reinforce the apparent meaning of the text. See supra notes 167-168 and
accompanying text. Of the eleven majority opinions by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, seven
relied on legislative history. It is also noteworthy that none of the eighteen opinions was
authored by Justices Scalia or Thomas, who are most persistently hostile to relying on this
intent-oriented resource. Finally, while majority reliance on both canons is associated with
diminished reliance on legislative purpose, the eighteen majority opinions do rely on legislative
purpose 67 percent of the time (twelve opinions); this, however, is a significant decline in relation
to the 83.4 percent level of reliance on legislative purpose for the base category of no canons. See
also supra tbl. I (reporting 81.2 percent level of reliance on legislative purpose for all 632
majority opinions).
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result is not significant but further analysis indicates that dissent
reliance on legislative history is significant during the Rehnquist
era. 22 1 In addition, Table XII indicates that majority reliance on
language canons is associated with a significant increase in dissent
dependence on language canons, while the relationship between
majority and dissent reliance on substantive canons approaches
significance. 222
These results suggest the presence of certain
competitive tensions in the Court's interpretive approach that warrant
further analysis at the individual case level.
In an effort to identify cases that are potentially illustrative of
-these tensions, we compiled two lists. One consists of decisions in
which the majority relies on language canons or substantive canons
but not legislative history, while the dissent relies on legislative
history. We assume arguendo that when both majority and dissent
invoke legislative history, there is likely to be reasonable
disagreement about what Congress actually intended. Conversely, we
assume that when a majority relies on canons without legislative
history, either no reliable evidence of legislative intent is available to
support the majority position or such evidence is viewed by the
majority as irrelevant. In either case, the tension between a majority
that declines to rely on evidence of congressional intent and a dissent
that embraces such evidence raises the possibility that the canons
may be used to frustrate or undermine Congress's discoverable
preferences.
There are twenty-one decisions in which the majority opinion
relies on language or substantive canons (but not legislative history)
while the dissent invokes legislative history to support its position.
Two of the twenty-one are ideologically indeterminate, but of the
nineteen decisions that have an ideological direction, seventeen are
conservative in outcome. 223 Further, sixteen of these nineteen cases
(fourteen conservative) were decided by the Rehnquist Court, all
between 1988 and 2003.
The second list of cases is comprised of decisions in which both
majority and dissent rely on the canons. Here, we were influenced by
Karl Llewellyn's famous article positing the presence of a

221. When running the full multinomial model on only Rehnquist era cases (see supra text
accompanying note 192), the association with dissent reliance on legislative history is significant
(p = .04). Copies of these results are on file with the authors.
222. Majority reliance on both types of canons is not significantly associated with dissent
reliance on either language or substantive canons or on legislative history. Because nine of the
eighteen majority opinions relying on both types of canons are unanimous, the number of
decisions in this grouping that include a dissent is quite small.
223. We discuss or refer to ten of these nineteen decisions in Part IV.B.
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countercanon for each canon as proof of the canons' fundamentally
indeterminate nature. 224 We wondered whether a review of these
"dueling canon" cases would suggest the Justices' willingness to
engage one another regarding their competing reliance and also how
that inter-canon tension related to the ideological orientation of the
cases.
This second list includes thirty-three cases, three of which are
ideologically indeterminate.
Of the thirty cases that have an
ideological direction, 73 percent (twenty-two) arose during the
Rehnquist era, and 70 percent (twenty-one) reach conservative results.
However, there is some overlap between our two lists: ten dueling
22 5
canon cases also involved dissents relying on legislative history.
With these ten cases omitted, the ideological results are only modestly
directional.
There are thirteen conservative and nine liberal
decisions, with eight cases decided by the Burger Court and fourteen
226
by the Rehnquist Court.

IV. THE MALLEABILITY OF THE CANONS: CASE LAW ANALYSIS AND
CONTENDING THEORIES

While there are doubtless further empirical assessments that
would shed more light on our results, we now shift our attention to the
case-specific level. We have chosen to focus on individual Court
decisions that address three specific aspects of our findings. Each
aspect relates to one of the principal theorized accounts of how the
canons function in the interpretive process.
First, we analyze several cases that exemplify the Court's
reliance on language canons in more technical subject matter areas,
and with respect to technical or procedural issues in an "ideologically
charged" subject area. Following up on our discussion in Part III.B.,
we explore the extent to which the reasoning in these cases supports
the public choice account of canon usage. Next, we consider a number
of contested cases that illustrate the tension within the Rehnquist
Court between reliance on canons and invocation of legislative history.
224. Llewellyn, supra note 22. Table XII reports that majority reliance on each type of canon
(language and substantive) is significantly associated with dissent invocation of that same type
of canon. We extended our list, however, to include cases in which both majority and dissent
relied on canons of any kind, in order to consider more fully the doctrinal implications of these
canon-related tensions.
225. All ten of these cases are from the Rehnquist years; eight have conservative outcomes
and two are indeterminate.
226. Lists of all decisions referred to in text accompanying notes 223, 225, and 226 are on file
with authors.
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This tension, described in Parts III.D. and E., seems to support the
pessimistic assertions that canons are used to undermine identifiable
legislative intent. Finally, we review certain divided decisions in
which canons are relied on by both majority and dissent. These
dueling canon cases, referred to in Part III.E., cast serious doubt on
legal process claims that the canons enhance predictability and
consistency in the interpretation of statutes.
In each instance, our doctrinal discussion is meant to be
illustrative rather than exhaustive. We have uncovered various
patterns of canon usage in Part III, but some individual cases will
relate to those patterns more clearly than others. We believe the
cases discussed below are appropriate examples that help us to assess
the potential applicability of our three distinct accounts: public choice,
pessimistic, and legal process. Together, they contribute to a nuanced,
composite picture of how the canons have functioned as justifications
for the Court's decisions. After examining cases in these three areas,
we offer some thoughts on the role played by the canons in general,
focusing on their value as well as their limitations.
A. Obscure Subject Matter and the Public Choice Account
As noted earlier, 22 7 Professors Macey and Miller contend that
the canons, by which they seem to mean primarily language canons, 228
tend to be used in statutory cases of technical complexity and little
ideological interest. According to Macey and Miller, these are the
cases in which the Justices are most likely to worry about their lack of
subject matter expertise and the possibility that they will make an
embarrassing substantive or policy-related mistake. 229 By serving as
a kind of "stop-gap" to facilitate decisionmaking "in the absence of a
policy-based justification," these canons provide a "contentindependent decision methodology" that often attracts unanimous or
230
near-unanimous approval.
The results set forth in Table III and the accompanying
discussion provide some support for this account. Language canons
are used significantly more in decisions interpreting ERISA and other
retirement-related statutes, and in minimum standards cases-both
subject areas that tend to be technically complex and less obviously
227. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
228. See Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 663 (focusing on "content-independent
justifications"); id. at 652 (using as their illustrative decision Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers,
493 U.S. 67 (1989), which relies on ejusdem generis).
229. Id. at 660.64.
230. Id. at 657-58.
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ideological. Further, we reported that with respect to Title VII, the
Court relied on language canons in interpreting more complicated
procedural facets of that ideologically charged statutory scheme. Vote
margins in these Title VII procedural cases also tend to be wider than
231
for Title VII decisions in general.
One case that generally comports with this public choice
account is Universities Research Ass'n Inc. v. Coutu, 232 a unanimous
1981 decision authored by Justice Blackmun construing a pre-New
Deal prevailing wage law. In Coutu, the Court held that the DavisBacon Act 233 precludes a private right of action for back wages under a
contract that has been administratively determined not to call for
Davis-Bacon work. In addition to the arcane nature of the subject
matter, 234 the Court resolved the case on very narrow grounds.
Justice Blackmun relied in part on the expressio unius canon,
observing that because Congress had authorized a private damages
remedy for back wages under certain conditions, the Court was
unwilling to infer such a remedy under the different circumstances of
this case. 2 35 The federal contractor had argued that there could be no
implied right of action even for a contract that contained specific
Davis-Bacon wage stipulations, 236 and Justice Blackmun recognized
that the majority's reasoning might well foreclose any implied right of
action under the statute. 237 Nevertheless, he confined the Court's
holding to a very small universe-employees who seek judicial
enforcement of Davis-Bacon wage protections with respect to contracts
that never mention a right to receive Davis-Bacon wage rates. It may
be that the Court's willingness to duck potentially troubling larger
issues 238 contributed to unanimity as much as the technical and
231. Of seventeen Title VII "procedural" language canon cases (see supra text accompanying
notes 146-49) eight were unanimous and four were decided by wide margins; this combined total
amounts to 71 percent (twelve of seventeen). For the ninety-one other Title VII cases, the
proportion of unanimous and wide margin votes was somewhat lower (forty-eight of ninety-one,
or 53 percent).
232. 450 U.S. 754 (1981).

233. Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §
276a(a)) (requiring that construction contracts pay no less than prevailing wage rates, as
determined by Secretary of Labor).
234. The Davis-Bacon Act is a 1931 statute regulating wage rates on federal construction
contracts, and it is rarely litigated at the Supreme Court level. Coutu was the only Davis-Bacon
decision in our 632-case dataset.
235. Coutu, 450 U.S. at 773.
236. Id. at 768-69.
237. Id. at 769 n.19.
238. In addition to the broader implied right of action issue referred to in the text, the Court
also declined to address a second argument made by the federal contractor: whether federal
courts have jurisdiction to review coverage and classification determinations made by the
Secretary of Labor. Id. at 768-69 & n.18.
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unglamorous nature of the subject matter. The majority opinion also
relied on plain meaning of the text, specific legislative history, general
2 39
legislative purpose, and agency deference to support its result.
A decade later, in Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,240 a unanimous
Court invoked the expressio unius canon to help justify a private right
of action under a comparably obscure federal statute, the Migrant &
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (AWPA).24 1 The issue in
Barrett was whether the right of action expressly conferred on migrant
workers under the AWPA is effectively conditioned by the exclusivity
provisions in state workers' compensation laws. The employer pointed
to the Act's motor vehicle safety provisions, which permit employers to
satisfy AWPA insurance policy and liability bond requirements
through state workers' compensation insurance. 242 The employer
contended that it made no sense for Congress to have waived federal
insurance coverage requirements when workers' compensation was
provided and yet allow migrant workers to pursue cumulative
243
remedies under workers' compensation laws and AWPA.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, declined to allow the
enforcement provisions of AWPA to be restricted by language in a
separate title of the Act.
Emphasizing that the enforcement
provisions themselves provided one express limitation (unrelated to
workers' compensation schemes) on the availability of relief, Justice
Marshall reasoned that Congress's failure to include a further
limitation was highly probative as a matter of basic statutory
construction. 244 While relying on the Act's language and structure to
preserve this AWPA right of action, Marshall did circumscribe the
implications of the Court's holding by adding that any AWPA damages

239. Id. at 771-73 (relying on language of Act); id. at 773-780 (relying extensively on history
of 1931 Act and 1964 amendment); id. at 782-83 (relying on Act's purpose of promoting efficiency
and certainty in government contracting); id. at 783 (relying on respect for Secretary's detailed
regulations fostering uniformity in contract coverage). This use of language canons as part of a
broader web of interpretive resources is fairly typical of Justice Blackmun's opinion-writing
methodology. See supra notes 173-177 and 197-201 and accompanying text.
240. 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
241. Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et. seq.
(2000)). This is the only AWPA case in our dataset.
242. Barrett, 494 U.S. at 643-44.
243. Id. at 644.
244. Id. at 644-45. The express provision in AWPA called for limiting the amount of
damages based on whether "an attempt was made to resolve the issues in dispute before the
resort to litigation." Id. at 644 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(2)). Justice Marshall noted that the
Department of Labor had taken the opposite view in its regulations, but he refused to defer to
the agency in light of the Act's linguistic and structural clarity, as well as his determination that
regulating the scope of judicial power granted by the AWPA was a matter Congress had not
delegated to the Department. Id. at 649-50.
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award could be reduced in light of a farmworker's receipt of state
workers' compensation benefits. 245
Both Coutu and Barrett involved a unanimous Court relying on
the expressio unius canon to help justify its interpretation of an
obscure workplace standards statute in a decision with very limited
practical consequences. 24 6 There are numerous additional decisions
that conform to this general picture.
Some arise under similar
minimum standards statutes while others interpret certain provisions
of ERISA; the Court frequently relies on language canons besides
expressio unius to help explain its holdings in such decisions. 247
While Professors Macey and Miller suggest that judges tend to
opt for such language canon reliance in cases where the policy choices
of the political branches are essentially unknown, 248 that overstates
the matter. The Court in these cases often invokes purposive
justifications-gleaned from legislative record evidence or imputed to
Congress-thereby attributing its result in part to the policy
preferences of the legislative branch. 249 In addition, the relevant
executive branch agency has sometimes advanced its own policy-based
interpretation to which the Court is simply unwilling to defer. 250 Still,
in cases interpreting procedural or remedial aspects of relatively
lackluster federal laws, where the outcome is at best of modest

245. Id. at 651 n.5.
246. The result in Coutu was conservative (prohibiting the employee's federal lawsuit) while
in Barrett the outcome was liberal (preserving the employee's federal cause of action).
247. See, e.g., Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513
U.S. 414 (1995) (relying inter alia on Whole Act Rule to hold unanimously that under
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, interest on the charge for withdrawal from a
pension plan begins to accrue on first day of plan year following withdrawal rather than last day
of plan year preceding withdrawal); Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22 (1993) (relying inter
alia on Whole Act Rule to hold unanimously that under FLSA section regulating comp time for
government employees, a public employer in a right to work state may provide comp time
pursuant to individual agreements with each employee, even though the employees have
designated a union representative to negotiate for such arrangements); Comm'r. of Internal
Revenue v. Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 152 (1993) (relying in part on canon that same
words used in different parts of a statute are meant to have the same meaning to hold (by 8-1
margin) that an employer's transfer of certain property to a defined benefit plan in partial
satisfaction of its funding obligation was a prohibited "sale or exchange" under ERISA).
248. Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 659.
249. Univs. Research Ass'n Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 773-80, 782-83 (1981); Keystone, 508
U.S. at 160; Schlitz, 513 U.S. at 428-30.
250. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990); see also Potomac Electric
Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 275-76, 277-80 (1980)
(relying in part on in pari materia canon and rejecting agency's position on scope of employee's
statutory recovery rights under LHWCA); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
477-81 (1992) (relying in part on Whole Act Rule and rejecting agency interpretation of scope of
LHWCA's forfeiture provision for settlement of third party claims).
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practical importance, the Court is especially inclined to use maxims of
linguistic meaning and structure to help justify its results.
It may be, as Macey and Miller suggest, that such facially
content-neutral rationales help to insulate the Justices from error or
embarrassment in areas where they feel less confident about either
their substantive expertise or their policy preferences. It seems more
likely, however, that the Justices in these cases are less personally
invested rather than less confident. Their willingness to invoke the
language canons is due-consciously or subconsciously-to diminished
appetite for the subject matter, an understanding that the practical
stakes are not terribly high, or some combination of these factors.
Apart from the weaker substantive interest such cases
generate, the relatively precise and detailed nature of the provisions
at stake also may help to explain why the Justices rely more often on
language canons. In both Coutu and Barrett, the Court was called
upon to construe intricate statutory terms covering the relationship
between possible private rights of action and the roles of other
regulatory actors. The elaborately complicated aspects of these
interpretive controversies stand in contrast to instances of Congress's
more open-textured drafting. Statutory directives that simply prohibit
employers from "restrain[ing] or coerc[ing]" workers who seek to
organize a union, 251 or from "discriminat[ing]" against employees
because of race or sex, 252 effectively delegate broader interpretive
authority to agencies and courts. Such provisions lack the more
particularized verbiage that invites close linguistic analysis. Further,
the controversies addressing Congress's more detailed and closetextured legislative products often require interpretation of
jurisdictional, remedial, or procedural provisions that are perceived to
have analogs in other statutes or elsewhere within the same statute.
In these circumstances, the Justices may find the cross-referential
nature of language canon analysis a relatively comfortable
methodological fit.
This explanation, keyed to the specificity and structural
context of the provision at issue, may apply as well for subject matter
areas that are not at all esoteric, such as Title VII. We described
earlier our finding that the Court's reliance on language canons when
interpreting Title VII is strongly associated with procedural and
technical aspects of that ideologically sensitive statute. 253 A good

251. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
253. See supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text.

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

example of this association is Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,2 54 a
unanimous 1997 decision authored by Justice Thomas.
In Robinson, the issue presented was whether Title VII's antiretaliation provision, Section 704(a), protects former employees as well
as current ones. A former employee alleged that Shell Oil had given
him a poor reference in retaliation for his having previously filed a
race discrimination charge with the EEOC. 255 The language of Section
704(a) prohibits discrimination by an employer "against any of his
employees or applicants for employment" who have filed a charge,
testified, or otherwise assisted in an EEOC investigation. 2 56 The
Court of Appeals had held that this language was clear on its face:
"employees" referred only to current employees, and an anti257
retaliation claim by a former employee was therefore not cognizable.
The Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on the Whole Act Rule
while declining to make use of language canon analysis that pointed in
the opposite direction.
Justice Thomas first determined that against the background
of Title VII as a whole, the term "employees" in Section 704(a) was
ambiguous with respect to excluding former employees.
Thomas
reasoned that neither the basic definition of "employee" within the Act
nor treatment of the term in legal dictionaries included a clear
temporal qualifier. 258
Importantly, he also recognized that in a
number of other statutes, Congress had identified "former employees"
as a class separate from current employees. In his view, however, this
"prove[d] only that Congress can use the unqualified term 'employees'
to refer only to current employees, not that it did so in this particular
statute."259 The Court thus rejected reliance on the linguistic maxim
that Congress uses the same term consistently in different statutes, a
canon that has attracted some scholarly criticism 260 but also frequent

254. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
255. Id. at 339-40.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
257. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
258. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341-42. Justice Thomas acknowledged that the Court only weeks
earlier had interpreted the word "employees" appearing in a separate section of Title VII as
referring to those having a current employment relationship, but he distinguished the prior
holding because that different section included a present-tense qualifier in its discussion of
"employees." Id. at 341 & n.2.
259. Id. at 341-42 (emphasis in original).
260. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 171, 234-40 (2000) (contending that such reliance on interstatutory references is
prone to judicial manipulation and will unsettle bodies of federal law not before the court).
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adherence from the Justices, 261 including in decisions that interpret
Title VII.262
Instead, the Court focused on a number of other places in Title
VII where the term "employees" plainly did encompass former
employees, notably provisions specifying access to the statute's
remedial mechanisms. 263
Consideration of this broader context,
including the fact that Section 704(a)'s protection for filing a "charge"
would seem inevitably to embrace charges by former employees
alleging unlawful termination, led the Court to conclude that the
genuinely ambiguous word "employees" in Section 704(a) should be
read to cover former employees. 264 Justice Thomas then invoked
legislative purpose as "further support" for the majority's position,
observing that it would undermine the basic concept of anti-retaliation
protections to hold that they expire as soon as an employee leaves the
265
job or is terminated.
In Robinson, as in many other procedural or jurisdictional Title
VII decisions that rely on language canons, the Justices are well
aware of the policy implications involved. 266
Moreover, these
implications are hardly unimportant in practical terms: a
determination that anti-retaliation protections covered only current
employees would presumably have had a severely chilling effect on
267
individuals wishing to invoke agency procedures under the Act.
Still, Justice Thomas devotes almost all of his analysis to arguments
about the meaning and structure of the statutory language, saving
only his final two paragraphs for discussion of congressional purpose
as supplemental reinforcement.
Admittedly, Justice Thomas-a textualist and frequent
language canon user-may be especially inclined to dwell on parsing
the language of key provisions and analyzing the interplay among
261. See id. at 180-203 (citing to multiple decisions between 1991 and 2000 in which use of
what Buzbee calls the "one-Congress fiction" was a driving force in the result reached by the
Court).
262. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
263. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342.43 (referring to meaning of "employees" in Sections
706(g)(1), 717(b), and 717(c)).
264. Id. at 345.
265. Id. at 345-46.
266. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512-514 (2002) (invoking legislative
purpose to support holding that is also justified by language canon reliance); Loeffler v. Frank,
486 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1988) (same); EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600-02
(1981) (same).

267. See also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-18 (2002) (discussing
policy implications of limitations period for hostile environment sexual harassment claims);
Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 556-57 (addressing policy consequences of allowing prejudgment interest in
suit against Postal Service).
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detailed subparts of a complex statutory scheme. But the Court's
comfort level with these refined language canon analyses extends to
nontextualist Justices as well. 268 Language canon usage is inevitably
a byproduct of assessing the statutory text, and this consideration is
likely to occur early in the Court's interpretive reasoning processes.
When the language of that text deals with procedural, jurisdictional,
or remedial matters that recur in other statutory settings, or in
different parts of the statute being construed, language canons seem
to play a more important role.
In sum, it is unlikely that the Justices' more frequent language
canon reliance, associated with several relatively obscure areas of
substantive law and more generally with technical matters that are
codified in some detail, occurs out of ignorance regarding the policy
preferences of the other two branches, or out of a desire to avoid
making a policy mistake. Rather, their reliance may well be a
function of two other motives that are distinct yet overlapping.
The Justices' inclination to invoke language canons in this
subset of cases would appear to reflect a relative lack of interest in
certain esoteric subject matter areas and a relative comfort level with
the intra and interstatutory frames of reference afforded by certain
types of procedurally-related issues. It is even possible that the first
of these motives may have helped to encourage the second, at least in
cases that are decided with little or no dissent. The wide margin of
support in many obscure or technical decisions may reflect the
Justices' comparatively softer investment in "taking sides" on such
matters. Justices adopting this somewhat more relaxed stance may
then find it easier to embrace an interpretive approach that takes an
aspirational view of congressional lawmaking as a linguistically
integrated and harmonious enterprise.
B. Pessimists'Perspective:Tension Between Canons and Legislative
History
Professors Ross and Rubin each have warned against the
dangers that courts will use canons to frustrate readily discernible
congressional intent. 269 Their concern reflects the existence of periodic
tension between invocation of the canons and reliance on legislative
history, a tension that has become more prominent in recent times.
268. See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823-26 (1990) (majority
opinion by Justice Stevens); Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 549, 558-63 (majority opinion by Justice
Blackmun); Associated Dry Goods Corp, 449 U.S. at 590, 598-603 (majority opinion by Justice
Stewart).
269. Ross, supra note 13, at 562; Rubin, supra note 13, at 580.
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As Professor Manning observed in an article chronicling the revival of
the canons, to the extent there are misgivings about "the judicial
capacity to find ... legislative intent or purpose, it may seem
important, if not essential, to emphasize and develop effective rules of
thumb to resolve the doubts that inevitably arise out of statutory
language. ' 270 Our findings document a brisk competition involving
these two interpretive approaches, in the connection between majority
reliance on canons and dissent use of legislative history, and also the
contrast between the rising influence of the canons as an interpretive
justification and the Court's diminished reliance on legislative
27 1
history.
There is no intrinsic reason why the results of such tension
should point in a single ideological direction. Legislative history at
times reveals conflicting or overlapping motivations among members
who supported enactment, and even those who bristle at Judge
Leventhal's famously sardonic observation 272 would concede that
legislative history may contain credible evidence of divergent
rationales. To be sure, Justices Scalia and Thomas-frequent users of
language canons-have publicly renounced relying on legislative
history in their majority opinions. But this refusal, adopted and
applied as a matter of principle, appears on its face to be ideologically
neutral.
Moreover, thirteen other Justices authoring majority
opinions during the Rehnquist era continue to regard legislative
history as potentially probative. They too are part of the sharply
increased willingness to rely on both language and substantive
canons, and Justices Scalia and Thomas have in fact contributed only
modestly to our pool of majority opinions pitting canons against
273
legislative history.
Accordingly, it is striking to find such an overwhelmingly
conservative set of results for the nineteen decisions in which majority
reliance on canons clashes with dissent dependence on legislative

270. Manning, supra note 9, at 285.
271. See supra tbl.XII and accompanying discussion; supra text accompanying notes 123-133.
272. Judge Leventhal once referred to legislative history as a way of "looking over a crowd
and picking out your friends." Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). Notwithstanding this
critical comment, Judge Leventhal regularly relied on legislative history in justifying his
decisions while a member of the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030,
1036-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F. 2d 1369, 1373-76 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
273. Of the nineteen ideologically directional majority opinions referred to supra in note 223,
Justices Scalia or Thomas authored a total of three. Of the ten majorities analyzed or referred to
in this subpart, Justices Scalia and Thomas authored one each: the rest were written by Justices
Kennedy (3), O'Connor (2), Rehnquist, White, and Powell.
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history: eight of nine language canon cases and nine of ten substantive
canon cases. We reported earlier the findings that in closely divided
decisions the majority's reliance on canons tends to produce
conservative outcomes, 274 and that canon reliance is significantly
275
associated with greater dependence on legislative history in dissent.
Overall, this polarized pattern suggests that for an identifiable subset
of divisive cases, the canons are being used by the Rehnquist Court to
help produce a judicially desired set of policies, ignoring or sacrificing
legislatively expressed preferences in the process. We consider in
some detail five cases-three involving language canons and two
substantive canons-that present specific examples of this pattern.
1. Language Canon Reliance
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,276 a closely divided 1993
ERISA decision, the Court held that a nonfiduciary who knowingly
takes part in the breach of a fiduciary duty imposed under the Act is
not liable for consequent monetary losses suffered by employee benefit
plan participants.
The case involved a class of former salaried
employees at Kaiser Steel who alleged that they had received
substantially reduced pensions. 277 Their claim against Hewitt, the
plan actuary, was for a breach of professional duties: Hewitt's
knowing use of flawed actuarial assumptions and its failure to disclose
that Kaiser had not adequately funded the plan resulted in there
278
being insufficient assets to cover the retiree's fully vested pensions.
The question before the Court was whether Section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA, which authorizes plan participants to sue for "appropriate
equitable relief to redress ... violations,"' 279 covered an action for

274. See supratbl.XI.
275. See supra tbl.XII and accompanying discussion. The tension between canons and
legislative intent takes on a more subtly ideological flavor when the two interpretive resources
have inverted roles. Of the eight contested decisions in which the majority (but not dissent)
relied on legislative history while the dissent invoked language canons, seven reached liberal
results. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S.
212 (1999); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996). Of the five contested decisions in
which the majority (but not dissent) relied on legislative history while the dissent invoked
substantive canons, four reached conservative results and the fifth was indeterminate. See, e.g.,
Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
276. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
277. Id. at 250. For a thoughtful contemporary analysis of Mertens that adopts a perspective
similar to the authors', see Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court's 1992-93 Term: A Review of
Labor and Employment Law Cases, 9 LAB. LAWYER 603, 613-17 (1993).
278. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 250-51.
279. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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monetary damages against nonfiduciaries in these liability-producing
circumstances.280
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Scalia held that
the answer was no. 28 1 The majority opinion relied heavily on plain
meaning and language canons. Justice Scalia insisted that the term
"equitable" in connection with "relief' should be understood to cover
only remedies traditionally available at equity, not monetary damages
that constitute legal relief. 28 2 He then made use of the "consistent
usage across statutes" canon, emphasizing that the Court had
construed very similar language in Title VII to foreclose access to
compensatory or punitive damages. 28 3 Justice Scalia also relied on the
Whole Act Rule, reasoning that if "equitable" relief in Section 502(a)(3)
were construed to include damages, this would vitiate the meaning of
distinctions Congress had drawn elsewhere in ERISA between
"equitable" and "legal" relief.28 4 The majority acknowledged that
under the common law of trusts, courts of equity had authority to
award money damages in actions by beneficiaries, both against a
trustee for breach of trust and against third parties who knowingly
participated in the breach. 28 5 The Court reiterated, however, that
"equitable relief' must mean something less than "all relief," and
accordingly declined to impose a "strained interpretation" on Section
28 6
502(a)(3).
The dissent, written by Justice White, relied heavily on
legislative history and purpose to support its argument for a broader
meaning of the phrase "equitable relief."28 7 Justice White pointed to
comments in both House and Senate committee reports and also to
remarks by chief Senate sponsor Senator Williams; these statements
reflected an intent that the courts rely on settled precedents under the
common law of trusts in shaping the contours of breach of trusts law
contemplated under Section 502(a)(3). 288 It was well established when
280. The Court assumed arguendo that the facts alleged would qualify as a violation of
ERISA by nonfiduciary Hewitt, although the majority expressly reserved the liability question
for another day. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254-55.
281. Id. at 251-63. Joining Justice Scalia's opinion were Justices Blackmun, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas. Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor. The presence of Blackmun and Souter in the majority, and Rehnquist and O'Connor
in dissent, makes this a somewhat unusual lineup.
282. Id. at 255.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 257-59.
285. Id. at 256.
286. Id. at 258 n.8, 261.
287. Id at 263-74.
288. Id. at 264-65 (relying on H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973); at 11, S. REP. NO. 93-527, at 29
(1973); 120 CONG. REC. 29928, 29932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
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ERISA was being enacted that the traditional "equitable" relief
available to trust beneficiaries included compensatory damages, and
the dissent accordingly maintained that Section 502(a)(3)'s reference
to "appropriate equitable relief' was meant to cover make-whole
monetary awards, "equity's routine remedy" for breaches of trust like
the one at issue here. 28 9 Indeed, the dissent added, given Congress's
overriding purpose of protecting participants in ERISA-governed
plans, and the broad preemption of state law in other parts of the Act,
it would be nothing less than subversive to construe key remedial
language so as to leave the protected class worse off than they had
290
been before enactment of ERISA.
As noted above, Justice Scalia agreed with the dissent that
plan participants would have been entitled to recover under the
common law precedents in effect when ERISA was enacted. The
majority also acknowledged the dissent's reliance on legislative
purpose, but Justice Scalia referred disparagingly to "vague notions of
a statute's 'basic purpose' [as being] inadequate to overcome the words
of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration." 291 The
majority made no effort to confront the evidence of legislative intent
invoked by the dissent, evidence the Court had found probative on
other occasions. 292 Although Justice White offered a textual reading
that took issue with the majority's plain meaning analysis, 293 this too
did not dissuade Justice Scalia from adhering to his linguistic
approach.
The majority's one concession to the possibility that it might be
thwarting congressional intent came in the final paragraph of its
opinion. Justice Scalia posited a "tension" between ERISA's "primary
goal" of protecting beneficiaries and a "subsidiary goal" of containing
pension plan costs-notably defraying the higher insurance costs that
would be imposed on actuaries-and he concluded that the text here
favored the subsidiary purpose. 294 There is certainly a prospect of

289. Id. at 265-66.
290. Id. at 266-67. The beneficiaries end up worse off because ERISA's broad preemption
clause precludes formerly available state law actions. Id. at 267 n.2; id. at 261.
291. Id. at 261 (emphasis in original); see also John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By
"Equitable" The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1354-55 (2003) (criticizing Court for refusing to confront ERISA's remedial
purpose and for relying on "specificity myth" that statute's careful and comprehensive drafting
warrants excluding all details of practice not spelled out in text).
292. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264 (citing to Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
110-11 (1989) and Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp.
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985)).
293. Id. at 267-69.
294. Id. at 263.
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increased transaction costs flowing from the federal imposition of
monetary remedies on nonfiduciaries. Indeed, such a prospect is
present for any ERISA standard that has the effect of benefiting
employees and retirees. The majority, however, pointed to no evidence
that Congress was concerned about these particular costs when key
legislative players urged reliance on remedial standards established
under the common law of trusts. Instead, by elevating what it
conceded was the "subsidiary" goal of cost-containment over the
primary goal of protecting plan participants, the majority seemed to
be relying on its own policy preferences favoring business efficiency. 295
Both sides agree that the Court's result leaves Mertens (and large
numbers similarly situated) worse off than they were before ERISA.
One is hard pressed not to view such results as frustrating the Act's
generally recognized purpose, and the majority's linguistically driven
reasoning is largely indifferent to that concern. 296
Our second example, Sutton v. United Air Lines,297 involved a
divided Court in 1999 interpreting the Americans With Disabilities
Act ("ADA") 298 to mean that corrective and mitigating measures
should be considered when determining whether an individual is
disabled, thereby restricting the Act's potential scope of coverage.
Sutton and her twin sister, who were afflicted with severe myopia, had
applied for jobs with United as commercial pilots. Although they met
the company's basic qualifications (both were experienced, FAAcertified pilots), they were not offered a position because they did not
meet United's minimum standard for uncorrected visual acuity. 29 9
The main issue presented was whether, in interpreting the Act's
applicable definition of disability-"a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" 30 0 -a

295. See Bellace, supra note 277, at 616.
296. Proponents of the linguistic approach have maintained that if the Court's close textual
analysis frustrates congressional purpose, Congress can take the salutary step to clarify its
intended meaning. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. As one of us has argued in an
earlier article, this invitation to clarify the often-inconclusive quality of statutory language fails
to appreciate the institutional and political complexities endemic to the modern legislative
enterprise-Congress generally cannot enact statutes embodying the degree of precision desired
by textualists. In addition, the textualist approach imposes substantial opportunity costs that
are likely to undermine Congress's efforts to manage its own legislative agenda. See James J.
Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatter or
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16-26, 104-05 (1994).
297. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2000).
299. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Court also addressed a separate aspect of this definitionwhether Sutton should be "regarded" as having a substantial impairment under 42 U.S.C. §
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court should take account of corrective measures (such as eyeglasses,
medications, or prosthetic devices) that mitigate the individual's
impairment.
Justice O'Connor wrote for seven members of the Court,
concluding that the approach adopted by the EEOC and the
Department of Justice, that individuals were to be evaluated in their
hypothetical uncorrected state, was an impermissible interpretation of
the ADA. 30 1 Relying heavily on the Whole Act Rule, the majority
reasoned that the ADA was unambiguous on this issue and therefore
30 2
declined to consider the available legislative history.
The Court discerned clear meaning based in part on the phrase
"substantially limits," which in its view mandated individualized
inquiry into whether a particular person is actually disabled, as
opposed to the EEOC's "speculat[ive]" approach as to how an
uncorrected impairment tends to affect groups of people. 30 3 But the
lynchpin for the majority opinion was the ADA's findings section,
which declared that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities." 30 4
Although Justice O'Connor
expressed uncertainty about the origins of this forty-three million
figure, she reasoned that it could not possibly be squared with an
"uncorrected" approach that would cover one hundred million people
or more. 30 5 In order to avoid rendering the forty-three million number
meaningless, the Court concluded that this figure "gives content to the
ADA's terms, specifically the term 'disability.' "306
In dissent, Justice Stevens disputed the majority's position that
the text was unambiguous and contended that it was therefore proper
to consult the Act's legislative history. 30 7 Writing for himself and
Justice Breyer, Stevens observed that eight of nine circuits to address
the issue, and all three executive agencies to construe the language,
had concluded that Congress intended disability determinations to
focus on individuals in their unmitigated condition. 30 8 He found this
widely shared conclusion wholly unsurprising given the readily
available legislative history that was directly on point.

12102(2)(C). We do not discuss that part of the majority opinion, as it does not rely on language
canons. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-94.
301. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 482-84.
304. Id. at 484-87.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 497-99.
Id. at 495-96.
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Justice Stevens quoted extensively from House and Senate
committee reports on the bill that became the ADA. These reports
explicitly and repeatedly discuss various examples of correctable
impairments that are meant to be covered under the Act. 30 9 The
reports also cite with approval the fact that the ADA definition of
disability, borrowed almost verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, had been interpreted to cover such correctable impairments by
lower courts applying that earlier definition.3 10 In light of this
powerful legislative record, Justice Stevens maintained that it was
preferable to view the reference to forty-three million people as a
speculative estimate rather than wrapping the Act's critical definition
around that figure. 31 1 He reinforced this view by noting that the
majority definition might well bring the scope of coverage well below
3 12
forty-three million.
The majority and dissent in Sutton essentially draw conflicting
inferences from the same definitional text. While they agree that
Congress contemplated an individualized approach to coverage, they
differ about the sequence for arriving at such individual
determinations. Justice O'Connor, insisting that the Act focuses on
persons in a "corrected" condition, views those who are epileptic or
have artificial limbs as potentially covered by the Act if they are found
to be "substantially limited" even when using corrective medication or
devices. 313 By contrast, Justice Stevens, who asserts that the Act
contemplates assessment of "uncorrected" conditions, regards persons
with routine eyeglasses as potentially excluded upon a determination
that even in their uncorrected state they are only modestly or trivially
3 14
impaired.
Disagreements among the Justices about the implications of a
less than precise text are fairly common. Yet in this instance, there is
legislative history that is strikingly definitive and uncontroverted on
the very implications in dispute. By holding that the definitional
issue is unambiguously resolved based on reference to a numerical
figure in the findings section of the Act, the majority relies on a

309. Id. at 499-501 (quoting Senate and House reports expressly stating that persons who
are hard of hearing, or who suffer from epilepsy, heart disease, or diabetes, are covered under
the first prong of the definition of disability (42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)), even though their medical
conditions may be corrected through hearing aids or controlled through medication).
310. Id. at 501 (relying on Senate Report that cites Third Circuit decision with approval).
311. Id. at 503, 511.
312. Id. at 512.
313. Id. at 488.
314. Id. at 496.
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structural canon to foreclose all consideration of specific legislative
intent. Once again, the result can be seen as undermining that intent.
Our final language canon example is Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 3 15 a 2001 decision interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 316 In Circuit City, a consumer electronics company required
job applicants to agree to final and binding arbitration of future jobrelated disputes as a condition of their employment. Adams, a
salesman, had signed the agreement but he later filed an employment
discrimination lawsuit in court; Circuit City then sought to compel
arbitration under the FAA. 317 The Supreme Court had to decide
whether Section 1 of the statute, exempting "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce," 318 applied to all employment
contracts. The Court had earlier interpreted the FAA's basic coverage
language-providing for the enforceability of written arbitration
provisions that are part of "any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 319-as
signifying
Congress's intent to regulate to the full extent of its commerce
power.3 20 Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Section 1 exemption was much narrower, covering
only employment contracts of transportation workers.
Justice Kennedy relied primarily on language canons and plain
meaning analysis; as was true in Sutton, the majority found the text
at issue to be so unambiguous that it refused to consider the
legislative history. 321 The language canon the majority found highly
probative was ejusdem generis, which calls for a general term to be
interpreted to embrace only the class of objects enumerated in more
specific terms that accompany it.322 Because the residual clause "any
other class of workers engaged in interstate commerce" is preceded by
reference to two specific types of transportation workers, the majority
reasoned that the clause should be confined in scope to those employed
in transportation-related enterprises. 323 Justice Kennedy reinforced
this language canon reliance by conducting a comparative linguistic
analysis of the phrases Congress had chosen to modify "commerce" in
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

532 U.S. 105 (2001).
9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2000).
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109-10.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277-80 (1995).
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 115.
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Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA. He stressed that the phrase "involving
commerce" used in the Act's basic coverage section (Section 2) must be
construed broadly, connoting an almost passive accretion of
jurisdiction to the outer limits of Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. 324 By contrast, the phrase "engaged in commerce"
used in the Act's exemption section (Section 1) signifies a more limited
scope of jurisdiction, triggered only by active participation in
325
commercial employment.
Four members of the Court used two separate dissents to take
3 26
strong issue with the majority's invocation of an unambiguous text.
Justice Souter contended that the different phrasings of the two
commerce provisions should not be given any weight. In his view, it
was most plausible to infer from the text as a whole that Congress
meant for the basic coverage provision and the employment exemption
provision to be coextensive. 327 Pointing to the "context of the time,"
Justice Souter observed that when Congress acted in 1925 its
regulatory power was confined under prevailing Supreme Court
doctrine to the active operations of interstate commerce. 328 References
to seamen and railroad workers in Section 1 should therefore be
understood as something besides mere ahistorical illustrations of how
language can be parsed. Instead, argued Justice Souter, Congress's
evident intent in Section 1 was "to exclude to the limit of its power to
cover employment contracts in the first place, and it did so just as
clearly as [Section 2] showed its intent to legislate to the hilt over
commercial contracts at a more general level."329 Justice Souter
further noted that ejusdem generis, like other canons, "is a fallback" to
be put aside "if there are good reasons not to apply it. ' 33 ° He found
such reasons, pointing to the Act's legislative history as well as the
bizarre implications of holding that Congress in 1925 had targeted for
exemption only those employees it most obviously could regulate while
leaving regulated all other employees over whom its authority was
1
highly suspect.3 3
324. Id.
325. Id. at 115-16.
326. Id. at 124-40. Justice Souter's dissent (joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg) contested the majority's textual analysis. Id. at 133-40. Justice Stevens's dissent
(joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg) focused on the FAA legislative history. Id. at
123-44.
327. Id. at 135-36.
328. Id. at 136.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 138.
331. Id. Justice Kennedy countered that the exclusion of seamen and railroad employees
need not be viewed as irrational or anomalous, because by 1925 Congress already had enacted

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Justice Stevens's dissent analyzed the FAA legislative history
that the majority had determined was irrelevant. 332 When the FAA
was introduced in response to judicial refusals to enforce commercial
arbitration agreements, the bill was understood by members of
Congress to cover commercial and admiralty contracts. 333 Although
the bill's supporters did not anticipate that it would extend to
employment contracts at all, organized labor objected strongly to the
possibility of such coverage. 334 In response, Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover suggested adding language to exempt employment
contracts: when that suggested language became the relevant portion
of Section 1, organized labor withdrew its opposition and advised its
members that Congress had indeed "exempted labor from the
provisions of the law." 335 Justice Stevens concluded that by reading
the disputed exemption language to be confining rather than
comprehensive, the majority had in fact "defeat[ed] the very purpose
3 36
for which [the] provision was enacted."
The majority's canon-based reasoning is difficult to defend in
content-neutral terms. Even if one does not embrace Justice Souter's
interpretation, promoting a coherent interaction between the FAA's
coverage and exemption provisions, it seems impossible to view the
majority's linguistic analysis as so obviously correct that it renders
irrelevant any consideration of legislative intent.
By ignoring
legislative history, the majority has accomplished the exact opposite of
what the enacting Congress intended. Further, by construing this
1925 text to allow arbitrators instead of courts to resolve employees'
claims of discrimination against their employers, the majority has
undermined more recently articulated congressional preferences
favoring judicial access to vindicate specific federal civil rights
protections.3 3 7 In this regard, many nationally prominent interest
specific legislation providing for arbitration of seamen's disputes and it was contemplating such
legislation for railroad employees (eventually enacted in 1926). Id. at 120-21. This argument did
not, however, address the other half of Justice Souter's asserted anomaly-an almost casually
imposed national coverage for all other workers outside the transportation industry while the
most "regulable" employees were excluded.
332. Id. at 124-28.
333. Id. at 125 (citing to floor statements and hearing testimony from key legislative
participants).
334. Id. at 127-28 (citing to legislative history and related public statements).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 128.
337. See Charity Robl, Recent Developments: Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 17 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 219, 226 (2001) (suggesting that Court's decision undermines congressional
intent under Title VII, ADEA, and ADA); Harriet Chaing, High Court Limits Workers' Rights to
File Lawsuits, S.F. CHRONICLE, Mar. 22, 2001, at Al (quoting leading employees' attorney that in
Circuit City decision, the Justices "have gutted the nation's civil rights and labor laws"); Robert
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groups filed amicus curiae briefs in Circuit City, and the Justices
presumably understood the policy stakes of the issue before the
Court. 338
Under all these circumstances, the putatively neutral
interpretive approach followed in Circuit City seems an especially
339
stark instance of judicial policymaking.
2. Substantive Canon Reliance
Unlike language canons, substantive canons purport to reflect
judicially expressed policy preferences. Given the Court's gradual
340
shift in a conservative direction during this thirty-four year period,
one should perhaps expect to find in divided cases a prevailing
conservative cohort of Justices who often embrace substantive canons
that reinforce their own ideological perspective. It may, therefore, be
less surprising that majority reliance on substantive canons in the
face of dissent dependence on legislative history points so powerfully
in a conservative direction, especially during the Rehnquist era.
One substantive canon prominently associated with the Court's
conservative majority since the mid-1980s is the "superstrong clear
statement rule" promoting constitutional norms of federalism. 341 As
formulated by the Court, the canon provides that unless Congress has
been unmistakably clear in text that it means to limit the states' core
sovereign authority so as to alter "the usual constitutional balance,"
the Court will interpret the federal statute as not having accomplished
that purpose. Our dataset includes decisions relying heavily on this
canon to hold that Congress was not sufficiently clear in its enacted
text so as to limit the states' sovereign authority under Section 504 of

A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitrationof Public Law Disputes, 1995 ILL. L.
REV. 635, 677-81 (1995)
338. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 108 (listing nine amicus briefs supporting employer's
position from inter alia Chamber of Commerce, Securities Industry Association, and Society for
Human Resource Management, and eight amicus briefs supporting employee's position from
inter alia Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, American Association of Retired
Persons, and Association of Trial Lawyers of America. In the interests of full disclosure, we note
that one of us (Brudney) was a signatory on an amicus brief filed by a group of law professors
supporting the employee position.
339. While our three language canon decisions are adequately illustrative, there are other
comparable examples. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (relying
on expressio unius canon in interpreting Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992,
contrary to legislative history and agency position); NLRB vs. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am.,
511 U.S. 571 (1994) (relying on Whole Act Rule in interpreting National Labor Relations Act,
contrary to legislative history and agency position).
340. See supranote 207 and accompanying text.
341. ESKRIDGE., FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 35, at 889.
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the Rehabilitation Act,3 42 under Section 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act, 343 or pursuant to Section 11(f) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. 344 The majority opinion in each of these cases deems
legislative history irrelevant in light of its stringent clear statement
approach.3 45 In each case, a dissent points to legislative history as
evidencing Congress's clear understanding that it meant to subject
346
states to the sovereign authority of Congress.
The Court's superstrong clear statement rule protecting states'
sovereign authority has drawn considerable attention from legal
scholars. Critics have contended that the imposition of this canon
allows the Court to undermine what at time of enactment was settled
congressional intent, and also to circumvent the Court's own
constitutional precedent holding that our federal political structure
adequately protects the states' core sovereignty interests. 347 Because
debate about the normative implications of the canon has been fully
joined elsewhere, we will not dwell on this trio of decisions. What
matters for our purposes is that the canon on its face is indifferent to
evidence of congressional intent as expressed in legislative history,
and that a conservative majority has regularly relied on it to ignoreand effectively reject-such evidence.
In addition to divided decisions invoking the superstrong clear
statement canon, a number of majority opinions rely on other
substantive canons in the face of legislative history indicating a
settled congressional preference for a different result. We describe
two of those opinions here.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,348 the Court addressed
the meaning of a Civil War era civil rights statute, providing in
relevant part that "[a]ll persons ...shall have the same right ...to
make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 349
Writing for five members, Justice Kennedy concluded that this
provision, now codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, prohibits race
342. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-46 (1985) (holding that
Congress failed to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
343. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1989) (holding that Congress
failed to subject states to liability as "persons").
344. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-67 (1991) (holding that Congress failed to
subject appointed state judges to mandatory retirement).
345. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243; Will, 491 U.S. at 65; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 466-67.
346. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Will, 491 U.S. at 83-85
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 489-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
347. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 477-78 (White, J., dissenting in part); ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, &
GARRETT, supra note 35, at 901-02; Colker & Brudney, supra note 122, at 134-36.
348. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
349. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
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discrimination only in the initial formation of an employment
contract, not in the employer's post-formation conduct. 350 Accordingly,
the majority held Patterson's claim for racial harassment on the job to
be nonactionable under Section 1981. 351 Justice Kennedy relied
primarily on a plain meaning analysis, maintaining that the right to
"enforce" an employment contract extends only to conduct by the
employer that impairs an employee's ability to enforce his established
contract rights.3 52 Racial harassment on the job does not qualify as
such an impairment; rather, it is "post-formation conduct .. relating
353
to the terms and conditions of continuing employment."
The majority supplemented its literal meaning approach
through reliance on the substantive presumption against a federal
invasion of traditional state functions. Justice Kennedy noted that to
allow Section 1981 to cover racial harassment, even harassment
triggering a constructive discharge, would in essence confer federal
status on all state law claims for breach of contract that allege racial
animus. 35 4 Although he was prepared to do so if Congress had
directed such a result, Justice Kennedy invoked the rule that absent
such direction, "we should be and are 'reluctant to federalize' matters
355
traditionally covered by state common law."
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's
"formalistic method of interpretation" as incompatible with specific
evidence of congressional intent. 356 He pointed to statements in the
original legislative history to Section 1981, indicating that Congress
meant to encompass post-contractual conduct such as discriminatory
punishment and abusive mistreatment on the job. 357 Justice Brennan
also relied on legislative history to Title VII, specifically the defeat of a
1972 amendment by Senator Hruska that was expressly intended to
make Title VII the exclusive remedy for racially discriminatory
treatment on the job.3 58 Congress debated and eventually rejected the
Hruska amendment, after opponents stressed the importance of
350. 491 U.S. at 176-84.
351. Id. at 179. The Court in Patterson also reaffirmed Section 1981's basic applicability to
private conduct, not merely contract formation involving governmental entities. That issue had
been resolved in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), but the Court had invited
reconsideration after hearing oral argument on the racial harassment issue. Patterson, 485 U.S.
617 (1988). The Court's reaffirmation of its Runyon holding was unanimous.
352. Patterson,491 U.S. at 177-78.
353. Id. at 179.
354. Id. at 183.
355. Id. at 183 (internal citation omitted).
356. Id. at 189, 201-07.
357. Id. at 206-07.
358. Id. at 201-03.
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having the Civil War statute available as an alternative to race
discrimination remedies under Title VII. Justice Brennan reasoned
that this history confirmed Congress's conscious commitment to
preserving the applicability of Section 1981 for instances of on-the-job
359
discrimination.
There is a lot happening in the Patterson opinions, including
the Court's unusual focus on reconsidering its own recent decision in
Runyon v. McCrary360 interpreting the scope of Section 1981. From
our vantage point, however, the by-now familiar tension involves a
conservative majority relying on canons to help justify a willingness to
ignore what the dissent contends are demonstrable congressional
preferences regarding the very issue in dispute. 361 Congress on this
occasion promptly overrode the majority's position as part of the 1991
Civil Rights Act, a statute that rejected an unusually large number of
Court decisions construing Title VII and related antidiscrimination
provisions. 362 Still, the rapid and virtually unanimous repudiation by
both Congress and a Republican president 363 cannot conceal the
conservative majority's use of canons to help justify its result in the
face of considerable evidence that it was thwarting legislative intent.
Our final substantive canon decision, EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co.,364 involves a dispute over the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of Title VII. A United States citizen working in Saudi
Arabia for a U.S. company alleged that he was discriminatorily
discharged. 365 It was undisputed that Congress has constitutional
authority to enforce its laws beyond U.S. territorial limits; the issue
359. Id. at 203-04.
360. 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see supra note 351.
361. In addition to invoking the presumption against federalizing common law absent a clear
congressional mandate, Justice Kennedy also contended that because Title VII already
addressed racial harassment on the job and provided for conciliation prior to litigation, § 1981
should not be read to render Title VII's "detailed procedures ... a dead letter." Patterson,491
U.S. at 181. Reliance on this maxim favoring interstatutory harmonization again ignores the
reality that Congress in 1972 had explicitly declined to make the provisions of Title VII
exclusive.
362. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)
(2000)) (providing that "make and enforce contracts" covers all terms and conditions of
employment). The 1991 Civil Rights Act wholly or partially overrode at least twelve decisions.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 333 n.4 (1991).
363. See 136 CONG. REC. S. 16562 (1990) (Veto message from President Bush declaring that
his 1990 civil rights bill would overrule Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1981 in
Patterson;veto relates not to Patterson but to other provisions of bill Congress approved); id. at
S. 16565, 16571 (remarks of Senators Hatch and Jeffords emphasizing broad consensus between
President and Congress that Pattersonneeds to be overruled).
364. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
365. Id. at 247.
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presented was whether Congress had exercised that authority in Title
VII.366 Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of six members of the Court,
concluded that Congress had not done so.367
The majority relied primarily on the "longstanding principle of
American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only [domestically].' "368 Justice Rehnquist
added that in applying this "rule of construction," the Court would
examine whether the language of Title VII evidenced a congressional
purpose to extend coverage abroad. 369 Both the EEOC and the
discharged employee pointed to two parts of Title VII as disclosing
Congress's intent to legislate extraterritorially. First, within the
definitions section, an "employer" is covered if "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce," and "commerce" includes transactions "among
370
the several states; or between a state and any place outside thereof."
Second, a provision exempting aliens specifies that Title VII "shall not
apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside
any state," and petitioners reasoned that unless the Act was meant to
apply to citizens extraterritorially, Congress would have had no
37
rational basis for exempting the employment of aliens abroad. '
Justice Rehnquist did not reject these interpretations as
untenable. Rather, he concluded that they were no more plausible
than the company's competing interpretations of the same
language. 372 Given that the text was therefore ambiguous, the
majority concluded that petitioners had failed to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction by making the
373
required "affirmative showing" of congressional intent.
In dissent, Justice Marshall took aim at what he deemed the
majority's misuse of the substantive canon. The presumption against
extraterritoriality had not previously been applied as a "clear
statement rule," relieving a court of its obligation "to give effect to all

366. Id. at 248.
367. Id. at 248-60.
368. Id. at 248 (internal citation omitted).
369. Id. (emphasis added).
370. Id. at 248-49 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(h), 2000e(g) (2000)) (emphasis added).
371. Id. at 253-54 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000)).
372. Id. at 250 (discussing company's contention that the clause "between a state and any
place outside thereof' provides a jurisdictional nexus for regulating commerce not wholly within
a single state (i.e., covering commerce also involving another state or a foreign country) but not a
nexus to regulate conduct exclusively in a foreign country); id. at 254-55 (discussing company's
alternative contentions that the alien exemption provision either excludes employers of aliens
within the territorial possessions of the U.S., or it confirms (by negative implication) the
coverage of aliens within the U.S.).
373. Id. at 250, 255.
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available indicia of the legislative will." 374 As a traditional canon of
construction, the presumption should be rebuttable through evidence
other than the text, notably legislative history.3 7 5 While Justice
Marshall disputed the majority's view that the two key textual
provisions were at all ambiguous, 37 6 he also relied heavily on the
legislative history of the alien-exemption provision. The dissent
quoted from both House and Senate committee reports, each of which
described the exemption in terms reflecting a clear understanding
that U.S. employers operating in foreign lands were within the
377
purview of the Act.
The Rehnquist majority in Arabian American is less dismissive
and more deliberate than several other majority opinions we have
discussed in this subpart. Nonetheless, the Court's methodological
approach enables it to sidestep strong indicators that Congress meant
to accomplish a very different result. By establishing this substantive
canon as a barrier against considering the more ordinary indicia of
legislative purpose, the Court effectively devalues "any genuine
378
inquiry into the sources that reveal Congress's actual intentions."
As so often happens in these contested decisions, the result is hostile
to the interests of employees that Congress ostensibly sought to
protect.
3. Ideological Ramifications
A recurring theme in this subset of divisive cases is the
majority's use of canons as an integral part of its determination to
preclude all reference to legislative history. While the statutory text
may favor the majority's reading in some instances more than in
others, that reading is never close to unequivocally correct. Given this
reality, the role played by the canons is especially troubling. The
legitimacy of language canons, and most substantive canons, derives
in important respects from the judicial perception that language being
interpreted is unclear and additional interpretive resources are

374. Id. at 260-61.
375. Id. at 261-66, 278. Other relevant evidence of legislative intent was pertinent agency
interpretations, which the dissent noted were also supportive of its position. Id. at 275-78.
376. Id. at 266-68.
377. Id. at 268-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Shapiro, supra note 12, at 959 & n.195
(critical of majority reasoning). As with Patterson, the Court's decision here was promptly
overridden in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
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therefore needed to help understand an inconclusive text. 379 In these
circumstances, one might expect the Justices to consult both canons
and legislative history, recognizing that all such interpretive aids are
38 0
persuasive rather than conclusive.
Yet the majority opinions discussed here assign the canons a
more exalted status. They are a resource that itself can justify
ignoring potentially probative evidence of legislative intent. In the
language canon cases, the majority uses canons "to establish that the
text is so clear that legislative history is irrelevant." 38 1 In the
substantive canon cases, the text's lack of clarity triggers the
majority's adherence to a policy norm it has identified, again ignoring
altogether the possibility that Congress has articulated relevant policy
preferences
through
statements
in the legislative
record
accompanying the text. In both instances, it is the canons-not the
intrinsic clarity of the text-that ostensibly justify indifference to
legislative history, even though all of these Justices recognize
legislative history as probative in other settings. 38 2 This use of the
canons to trump more "purposive" resources reflects a form of judicial
activism that apparently need not be acknowledged because it is
couched in methodological terms.
The fact that the majorities
consistently favor employer interests over those of employees supports
the pessimistic critique that the canons' elevated role in these divided
decisions is fundamentally a fagade to justify certain judicially devised
policy preferences.
Admittedly, just as canon reliance in these cases is
unidirectionally conservative, the legislative history is invariably cited
by the dissent to support liberal or pro-employee outcomes. This,
however, should not be terribly surprising, given that the

379. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 138 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting);
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260-62 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall observes that clear statement rules may be an exception: they shield certain judicially
articulated values more than "operat[ing] to reveal actual congressional intent." Id. at 262.
380. See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 27 (classifying canons as persuasive, never conclusive);
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 863-67 (1992) (classifying legislative history as persuasive, never conclusive).
381. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 138 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
382. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-33 (2003) (Rehnquist,
J.); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2002) (Kennedy, J.); Brogan v.
United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1998) (Scalia, J.); Inter-Model Rail Employees Ass'n v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1997) (O'Connor, J.). Moreover,
despite their harsh criticism of legislative history in general, supra note 131, Justices Scalia and
Thomas do join numerous majority opinions that rely on legislative history. For examples of
such opinions, see Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, (2003); Food & Drug
Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, (1999).
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antidiscrimination and retirement-related statutes being construed
are dedicated to serving employee interests.
Since the 1960s,
Congress has prescribed multiple layers of federal protections for
workers as part of an effort to alter the employment-at-will status quo,
thereby imposing a modestly redistributive regulatory matrix on the
American workplace. 3 3 Evidence of legislative intent will tend to
support this consistently liberal legislative objective.
There may, of course, be instances where Congress arranged a
compromise, and legislative history helps explain the specific intent
behind that compromise.
That, indeed, was the kind of record
evidence invoked by the Stevens dissent in Circuit City. 38 4 More
broadly, the Court's repeated reliance on legislative history to support
conservative results in our 632 case dataset-even in close decisionsindicates that evidence of negotiations or compromises protecting
employer interests is also a staple of the legislative record. 38 5 What
remains distinctive about this group of cases is the majority's
unwillingness to contemplate, much less identify, such indicia of
congressional intent. 38 6 Instead, the majority in these cases regards
legislative history as irrelevant, largely if not exclusively because of
the role played by the canons. The Court thus uses interpretive
techniques it promotes as neutral to help it achieve conservative
results, ignoring substantial evidence that Congress had a very
different purpose in mind.
C. Dueling Canons and the Legal Process Account
Professors Sunstein and Shapiro, as well as Eskridge and
Frickey, all maintain that the canons perform important pragmatic
functions furthering rule-of-law norms. 38 7 As succinctly set forth by
Eskridge and Frickey, the canons serve as "gap-filling rules" that help
383. See PAUL

WEILER,

GOVERNING

THE

WORKPLACE:

THE

FUTURE

OF

LABOR

AND

EMPLOYMENT LAw 22-25 (1990); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of
the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1568-72 (1996); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1551-58 (2002).
384. See supratext accompanying notes 332-336.
385. Overall, legislative history reliance is relatively neutral in ideological terms: it supports
liberal decisions 49.8 percent and conservative decisions 43.2 percent of the time. Even in close
cases, its invocation seems fairly even-handed: reliance accompanies liberal majorities 45.3
percent of the time and conservative majorities 46.9 percent of the time.
386. Justice Scalia in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates did tender a belated assertion about
ERISA's subsidiary purpose but this was conclusory and not supported. 508 U.S. 248, 262-63
(1993). The other four cases simply regard legislative history as irrelevant because of the role of
canons.
387. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 151-53; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 66-67;
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 943.
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minimize judicial arbitrariness, thereby "rendering statutory
interpretation more predictable, regular, and coherent." 388 We have
no wish to oversimplify these scholars' positions: they assuredly do not
celebrate the canons as interpretive bromides, and each cautions
against mechanical application or undue reliance. 389 Still, they share
a perspective that use of the canons in practice enhances consistency
and predictability-regarding how the Court treats certain word
choices or syntactical configurations, and what it presumes about the
allocation of power among different branches or levels of our
constitutional structure.
Our results in Part III.E provide some basis for questioning
this optimistic perspective. Specifically, Table XII indicates that
dissenting Justices are significantly more likely to rely on language
canons when language canons are also part of the majority's reasoning
and are similarly inclined to invoke substantive canons when the
majority too relies on such canons. These findings in turn suggest
that in divided decisions, the Justices themselves are more prone to
view the canons as reasonably amenable to supporting either side.
Our previous case law discussion in this Part casts further
doubt on the predictability hypothesis, at least with regard to
language canons. In the Shell Oil decision, Justice Thomas for a
unanimous majority acknowledged a credible conflict between two
language canons often invoked by the Court. 390 His reasoning, relying
on the Whole Act Rule while rejecting the maxim that Congress uses
the same term consistently across different statutes, is cogent but not
irresistible. Given the number of statutes in which Congress has
identified both employees and former employees as objects of its
attention, a determination that this provision's reference to
"employees or applicants" actually excluded former employees would
also have been defensible. 39 1 In the end, the majority opinion derives
much of its persuasiveness from the purposive argument that Justice
Thomas withholds until the final paragraphs of his analysis.
A comparative glance at other cases discussed earlier invites
similar reservations. The Court in Coutu and Barrett relied on the
expressio unius canon-once to help foreclose and once to help

388. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 66-67.
389. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 151; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 66;
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 958-59.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 258-265.
391. Such defensibility is strengthened by the majority's candid acknowledgement that the
Court had recently construed "employees" in a basic definitional section of Title VII as covering
only current employees. See supra note 258.

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

preserve a private right of action. 392 To be sure, the majority in Coutu
had reasoned that it would not inferentially expand a right of action
clause that it viewed as already limited in scope, whereas the majority
in Barrett reasoned that it would not by implication constrain a right
of action provision that it characterized as unconditional. Yet even
these characterizations might be fairly contestable in linguistic terms.
In Barrett, for instance, the employer and its supporting amici
essentially invoked the Whole Act Rule, contending that the AWPA
right of action had to be limited in order to allow another important
provision in the Act to retain its coherence by avoiding implied
preemption of well-settled state law on workers' compensation. 393 And
while the majority in Barrett expressly declined to impose such a
restriction based on the meaning of an entirely separate section of the
statutory scheme, the majority in Sutton invoked the Whole Act Rule
394
as its justification for imposing precisely that kind of restriction.
Stepping back, it is notable that certain language canons
regularly relied on in majority opinions are also frequently promoted
by dissenters in those same cases without success. 395 There are at
least a dozen dissents invoking the Whole Act Rule to help challenge
majority reasoning that itself uses one or more canons to justify the
Court's holding. Such competitive reasoning does not signify that the
meaning of these canons is hopelessly relative. It does, however,
suggest that decisions about when and how to use the language
canons hinge on case-specific and Justice-specific considerations more
than the foreseeable logic of the canons themselves. In short, reliance
on the canons may be justified as situationally enlightening without in
any meaningful sense promoting a more systemic predictability or
consistency.
The fact remains that, in our dataset, the decisions featuring
dueling canons are for the most part ideologically conservative. This
result-oriented trend could qualify as a certain kind of predictability.
Professor Shapiro has observed that the canons tend to favor

392. See supra text accompanying notes 235-237 and 242-44.
393. See Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, Barrett v. Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (No.
88-2035); Brief for Amici Curiae American Farm Bureau Federation et al. at 18-19, 21-22,
Barrett v. Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (No. 88-2035).
394. Compare Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 644-45, with Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S.
471, 487 (1999).
395. For examples of conflict about proper application of Whole Act Rule, see CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354-55, 360 (1988); Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346,
351, 371 (1981); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641 &
n.45, 709 (1980). For examples of conflict about proper application of expressio unius, see
Barnhart v. Peabody, 537 U.S. 149, 168-69, 180-81 (2003); Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 582-84, 593-94 (2000).
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continuity over change by promoting cautious interpretations of
inconclusive text so as to minimize inadvertent sacrifices of the status
quo. 396 Shapiro makes clear that he does not advocate reliance on
canons when there is "sufficient evidence of legislative purpose" that
change was intended. 397
The canons, however, may well be
operating-especially in the Rehnquist era-to make it harder for
such evidence to be deemed "sufficient."
We have already discussed an important set of cases in which
language or substantive canons were used to preclude consideration of
clear and uncontroverted evidence in the legislative record. A number
of those decisions also feature dissents relying on canons that would
support a purposive interpretation of text. Thus, for instance, Justice
Souter in Circuit City invokes the Whole Act Rule, insisting that the
exemption for employment contracts must be treated "as keeping pace
with the expanded understanding of the commerce power generally" in
order to make the FAA "coherent ...as a whole."3 98 Similarly, Justice
Stevens in Sutton urges reliance on the substantive canon that the
ADA should be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial
purposes, 399 while Justice Marshall in Arabian American contends
that under a proper understanding of the canon disfavoring extraterritorial jurisdiction, Congress in its Title VII legislative record
overcame the presumption. 40 0
In these cases, and others, 40 1 the
Court's majority ignored or rejected pleas from colleagues to rely on
canons that supported legislative change. Still, while such cases may
illustrate a recent trend toward ideological conservatism in the
competitive use of the canons, they do not suggest the presence of any
larger methodological consistency in the way the canons are likely to
operate.
Two additional case law examples further address this concern
regarding potential indeterminacy in canon usage. In Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency, 40 2 a 1988 decision, the issue dividing the
Court was the impact of ERISA's basic preemption clause on a general
396. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 927-41.
397. Id. at 945.
398. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 137 (2001).
399. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 504.
400. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262-66 (1991).
401. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 592 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (relying on canon that statutory exemptions should be read narrowly); Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 484 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on
canon favoring liberal application of statutes protecting harbor workers); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 486 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on Whole Act Rule and in pari
materiato support position that Congress in ADEA meant to cover appointed state judges).
402. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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state garnishment law that applied inter alia to allow collection from
welfare benefit plans after monetary judgments had been obtained
against some fund beneficiaries. 40 3 Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts
"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan" covered by the Act. 40 4 Georgia's general
garnishment provision makes no specific reference to ERISA plans of
any kind. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice White held
that the federal preemption language did not bar applicability of the
state law, thus allowing the execution of judgments against ERISA
40 5
welfare benefit plans.
The majority opinion in Mackey relied in important respects on
the Whole Act Rule. 40 6 Justice White noted that another provision of
ERISA, Section 206(d)(1), explicitly barred the assignment or
alienation of pension plan benefits, thus prohibiting the use of state
enforcement mechanisms that would prevent pension benefits from
being paid to pension plan recipients. 40 7 In the majority's view, if
Section 514(a) were construed to bar garnishment of all ERISA plan
benefits (that is, affecting welfare benefits as well as pension benefits,
and affecting plans as a whole, not just direct benefit payments) there
would have been no need for Section 206(d)(1). The majority declined
"to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which
408
renders superfluous another portion of the same law."
In dissent, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the force of the
Whole Act Rule, but he contended that it actually cut in his favor.
Pointing to yet another ERISA provision, Justice Kennedy observed
that Congress in 1984 had added language to Section 514 explicitly
exempting certain domestic relations orders from the preemptive
scope of ERISA. 40 9 Accordingly, the dissent reasoned, by preserving
only a limited class of state garnishment orders, under specifically
prescribed conditions, this new Section 514(b)(7) makes clear that
403. Id. at 830-31.
The Court was unanimous in its view that state law specifically
regulating ERISA funds was preempted, but it split 5-4 on this general garnishment law that
made no reference to ERISA.
404. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
405. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830-841. The lineup of Justices writing opinions was somewhat
unusual, in that Justice White favored limited preemption of state law while Justice Kennedy in
dissent argued for a broad federal preemptive scope. Justice White was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, while Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia
joined Justice Kennedy in dissent.
406. Justice White also invoked text, legislative purpose, legislative inaction, and Supreme
Court precedent as part of his reasoning.
407. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000)).
408. Id. at 836-37.
409. Id. at 842-43 (discussing addition of § 514(b)(7), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7)
(2000)).
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Section 514(a) otherwise applies broadly to preempt the type of
general garnishment statute before the Court. 410 To Justice Kennedy,
the majority's reading rendered Section 514(b)(7) totally redundant.
He added that "it is preferable, in my view, to tolerate the partial
overlap [with Section 206(d)(1)] rejected by the Court than to construe
§ 514(a) so as to render another section of the statute surplus in its
41 1
entirety."
In a statute as "comprehensive and reticulatedd" 4 12 as ERISA, it
is perhaps unremarkable that both sides could find a plausible
reference point from which to identify superfluous structural
consequences if the imprecise language at issue were construed
against their position. Further, both opinions in Mackey marshaled
other interpretive resources as part of their reasoning, and one would
be hard-pressed to conclude that either side's application of the Whole
Act Rule was "more persuasive" within the Court or even in a larger
context. 413 Yet as we have previously observed, it is in complex and
technical areas that the Court is often more inclined to invoke a
structural language canon such as the Whole Act Rule. The Mackey
decision is an apt illustration of this canon's malleability in the service
of Justices who are pursuing reasonable yet conflicting approaches to
a close interpretive question.
In our final case law example, Lehman v. Nakshian,4 4 the
Court in 1981 had to decide whether the 1974 ADEA amendments
extending coverage to the federal government conferred the right to a
Justice
jury trial when federal employees sue their employer.
held
that
the
statute
did
not
writing
for
five
members,
Stewart,
4
15
Both language canons and
mandate the right to a jury trial.
substantive canons figured prominently in his reasoning.
The case revolved around the relationship between two
remedial provisions of the ADEA: Section 7(c), covering actions
brought against private employers and state or local governments, and

410. Id. at 843
411. Id. at 845-46.
412. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) See GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (describing the ERISA statute
as "comprehensive and reticulated"); Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.,
530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000) (same).
413. Although the United States was not a party, it filed an amicus brief and argued before
the Court that Section 514(b)(7) clarified the broad impact of Section 514(a). See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 21, Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency, 486 U.S. 825 (1988). (No. 86-1387); Mackey, 486 U.S. at 838-39. The executive branch
view of the Whole Act Rule secured only four votes.
414. 453 U.S. 156 (1981).

415. Id. at 160-69.
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Section 15(c), covering actions brought against the federal
government. 4 16 Section 7(c)(1) authorized aggrieved persons to seek
"legal or equitable relief," language identical to what appears in
Section 15(c). However, Section 7(c)(2), explicitly conferring the right
to a jury trial, had no analog in Section 15. Justice Stewart invoked
the expressio unius canon: Congress knew exactly how to provide for
the right to a jury trial, and its failure to do so in Section 15 was
highly probative. 417 He also relied on the in pari materia canon,
reasoning that because Congress had patterned its overall Section 15
enforcement scheme after the comparable provisions for federal
employees under Title VII, and Congress in the Title VII provisions
clearly provided no right to jury trials, it followed that no right to a
jury trial should be inferred here. 418
Although Justice Stewart
maintained that in light of the majority's linguistic analysis it was
unnecessary to consult legislative history, he did in fact explore that
history and concluded that it too supported the majority's position. 4 19
In dissent, Justice Brennan relied on the in pari materia canon
to draw very different conclusions. Pointing to the identical "legal or
equitable relief' language of Section 7(c)(1) and Section 15(c), Brennan
maintained that Congress had patterned the precise federal employee
provision at issue after its previously-enacted private employee
420
section, and the Court should therefore interpret them similarly.
Because the Court three years earlier in Lorillard v. Pons421 had held
that the text of Section 7(c)(1) conferred a right to jury trial, it seemed
clear to Brennan that the same text must yield the same result
here. 422 From the dissent's standpoint, Section 7(c)(2) was essentially
a red herring. It had been introduced while Lorillard was pending
before the Supreme Court, in order to settle the circuit court conflict
over the meaning of "legal and equitable relief' in what was then
simply Section 7(c). Once Lorillard was decided, the enactment of
Section 7(c)(2) in essence codified the Court's holding, a codification
423
that did not detract from the dissent's canon-based analysis.

416. 20 U.S.C. §§ 626(c), 633a(c) (2000).
417. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 162-63.
418. Id. at 163-64. The in pari materia canon calls for similar statutes to be interpreted
similarly. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 35, at Appendix B.
419. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 165-68. The majority's willingness to consider legislative history
as possibly rebutting its canon-based reasoning reflects a very different methodological approach
from that taken in later years. See supra Part IV.B.
420. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 177-78.

421. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
422. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 173-74.
423. Id. at 178.80.
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The majority had one last canon to invoke in its favor. Justice
Stewart observed that even if his linguistic and structural arguments
and his reliance on legislative history were not dispositive, the
presumption against a waiver of federal sovereign immunity dictated
the Court's ruling. The sovereign immunity of the United States
applies to the terms and conditions under which the government
consents to be sued; accordingly, continued the majority, Congress's
failure to express unequivocally in text its willingness to be subject to
jury trials meant that federal employees have not been granted such a
right. 424 Justice Brennan countered that the unequivocally expressed
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in Section 15 was itself
sufficient to cover jury trials. If anything, Congress's history of
stating explicitly that no jury trial was available in a range of statutes
authorizing suits against the federal government established that the
sovereign immunity canon did not include a presumption against the
425
right to a jury trial.
In contrast to Mackey, Lehman is a decision involving multiple
canons. As with Mackey, though, it is not obvious that one side's use
of canons is more convincing than the other's. The in pari materia
canon points in two plausible directions, in part because the ADEA is
a hybrid statute. Congress over the years has borrowed specific
language and general concepts from multiple sources, and reasonable
disagreements arise as to which "other law" is deemed the appropriate
pattern-setter. The clash over the sovereign immunity canon reflects
a dispute regarding outer contours rather than core applicability.
Here, too, one can expect disagreements given the complex body of
Supreme Court precedent construing the sovereign immunity canon
and the varied textual circumstances in which Congress has chosen to
expose the government to lawsuits.
It should be apparent that we have been examining some
"harder cases" in this subpart. When the Justices are unanimous in
their application of a specific canon, or if they view the canons as
pointing in only one direction, these maxims of construction will
appear to enhance predictability, as do other interpretive resources
relied upon without contradiction. It is the harder cases, howeverthose in which competing or even identical maxims support reasonable
disagreements-that counsel against making extravagant claims
regarding the canons' capacity to enhance consistency in judicial
decisionmaking.

424. Id. at 160-61, 168-69.
425. Id. at 170-71.
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One argument regularly advanced in recent years to support
the rationality and legitimacy of the canons is that they function as a
kind of ordering mechanism, a set of often-invoked interpretive aids
that Congress can and should anticipate when drafting, in order to
enhance its lawmaking prowess. 426 As a descriptive matter, a recent
case study of congressional drafting techniques seriously questions
whether Congress is capable of embracing such a role for the canons.
Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter interviewed a
bipartisan group of sixteen Senate Judiciary Committee staffers (all
attorneys) as well as lawyers from the Senate's Legislative Counsel
Office. 427 They found that counsel involved in drafting are generally
aware of the canons but that these rules and presumptions are not an
428
important factor as statutory language is written or debated.
Legislative committee counsel regard drafting as a highly contextual
and intensely pressured process, and generalized rules of construction
cannot be readily integrated into that process. 429 Further, because
drafting is focused on securing collective action through negotiated
agreement, often involving a shifting coalition of both invited and latearriving players, the canons' putative virtues-promotion of clarity
and predictability-are not as highly valued by lawmakers as they are
430
by many judges.
It is possible that the Nourse and Schacter study tells only part
of the story about how Congress actually peiforms-or might be able
to perform-as a lawmaking enterprise. But even assuming arguendo
that Congress is more educable than Professors Nourse and Schacter
contend, our findings and analyses raise considerable doubt as to why
lawmakers should look to the canons for guidance on any systemic
basis. Our empirical and doctrinal review suggests that the canons
are being overvalued in terms of their ability to promote either
predictability or impartiality in judicial reasoning.
1. From the standpoint of predictability, we reported that
when the majority relies on language canons or substantive canons in
426. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 154 (discussing canons' function to improve
lawmaking); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 12, at 66-67 (discussing canons' role as signaling
devices to legislative drafters, enabling them to lower costs of drafting statutes).
427. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
CongressionalCase Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (2002).
428. Id. at 600-04.
429. See id. at 590-97 (describing legislative drafting process as perceived by key staffers);
see also Brudney, supra note 296, at 16-17, 21-26 (discussing fractured and politically sensitive
nature of lawmaking process in Congress).
430. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 427, at 594-600, 614-16.
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nonunanimous opinions, the dissent is significantly more likely to
invoke that same type of canon as well. An important implication of
this finding is that the Justices regularly are prepared to argue that
the canons do not produce clarity, by applying them in ways that are
incompatible, if not inconsistent, when competing to advance
principled justifications.
Our discussion of individual cases illuminates how certain key
language canons lend themselves to such malleable uses. The Whole
Act Rule rests on a presumption that statutes should be understood,
whenever possible, to be structurally coherent and to contain no
surplus phrases or provisions. Yet Congress's complex statutory
schemes regulating the workplace-ERISA, Title VII, the ADEA, and
others-typically reflect an accretion of multiple enactments,
addressing both discrete and overlapping issues over a period of years
if not decades. Such lawmaking histories tend to produce linguistic
residues, redactions, and repetitions. Under these circumstances, it is
not surprising that thoughtful Justices, supplemented by arguments
from able counsel, will often reach conflicting understandings derived
The
from considerations of structural integrity or coherence.
disagreement in Mackey was a classic example of this conflict
involving the Whole Act Rule alone. And presumptions based on
structural coherence become even more susceptible to principled
disagreement when the Court also addresses the possibility of
43 1
consistent usage across distinct regulatory schemes.
The expressio unius canon similarly generates a likelihood of
reasonable divergent applications. 432 Two presumptions about law-

431. Majority opinions in Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981), Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993), and other cases have invoked this broader vision of harmonious
drafting to help explain why a phrase in one statute should be construed to have the same
meaning as it had been given in a different area of workplace law. At the same time, the dissent
in Lehman, and a unanimous majority in Robinson, illustrate the tensions that so often arise
between reliance on such interstatutory comparisons and claims based on structural coherence
within a single statutory scheme. Lehman, 435 U.S. at 172-82; Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S.
337, 340-46 (1997); see also Buzbee, supra note 260, at 234 (critical of counterfactual
assumptions about omniscient legislators in drafting process). Professor Buzbee contends that
intrastatutory linguistic comparisons such as expressio unius rest on more defensible
aspirational assumptions about thoroughness in drafting consideration, because there is an
enacting coalition that is aware of which provisions will share space within a single statute. Id.
at 225-28. But the concept of a single Title VII statute, or a single ERISA statute, is itself
suspect given the succession of revisions, modifications, and additions that are crafted by a series
of distinct enacting coalitions over a period of many years.
432. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583-84, 593-94 (2000) (majority
and dissent squarely debate applicability of expressio unius to a provision of Fair Labor
Standards Act); John Hancock Life Ins. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96-97, 112-13
(1993) (majority and dissent disagree on applicability of expressio unius approach to text of
ERISA).
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writing techniques underlie this canon: that legislative drafters do not
use excessive or dispensable language, and that they do use particular
words or phrases in different parts of a single statutory scheme to
convey the same meaning. 433 Once again, our cases demonstrate how
these beguiling presumptions minimize the very real prospects for
principled disagreement. The sharp division in Circuit City over the
meaning of "commerce" in two different sections of the FAA pertained
importantly to whether the different words modifying "commerce"
were probative or essentially superfluous. And the Court's candid
discussion in Robinson recognized that despite a specific Title VII
definition of the word "employee," the term has two quite different
connotations as used in different parts of that Act.
It also is worth recalling that language canon reliance in
majority opinions by both conservative Justices and liberal Justices
has produced results remarkably consistent with their respective
ideological preferences. 4 34
This finding further supports our
conclusion that the language canons cannot serve as a source of
systemic interpretive guidance for lawmakers. We do not mean to
suggest that the Justices apply these canons in a disingenuous
manner. Rather, it is precisely because the language canons are so
adaptable in their application that they can be, and have been,
invoked to help justify positions that have deeper ideological or policyrelated foundations.
The substantive canons at first glance appear more promising
as a set of signals to congressional drafters. Because these canons
tend to set forth judicial policy norms or preferences, they could be
viewed as more predictably instructive. While certain substantive
canons are relatively open-ended in policy terms, 4 35 others relied on by
the Court seem to convey a more precise prescriptive message. Since
the 1980s, for instance, the Court has regularly held that Congress
must speak in unequivocally clear terms if it means to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Over a longer period, the
Court has declared that Congress must be reasonably clear if it wishes
to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, to interfere with traditional or
historic state functions, or to waive the immunity of the federal

433. See R. N. Graham, In Defence of Maxims, 22 STAT. L. REV. 45, 63-64 (2001) (discussing
and amplifying these two presumptions).
434. See supra text accompanying tbl.X.
435. The canon of avoiding constitutional issues and the presumption against repeals by
implication offer only vague guidance to Congress: it is more difficult to anticipate, much less
avoid, constitutional problems that may arise in the future, and similarly challenging to
anticipate how current language may be construed in light of potentially affected provisions from
earlier statutes often dispersed through the U.S. Code.
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government including the particular conditions under which the
436
government consents to be sued.
Still, one concern raised by these policy-based maxims is just
how much weight to accord them. In promoting particular substantive
values, the canons may function as virtually irrebuttable clear
statement rules or as mere tiebreakers, but most often they operate as
presumptions that can be overcome by the cogent force of other
interpretive resources. 437 Assessing the persuasiveness of such other
resources-plain meaning, legislative history or purpose, Supreme
Court or common law precedent-allows for considerable discretion
and, hence, uncertainty as to the probative impact of the substantive
The Court's ERISA decisions invoking the general anticanon.
preemption presumption are illustrative in this regard. Over the past
fifteen years, the presumption has been relied on in numerous cases to
help justify restricting the scope of ERISA, 438 and it has been
distinguished or disregarded in a comparable number of other cases
that have imposed ERISA preemption. 439 Similarly, with respect to
the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Justices'
heated disagreement in the Arabian American Oil case 440 reflects
divergent understandings both as to how much weight the
presumption should receive and as to how consistently the Court has
441
applied it over the years.
Apart from the need to reconcile judicial policy norms with an
array of competing interpretive resources through case-by-case
analysis, there is an additional concern about the Court's ability to
furnish interpretive guidance through its choice of substantive canons.
It is far from clear that an enacting Congress can reasonably
anticipate future cycles of Supreme Court preference for particular
policy norms. Typically, the Court does not thoroughly engage the
major aspects of a new congressional regulatory scheme until a decade
or more has passed following enactment. Accordingly, there is the risk
that legislators who debate and approve that scheme simply cannot
436. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 and 368-373.
437. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 35, at 851; POPKIN, supra note 119, at 201.

438. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 363-65 (2002); Cal. Labor
Standards Enf. v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 330-32 (1997); Mass. v. Morash, 490 U.S.
107, 118-19 (1989).

439. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151-52, 156-61 (2001) (majority and
dissenting opinions); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 860-61 (1997) (dissenting opinion); FMC v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1990) (dissenting opinion).
440. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil, Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); see supra notes 368-377 and
accompanying text.
441. Compare Arabian American 499 U.S. at 248-49 (majority opinion) with id. at 260-66
(dissenting opinion).
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foresee how the Court's substantive canon priorities are likely to
evolve in the longer-term. During the 1960s and 1970s, when most of
the major workplace-related statutes being litigated today were
enacted, 442 the reigning interpretive presumptions favored broad
deference to congressional judgment in the exercise of its Article I and
Fourteenth Amendment powers 4 43 and respect for Congress's
purposive remedial efforts in general. 444
Two decades later,
inconclusive language in these legislative texts related to states'
sovereign authority was being subjected to very different judicial
policy norms.
One could argue that based on current preferred substantive
canons, Congress today should take pains to insert explicitly into text
every conceivable manifestation or extension of its legislative
authority. Alternatively, the current Congress might try to tailor its
drafting technique to what it can plausibly expect will be the Court's
next set of elevated policy-based presumptions or "dice-loading
rules."445 The latter approach would, of course, tend to vitiate further
the predictive value of the substantive canons.
Still, given the
unusually public tensions within this Court regarding the proper
distribution of sovereign authority between Congress and the states, it
may well be that a suitably educated Congress should anticipate a
446
reordering of at least some current judicial policy preferences.
In sum, we have shown how, for somewhat different reasons,
neither the language canons nor the substantive canons can be
counted on to generate consistent, objective guidance regarding the
interpretation of workplace law statutes. Our explanation for this
shortfall goes beyond Llewellyn's assertion of radical indeterminacy
447
based simply on the presence of a countercanon for every canon.
The systemic indeterminacy we have described is attributable to a
442. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act (extended to federal
employees in 1972), ADEA of 1967 (extended to federal employees in 1974), Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969, ERISA in 1974.
443. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447-48, 487-89,
494-95 (2000); Colker & Brudney, supra note 122, at 89-94..
444. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW xci-cvi, 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds. 1994).
445. SCALIA, supra note 10, at 28.
446. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (dissenting opinion)
(asserting that four Justices do not recognize stare decisis on Court's Eleventh Amendment
decisions and implying they will overrule these decisions as soon as practicable); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740-41 (2003) (concurring opinions) (reaffirming this
position on behalf of same four Justices).
447. See Llewellyn, supra note 22, at 401-06.
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confluence of factors.
Language canons that contemplate the
structural integrity of the law often invite principled disparate
applications. Key substantive canons are assigned varying weights in
different case-specific
circumstances.
Most important, the
multilayered and detailed arrangement of our basic regulatory
schemes typically allows for several canons to be arrayed on each side
of a contested case. These factors combine to assure the exercise of
considerable judicial discretion when applying the canons.
Such
discretion is an important component of the Court's decisionmaking
process, but it does undermine claims that reliance on the canons
somehow makes judicial reasoning as to the meaning of legislation
more predictable or consistent.
2. With respect to the goal of impartiality, the most strikingly
consistent finding from our study may well be the ideologically-colored
tension on the Rehnquist Court between majority invocation of canons
and dissent reliance on legislative history. We expected to observe
some wariness about legislative history within canon-dependent
majority opinions, given the broader pattern of diminished reliance on
such legislative materials and the particular skepticism expressed by
public choice scholars and some current Justices as to the underlying
value of "congressional intent" evidence beyond text. 448 What we
discovered from our subset of majority opinions, however, is much less
neutral than generalized wariness.
In their revived status, the canons have been hailed as shared
conventions that can help interpreters to decode ambiguous or
inconclusive texts. 449 Intentionalist evidence, derived from legislative
history, has been promoted over the years as serving a similar
450
function with the added value of possessing a democratic pedigree.
To the extent that intentionalist efforts at decoding are now deemed
more vulnerable to error, a pragmatic interpreter might well try to
reconcile the two resources by discounting the weight accorded to
record evidence in the face of persuasive canon-based reasoning. The
Court in the cases we analyzed went further-it relied on the canons
to preclude any weighing of legislative history at all. 45 1
That
448. See supra text accompanying note 120.
449. Manning, supra note 9, at 291-92.
450. Id. at 288-89.
451. We discussed ten such cases. See supra Part V.B. While we focused on decisions and
reasoning we found especially revealing, we also noted that the tension between canons and
legislative history extends beyond these ten cases. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn.
534 U.S. 533 (2002); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992); Norfolk &
Western Ry. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117 (1991); Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310 (1986); see also supra note 275 (discussing seven additional cases in which language
canon dissents clash with reliance on legislative history by liberal majority).

2005]

CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

109

interpretive move would likely be criticized as anti-legislative, at least
from within the intentionalist camp.
Such criticism, however, should carry comparatively little
methodological bite for canon supporters, so long as the results of the
majority's preclusive reasoning seem to reflect disinterested and
impartial analysis. It is not hard to imagine a subset of decisions in
which the ignored or excluded legislative record evidence in numerous
instances supported the employee's legal position while on many other
occasions favoring the employer's. 452 Insofar as the canons are being
used objectively to discredit reliance on legislative history, one would
expect the consequences of such discrediting to be relatively contentneutral.
Justice Scalia has aptly observed that the canons are meant to
be persuasive, not conclusive. In responding to persistent concerns
about their thrust-and-parry imprecision, he has defended their role
as one among many interpretive resources that help courts to provide
uniform and objective answers regarding the reasonable meaning of
statutes. 453 While the Court's answers in this group of decisions is
very close to uniform, the outcomes reached are harder to justify as
objective. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the language
canons and substantive canons in such cases are functioning more as a
fagade to promote judicial policy preferences than as a principled
methodological tool.
3. To be sure, the subset of cases that exemplifies strategic use
to serve policy-related ends is just that-a subset.
Our larger
collection of majority opinions reflects that the canons can and do
assist in the performance of valued interpretive functions. As rules of
thumb addressing how certain words or phrases often interrelate, or
how a hypothetical legislature might expect its authority to be
reconciled with that of other lawmaking entities, the canons "help
uncover competing interpretive possibilities." 454 When these rules of
thumb are understood as presumptive rather than conclusive, they are
subject to being questioned, challenged, or distinguished in light of
455
other interpretive factors.

452. See supra note 385 (reporting that legislative history reliance supports an equal share
of liberal and conservative results in close cases, and overall).
453. SCALIA, supra note 10, at 27-28. As we noted earlier, Justice Scalia's justification here
is for language canons, rather than substantive canons, although he specifically includes "clear
statement" protection for state sovereign immunity as a commonsense norm more than a
substantive canon. Id. at 29.
454. Graham, supra note 433, at 68.
455. See, e.g., Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (using language canon to raise a
question about congressional intent); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 261-62 (1991)
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Such reflective and ongoing conversation within judicial
opinions deepens the interpretive inquiry, by effectively encouraging
courts to consider additional sources of legislative meaning, and even
to appreciate how the rules of thumb themselves often point
persuasively in divergent directions. 456 Some of the decisions we
examined used canons to recognize and respond to arguments raised
by dissenting Justices or nonprevailing parties. Other decisions relied
on canons to help explain and justify a result which, although
unanimous, was not therefore free from doubt.
In performing these functions, the canons can provide shape
and promote coherence for individual majority opinions, which over
time helps to build professional and public respect for the body of work
generated by the Court. Of course, other interpretive resources
contribute in precisely the same way to constructing the Court's caseby-case reputation for rational, principled decisionmaking. Indeed by
invoking a range of resources in virtually every majority opiniontextual and contextual, historically-based and contemporary,
descriptive and normative-the Court invites the legal profession to
anticipate, and strive for, an approach to judicial reasoning that is
cautious, deliberative, and objective.
Like any interpretive resource, however, the canons carry both
inherent limitations and risks of misuse. The risks have become more
serious in recent times, given the normative claims for special status
that have been advanced on the canons' behalf. It is possible that the
theorized accounts celebrating predictability or neutrality are
influenced to some extent by a perceived distinction between law and
politics. Disputes over the meaning of abstract Latin phrases, or
freestanding policy maxims, may seem relatively respectable and lawlike not only to scholars but also to judges and the attorneys who
argue before them. These arguments may be contrasted, even if
subconsciously, with messier, more politically tinged disagreements
about the implications of committee reports or floor statements. The
presence of such subtle favoritism for "law-based" argumentation may
in part reflect an understandable impulse to defend the legitimacy of
judicial reasoning in a vulnerable, "politicized" era.
Still, our findings and analyses suggest that the canons-at
least as applied by the Supreme Court in this area of law-are not
entitled to this added measure of respect. Once we see in detail how
readily canons can be used to defend contradictory results, and how

(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for use of substantive canon as presumption that triggers
consideration of legislative history and other "conventional techniques" of interpretation).
456. See Graham, supra note 433, at 68 (discussing benefits of maxims).
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they have been used to promote judicial policy preferences at the
expense of evident congressional intent, it becomes problematic to
view them as systemically contributing to a consistent or impartial
methodology of interpreting statutes. The decisions in our dataset,
aggregatively and individually, demonstrate these limitations and
pitfalls.
CONCLUSION
The issues we set out to explore are not new. Sixty years ago,
Justice Jackson, confronted with plausibly competing canon-based
arguments, wondered out loud, "what's a judge to do?" 457 More
recently, scholars and judges have advanced a range of descriptive and
normative models to explain or justify how the canons operate. While
the role of this interpretive resource has been heavily theorized, it has
also been underexplored from an empirical standpoint. Our effort to
demonstrate the complexity and variability of canon applications is a
first step toward redressing that imbalance.
The canons are distinctly more popular with the Supreme
Court today than they were a generation ago. Part of that popularity
includes a certain elevation in their status above other interpretive
resources, at least for some members of the Court. Yet, as we have
shown, language canons turn out to be remarkably adaptable when
applied to the comprehensive, complex, and often confusing regulatory
schemes that define our statutory landscape. Accordingly, it is a
mistake to expect that canons like expressio unius, in pari materia,or
the Whole Act Rule can provide predictable guidance or enhance the
clarity of statutory interpretation in any larger sense.
The
malleability of these language canons, and the uncertain weight and
cyclical fashionability of certain substantive canons, should serve as a
warning against unduly ambitious claims on their behalf.
As our study also indicates, the canons in recent times have
been applied in ideologically slanted ways that are hostile to
considerations of legislative purpose or intent. That, too, is a
dimension of canon usage on which Justice Jackson offers some
historical perspective. 458 There are deep-seated tensions between the

457. S.E.C. v.

C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943).
458. See id. at 350 n.7 (observing that the preface to Sutherland's first edition on statutory
construction, published in 1890, scorned the legislative enterprise as interfering with the law's
"process of... intelligent judicial administration," and noting the modest progress made by the
third edition (published in 1943) which "reflect[ed] the growing acceptance of statutes as a
creative element in the law rather than . . . as 'legislative interference' ") (internal citations
omitted).
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canons and legislative history, on this Court as in earlier times. In a
subsequent article, we hope to examine the Court's use of legislative
history as a resource during the extended period of our dataset.
In the end, the canons are only one of many interpretive tools
available to judges engaged in the deliberative process. Whether they
serve as a form of neutral reasoning depends both on how they are
used in a range of settings and on how they are understood to have
been applied by the Court's various audiences - lower courts,
lawyers, scholars, and the attentive segments of the public. Our
showing, that the Court's reliance on canon-based reasoning can seem
plausible and "objective" under one set of conditions, unpredictable
and inconsistent in a second setting, and strategic or ideologically
driven in a third, offers a cautionary message for proponents of any
particular approach to judicial reasoning. While the canons may be
situationally useful as an interpretive resource, they should hardly be
esteemed as a first among equals.
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Appendix:
Differing Types of Reliance on Language Canons

In Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.,1 the Court held that
under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal
Act), 2 the Commissioner of Social Security was barred from assigning
retired miners to the direct successors in interest of out-of-business
coal mine operators. Writing for six members of the Court, Justice
Thomas concluded that the Coal Act unambiguously prohibited the
assignment of responsibility for insurance premiums that the
Commissioner had made. Justice Thomas relied primarily on the
statutory language itself; the Act listed three categories of "related
person" to which the disputed retirees could be assigned, and this
3
successor corporation did not fall into any of those categories.
Justice Thomas then relied on the expressio unius canon for
additional support. He noted that because Congress had explicitly
provided for successor liability in two other sections of the Coal Act,
neither of which applied to this factual setting, Congress's failure to do
4
so in the section being litigated precluded any inference of liability.
The Commissioner and the dissenting Justices relied on floor
statements from two key Senate sponsors stating the Senators'
understanding that the definition of "related person" was meant to be
broad enough to encompass successors like the one in Barnhart.5 The
Commissioner and the dissenters also contended that a less literal
reading of "related person" would support Congress's underlying
purpose of identifying those persons (such as direct successors to a
6
collective bargaining agreement) most responsible for plan liabilities.
Justice Thomas considered these legislative history and purpose
arguments, but he found them unavailing in the face of clear statutory
7
text.
In Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co.8 the Court unanimously ruled that the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP") in the Department of
Labor lacked standing to appeal a decision by the Department's
Benefits Review Board ("BRB") which was adverse to an injured
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

534 U.S. 438 (2002).
26 U.S.C. § 9701 et seq. (2000).
See Barnhart,534 U.S. at 451-52.
Id. at 452-54.
Id. at 465-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 464-65, 467.
Id. at 456-62.
514 U.S. 122 (1995).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:1

employee claimant. The claim arose under the Longshoremen and
Harborworkers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), and the Secretary of
Labor had delegated all administrative responsibilities under that Act
to OWCP. Writing for eight members, Justice Scalia focused on the
language of the text that allowed appeals from a BRB order by "any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by" the order. 9 He emphasized
that the phrase "person adversely affected or aggrieved" was a term of
art dating back to New Deal statutory drafting, and that the phrase
had nowhere else been construed by a court to include an agency in its
regulatory or policymaking capacity. 10
Justice Scalia then invoked linguistic comparisons to other
sections of the U.S. Code. He noted that Congress in a number of
federal statutes had explicitly conferred standing on a federal agency
acting in its governmental capacity, and he determined that "the
LHWCA's silence regarding the Secretary's ability to take an appeal is
significant when laid beside [those] other provisions of law."" Justice
Scalia went on to reject the OWCP's argument that the Court should
reason by analogy to the similarly administered Black Lung Benefits
Act, which does confer party status on the Secretary. For Justice
Scalia, it was precisely the linguistic difference on this matter between
12
LHWCA and the Black Lung statute that provided reassurance.
The opinions from Justices Stevens and Blackmun also make
use of language canons, but the framework in which they are applied
is rather different.
In Crandon v. United States, 3 the Court
unanimously held that a federal law, criminalizing a government
employee's acceptance of supplemental compensation for his
government service, did not apply to a severance payment made by
the employee's private employer before the recipient became a
government employee. Justice Stevens's majority opinion initially
observed that, although awkwardly drafted, the literal text of Section
9.
33 U.S.C. § 921(c).
10. Newport News, 514 U.S. at 126-28.
11. Id. at 129. Although the form of this argument ("Congress knows how to confer agency
standing, so we should infer it chose not to do so here") is quite similar to expressio unius,
Scalia's use of interstatutory linguistic comparisons may make in pari materia the more apt
canon heading. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 221-25 (2000) (discussing Justice Scalia's use of this technique).
12. Newport News, 514 U.S. at 135. Justice Ginsburg, who concurred in the judgment,
observed that the Court's decision had "the practical effect" of imposing a "disparity" in the
operation of two compensatory schemes-LHWCA and the Black Lung statute-that Congress
had intended should work in the same way. Id. at 136. She went through a detailed review of
LHWCA amendments over the years to support her view that Congress never meant to create
the disharmony in administration imposed by the Court here, but added that it was up to
Congress to correct what was obviously an oversight. Id. at 136-42.
13. 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
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209(a) (the conflict of interest provision at issue) supported the Court's
conclusion. But writing for six members, Justice Stevens recognized
that before 1962, the disputed provision had been unambiguously
limited to individuals who were already government officials or
employees. 14 In response, he relied at some length on the legislative
history accompanying the 1962 revision to conclude that elimination of
the unambiguous language had not been intended to broaden the Act's
coverage.15
After his legislative history analysis, Justice Stevens made use
of expressio unius and the Whole Act Rule. He noted that Congress in
two other 1962 revisions to the same statute (Sections 201 and 203)
had inserted unambiguous language to cover pre-employment
payments, suggesting the absence of such language in Section 209(a)
was deliberate. 16 In addition, two companion provisions to Section
209(a) (Sections 209(b) and (c), also added in 1962) plainly focus only
on payments to employees, and the majority suggested that the scope
of Section 209(a) should be harmonized with that approach. 17 Finally,
Justice Stevens relied on legislative purpose, the rule of lenity, and
18
agency deference to help justify the result reached by the Court.
In Loeffler v. Frank,'9 the Court ruled that an award of
prejudgment interest could be made in a successful Title VII lawsuit
brought against the U.S. Postal Service. Justice Blackmun relied
heavily on the Court's precedents interpreting the 1970 Postal
Reorganization Act. Writing for five members, he held that in
empowering the newly created Postal Service to "sue and be sued,"
Congress in 1970 had wanted Postal Service liability to be the same as
that of any other commercial enterprise.2 0 The majority further noted
the Court's prior decisions that this "sue and be sued" language could
serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity from awards of interest that
21
are incidental to the lawsuit itself.

14. Id. at 162.
15. Id. at 162-64.
16. Id. at 163-64.
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id. at 166-68 (legislative purpose); id. at 168 (substantive canon on lenity); id. at 164
(deference to Attorney General's contemporaneous opinion). It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia,
in an opinion concurring in the judgment (joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy), made more
elaborate use of the same language canons, and also relied on the dictionary definition of
"salary," while eschewing reliance on legislative history or agency deference. Id. at 168-82.
19. 486 U.S. 549 (1988).
20. Id. at 554-56 (relying heavily on Franchise Tax Bd. of Calif. v. USPS, 467 U.S. 512
(1984)).
21. Id. at 555.
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Justice Blackmun's language canon reliance came as he
considered the argument that Congress in 1970 had meant for the
"sue and be sued clause" to be construed narrowly with respect to
interest awards. Blackmun reasoned that because Congress had
included specific restrictions on the operation of the clause in several
other provisions of the Act that did not cover interest payments, "the
natural inference" was not to imply a restriction as regards such
payments. 22 Justice Blackmun also made use of legislative history,
legislative purpose, and substantive canons to support the Court's
23
decision.

22. Id. at 557.
23. Id. at 561-62 (legislative history); id. at 556-57 (legislative purpose); id. at 554-55
(substantive canon that "sue or be sued" provisos shall be liberally construed as sovereign
immunity waivers in the commercial arena). Justice White's dissent (joined by Justice O'Connor
and Chief Justice Burger) relied on the appellate court opinion below, which had reasoned that
the Supreme Court precedents precluded prejudgment interest in this setting. Id. at 566.
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This Article explores the jurisprudential and practical
feasibility of a 'preventive" regime of criminal justice, based on
assessments of dangerousnessand the provision of treatment designed
to reduce it .Defense of a purely preventive regime has been rare in the
legal literature since the 1960s, when just deserts philosophy became
popular and preventive approaches fell into disrepute. The case for
a preventive regime nonetheless deserves serious consideration in
the twenty-first century, as an increasing number of jurisdictions
adopt harsh determinate sentencing based on desert principles,
and in
the wake of the American Law Institute's recent
announcement that its planned revision of the Model Penal Code
will forsake the original Code's focus on reform of prisoners and
instead endorse a
just
deserts
approach
to
sentencing.
The Article first looks at jurisprudential objections to a
prevention regime, which all center on its perceived failure to do
'justice." It contends that such a regime would neither slight human
dignity nor undermine the general deterrence and character-shaping
goals of the criminal law. The second part examines concerns about the
feasibility of a preventive system, including questions about the
accuracy of predictions, the efficacy of treatment, and the costs of
a reform-oriented justice system. It concludes that these concerns
are overstated, and in any event are less serious than the practical
problems that afflict the punishment model. The third part
describes one further reason for favoring prevention over traditional
punishment: a preventive regime is much better at assimilating the
proliferation of scientific findings that call into question humans'
ability to control their actions, which is the central premise of a
punishment system based on desert.
The view taken in this Article is exploratory, however. For a
number of reasons, legal and sociological, one might be ambivalent
about instituting a full-blown preventive regime, at least in the
immediate future. Accordingly, the conclusion to the Article suggests a

transitional compromise, which maintains culpability as the
threshold for government intervention, and reserves application of
the preventive model for disposition, in what amounts to a modern
version of indeterminatesentencing.

